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2Abstract
Article 1, common to the Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Article 1(1) of
Additional Protocols I and III to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 and 2005 respectively,
state that ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect’ for the
Conventions and Protocols ‘in all circumstances’ (collectively Common Article 1). This
thesis considers the nature and scope of the obligation found in Common Article 1. Common
Article 1 has two components: the obligation to respect international humanitarian law (IHL);
and the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. The obligation to respect IHL requires the good
faith implementation of the provisions of IHL by the High Contracting Parties. The
obligation to ensure respect for IHL is concerned with states actions in respect of violations,
or potential violations of IHL, by parties to a conflict. That is, third party states must exercise
due diligence in relation to violations or potential violations of IHL by parties to a conflict.
The thesis supports the view that the scope of this obligation is one that is relative to the
capacity and influence of a state and that it should be seen as the source of an opportunity for
states to provide strong support for humanitarian outcomes.
The thesis considers how Australia has approached one aspect of IHL - namely weapons law
- in recent history.  It notes that Australia has both undermined Common Article 1 in its
approach (cluster munitions and nuclear weapons prohibitions are used as examples) and
ignored Common Article 1 in its approach (the Arms Trade Treaty and new weapons
technologies are used as examples). The thesis proposes that Australia give greater
consideration to Common Article 1 when approaching weapons law, so as not to breach its
obligation under Common Article 1 and to be a nation with credibility and influence in this
field. Australia must work to fully implement the provisions of IHL in good faith and,
because it has significant capacity in terms of resources, where it has influence over other
states and/or non-state actors it must use this influence in support of Common Article 1.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to better understand the nature and scope of the obligation to respect
and ensure respect for IHL and to practically link this obligation to its application to a part of
IHL - namely weapons law. The aim of this thesis is also to explore the ways in which
Australia has engaged with Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, in the context of
its approach to recent weapons law negotiations, and to investigate whether Australia should
give greater consideration to Common Article 1 when approaching weapons law. Chapter one
provides an introduction to the topic of the thesis. It also explains the significance of the
thesis and sets out the objectives, research questions, methodology and structure of the thesis.
1. Topic
Article 1, common to the Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 19491 (Four Geneva
Conventions) and Article 1(1) of Additional Protocols I and III to the Geneva Conventions of
1977 and 20052 (AP I and AP III) respectively, provide that ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and ensure respect’ for the Conventions and Protocols ‘in all
circumstances’ (collectively Common Article 1). This thesis considers the nature and scope
of the obligation found in Common Article 1. Common Article 1 has two components: the
obligation to respect international humanitarian law (IHL); and the obligation to ensure
respect for IHL. The obligation to respect IHL requires the good faith implementation of the
provisions of IHL by the High Contracting Parties.3 The obligation to ensure respect for IHL
is concerned with their actions in respect of violations, or potential violations of IHL, by
parties to a conflict. That is, third party states4 must exercise due diligence in relation to
violations or potential violations of IHL by parties to the conflict. The thesis supports the
  
1 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August
1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force
21 October 1950).  
2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978); Protocol
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional
Distinctive Emblem, 8 December 2005, 2404 UNTS 261 (entered into force 14 January 2007).  
3 The Four Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified and as such the obligations of the High
Contracting Parties are the obligations of all states.  The term states will be used hereafter.
4 In IHL this term is used to describe states which are not parties to the conflict (rather than states which are not
party to a particular treaty).
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view that the scope of this obligation is one that is relative to the capacity and influence of a
state and that it should be seen as the source of an opportunity for states to provide strong
support for humanitarian5 outcomes.
The thesis considers how Australia has approached one aspect of IHL – namely weapons law
- in recent history.  It notes that Australia has both undermined Common Article 1 in its
approach to some issues (using the examples of cluster munitions and nuclear weapons
prohibitions) and ignored Common Article 1 in its approach to other issues (using the
examples of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and new weapons technologies). The thesis
proposes that Australia give greater consideration to Common Article 1 when approaching
weapons law, so as not to breach its obligation under Common Article 1 and to be a nation
with credibility and influence in this field. Australia must work to fully implement the
provisions of IHL in good faith and, because it has significant capacity in terms of resources,
where it has influence over other states and/or non-state actors it must use this influence in
support of Common Article 1.
2. Background
2.1 The Four Geneva Conventions and Common Article 1
The Four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols6 form the central tenets of IHL.
These rules establish the minimum standards applicable to the conduct of armed conflicts.
Regardless of the legality or otherwise of the use of armed force, or the reasons for it, they
seek to protect those who are not, or who are no longer taking part in the hostilities. The
wounded and sick, the shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians are protected. Military
personnel, while able to be targeted by those complying with the rules, are also protected
against unnecessary suffering.7
  
5 Being the alleviation of human suffering.  
6 See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December
1978).
7 See ICRC, What is international humanitarian law (31 July 2004) ICRC
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-international-humanitarian-law#.VO_LyU101aR>; See generally
Jonathan Crowe and Kylie Weston-Scheuber, Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar,
2013); Gretchen Kewley, Even Wars Have Limits: The Law of Armed Conflict (Australian Red Cross, 2nd ed,
1993).
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IHL is a significant body of law. All States have agreed to be bound by the Four Geneva
Conventions, and more than two-thirds by AP I and Additional Protocol II (AP II).8  IHL is
enshrined in traditions of warfare in cultures and religions across the world.9 The principles
are generally very basic and they are ones that often serve military interests. Indeed no State
would have signed the Four Geneva Conventions had they been an impediment to the
exercise of the right of self-defence enshrined in article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations. The principle of distinction for example, requiring warring parties to target only
military objectives and to spare civilians and civilian objects,10 is reflective of military
principles of economy of effort11 which require that military resources are directed towards
the targets which will most assist the war effort.  
IHL is also vitally important for humanity. Gilbert,12 in writing the foreword for a book by
Durham and McCormack,13 paraphrased HG Wells (‘[h]istory is more and more a race
between education and catastrophe’) writing,  ‘[h]istory … is more and more a race between
the increasingly terminal disaster of war and the effective realisation of IHL’.14 This 1999
summation is an apt one; sadly, 16 years later, IHL only has more challenges facing it today.  
Unlike many areas of international law where most discussion focuses on the state as the
subject of the law15, most IHL discussions are concerned with the actions of individuals –
whether they be acting themselves or in command of others. IHL provides for both individual
and command responsibility for serious violations of the law and customs of war, more
commonly known as war crimes. There are, however, also a number of obligations on states
which derive from IHL. Chief among them is the obligation to respect and ensure respect for
  
8 ICRC, States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 13-
Apr-2015 (6 August 2015) ICRC <https://www.icrc.org/IHL>
9 Helen Durham and Eve Massingham, ‘Moving from the mechanics of accountability to a culture of
accountability’ in Petrovic, J (ed) Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Essays in
Honour of Tim McCormack, (Routledge, 2015) 276-277.
10 AP I art 48.
11 Economy of effort is the prudent allocation and application of only those resources needed to achieve the
desired results. …Economy of effort maximises the contribution of resources to the achievement or the
maintenance of the aim:  Australian Defence Doctrine, ‘Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine’ (3rd ed,
2012, Defence Publishing Service Canberra), [23].
12 Then Vice Chancellor of the University of Melbourne.
13 Dr Helen Durham is the Director of International Law and Policy for the ICRC. She was the first women,
first Australian and youngest person to ever to be appointed to this position in July 2014. Professor Tim
McCormack is, among other appointments, the Special Advisor on IHL to the Prosecutor of the ICC.
14 Tim McCormack and Helen Durham (eds), The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International
Humanitarian Law (Kluwer Law International,1999) xiii.  
15 See Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005, 2nd ed) 3.
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the Four Geneva Conventions and APs I and III. Pursuant to Common Article 1 ‘[t]he High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect’ for the Conventions and
Protocols ‘in all circumstances’. Customary international law further establishes that states
have an obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL in both international and non-
international armed conflicts, regardless of the status of their signature and/or ratification of
particular treaties.16  
The obligation to respect and ensure respect for the provisions of IHL is a core legal
obligation of every country in the world.  Whilst widely cited in many contexts, the
interpretation of the Common Article 1 obligation has been the subject of some debate.  It
was recently described as ‘being beset by uncertainty’ and that there is ‘a need to elucidate
the extent of this obligation’.17  This thesis provides an examination of this obligation, with
particular emphasis on Australia’s record of respecting and ensuring respect for the Four
Geneva Conventions and APs I and III, and IHL more broadly, in relation to weapons.
2.2 Justifications for focusing on weapons law
In addition to the protections enshrined in IHL mentioned above, these rules also place
restrictions on the means and methods of conducting warfare, and in particular, on the types
of weapons that can be employed by warring parties. While not specifically naming weapons
or categories of weapons, AP I to the Geneva Conventions notes that ‘methods or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective’ are prohibited.18 Further,
‘weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering’ and those ‘methods or means of warfare which are intended,
or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment’ are prohibited.19  As such, the means and methods of warfare selected by a
party to a conflict play a significant role in whether or not that party is able to respect IHL.
  
16 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law
Volume 1: Rules, (ICRC, 2005) (hereinafter ICRC Customary Law Study) rule 139. This is discussed further
below.
17 Knut Dormann and Jose Serralvo, ‘Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the obligation to
prevent international humanitarian law violations’ International Review of the Red Cross First View Articles
(CUP, 30 January 2015)  3.
18 AP I art 51(4).
19 AP I art 35.
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By virtue of these provisions many weapons are unable to be used in armed conflict and other
weapons have their use restricted to particular targeting situations. However, in addition,
since the late 19th century a number of weapons-specific legal frameworks have been
developed to add to the limitations on weapons use and to add clarity on their use vis-à-vis
the principle of IHL. These treaties have also had the added benefit of going beyond IHL to
provide for an arms control element.20 That is, they not only prohibit use but also include
prohibitions on production, acquisition, stockpiling and transfer of the weapons. Weapons
have been selected as the case study focus to conduct this analysis because a country’s choice
of weapon is central to the ability of its armed personnel to comply with the fundamental
principles of IHL (provided that the lawful weapon is then also used in a lawful manner).  
This connection has been made particularly clear in recent times. In 2003, the States Party to
the Four Geneva Conventions adopted Final Goal 2.3 of the 28th International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent which directly linked Common Article 1 to controls on
weapons.21 In February 2014, Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Mexico and Chair of the Second Conference on the Humanitarian Consequences of
Nuclear Weapons, spoke about the need to conclude a legally binding instrument prohibiting
the use of nuclear weapons. He noted ‘[i]n our view, this is consistent with our obligations
under international law, including those derived from the NPT as well as from Common
Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions’.22 A recent article in the International Review of the
Red Cross has also made strong linkages between Common Article 1 and the ATT.23  
2.3 Selection of case studies topics  
The use of weapons case studies has enabled an original and contemporary assessment of one
way in which a State Party, specifically Australia, approaches compliance with broader IHL
  
20 See also Tim McCormack, ‘The Use of Force’ in Sam Blay, Ryszard Piotrowicz & B Martin Tsamenyi (eds),
Public International Law: an Australian Perspective (Oxford University Press, 1997) 223, 249.
21 ‘Final Goal 2.3 - Reduce the human suffering resulting from the uncontrolled availability and misuse of
weapons. In recognition of States’ obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law,
controls on the availability of weapons are strengthened – in particular on small arms, light weapons and their
ammunition – so that weapons do not end up in the hands of those who may be expected to use them to violate
international humanitarian law.’  Red Cross Red Crescent, International Conference on the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Declaration, Agenda for Humanitarian Action, Resolutions (28th Conference, Geneva, 2-6 December
2003).
22 Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, ‘Chair’s Summary’ (Speech delivered at the Second Conference on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, Nayarit, Mexico, 14 February 2014).
23 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 17.
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obligations.  The case study topics - namely cluster munitions, nuclear weapons, the ATT and
new weapons technologies - have been selected for three reasons.
The first reason is their currency. The Cluster Munitions Convention (discussed in chapter
three) and the ATT (discussed in chapter five) are the most recently concluded major
international agreements pertaining to weapons law while nuclear weapons (discussed in
chapter four) and new weapons technologies (discussed in chapter six) are the subject of
current and ongoing discussion at the international level. Whilst a historical analysis could
also be of some value and may be the subject of future work, the current approach to
weapons law by Australia is the most telling indication of the current influence of Common
Article 1 on Australia with regards to weapons law.
The second reason is that each of these case studies provides evidence of fundamental change
in the global thinking about arms to have humanitarian security as a central element.24  The
Cluster Munitions Convention (discussed in chapter four) was the culmination of work dating
back to the 1960s and really cemented the focus of weapons law as being that of addressing
issues of human impact (rather than military utility).25 The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear
Weapons project26 (discussed in chapter five) demonstrates the coming of age of a
fundamental shift in thinking about nuclear weapons from a Cold War focus on the strategic
interests of arms control to a focus on humanitarian consequences and on prohibition.  The
ATT (discussed in chapter six), which traces its trajectory back as far as the 1870s, is a shift
in thinking from limiting the use of these weapons (under IHL - and other legal frameworks
when they are being used outside of the context of an armed conflict), to limiting the
proliferation of them and will have significant humanitarian benefits. New weapons
technologies (discussed in chapter seven) are significant because, while new technologies
have always been emerging, the rapid pace of technological development is challenging this
  
24 Denise Garcia, ‘Humanitarian security regimes’ (2015) 91 (1) International Affairs 55.  Garcia notes that
‘chief goals of humanitarian security regimes are to reduce human suffering, to prohibit harm and to protect
victims’.  
25 John Borrie, Unacceptable Harm: A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won, (UN
Institute for Disarmament Research, 2009), 313.  Borrie notes (at 320) the inclusion of individuals affected by
cluster munitions as part of a ‘collective reframing of cluster munitions and the humanitarian responses to
them’.
26 ‘This project aims to challenge the way in which the nuclear weapons issue is currently framed by
highlighting the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament. The project brings together a range of diverse
opinions, engaging both academics and humanitarian ('boots-on-the-ground') workers from developing countries
to participate and contribute their specialized knowledge.’ Chatham House, Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons, 2014 <http://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/international-security-department/humanitarian-
impact-nuclear-weapons-project#>.  
18
field in ways not seen before – and leading to new questions relating to attribution of
responsibility and ethical considerations about outsourcing warfare to robots.  
The third reason is that these case studies represent a cross section of approaches taken by
Australia to both prohibition treaties and regulatory treaties, as will be seen in the chapters
which follow.  In short, the case studies demonstrate a case where Australia has been
beholden to concerns about interoperability with the United States (cluster munitions), a case
where Australia has been reluctant to join the challengers to the status quo (nuclear weapons)
and a case where Australia has sought to be a leader (ATT). The new weapons technologies
discussion then demonstrates potential for the future in terms of Australia’s approach and
current thinking.  
2.4 Selection of Australia
A country specific analysis (in this work using Australia) will add content to the Common
Article 1 obligation (including its scope and the methods by which compliance might be
achieved), as well as providing a critique of one country’s record. Australia is a suitable study
for this work by virtue of its influence in the international community on weapons related
issues and the various approaches it has taken. Australia is generally accepted to have
‘middle power’ status.27 While arguments can be made that there is little influence that
middle powers such as Australia can have, Beeson notes that middle powers ‘can make
material and ideational choices that have a powerful impact on their own welfare and help to
legitimate the extant international order’.28 Indeed, Beeson specifically mentions nuclear
disarmament and also defence spending as areas where a middle power such as Australia,
through its actions is having global reach.29 McCormack notes that ‘Australia has taken a
leading role in the promotion of global multilateral arms controls and disarmament
  
27 Andrew Carr, ‘Is Australia a middle power?’ A systemic impact approach’ (2014) 68 (1) Australian Journal
of International Affairs 70, 70, 79-81. Carr defines middle power as being a state that has the defence capacity
to defence itself, ‘without great capacity for coercing others’ and the ability to shape parts of the international
system.  Carr references a number of studies citing Australia as a middle power and also adopts the view that it
is using his systemic impact approach. He also notes that ‘the Australian government’s claim to middle power
status is increasingly under threat, given the lack of recent demonstration of capacity to influence specific
elements of the international system’.
28 Mark Beeson, ‘Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy’ (2011)
65 (5) Australian Journal of International Affairs 563, 567. See also Tracy Slagter, ‘International Norm
Entrepreneurs: A Role for Middle Powers?’ (Paper presented at Annual Meeting of International Studies
Association, Montreal, 17-20 March 2004).
29 Beeson, above note 28, 567.  
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agreements’ and has credited Australian efforts as being ‘largely responsible for a successful
conclusion’ to the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).30  
Further, Australia does not appear to have given consideration to Common Article 1 in its
approach to weapons law. As such it is hoped that this thesis is of value to the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and
the Commonwealth Attorney- General’s Department in demonstrating the significance and
potential value of this provision. As a middle power that has taken a leading role in weapons
law Australia should be looking to frame discussions and regulations in terms of Common
Article 1. Australia has the wealth and resources, capacity to influence, culture of defence
force training and legal expertise to take this leading role.
A broader study of approaches taken, either by Australia, or by other States Party, may
suitably form the content of some further work to build on the understanding of the practical
implications of Common Article 1 in other areas including those aspects of the Geneva
Conventions relating to the protection of those not, or no longer, taking part in hostilities.
3. Significance
This thesis is significant because it considers the practical application of this seminal and
unique provision of IHL, namely Common Article 1. In doing so the thesis develops the body
of literature on Common Article 1 and explores the nature and scope of this provision. The
body of work on Common Article 1 is limited with only a few key references in case law and
a few key articles in the literature. With the exception of Focarreli’s analysis31 and a recent
article by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)32 much of this analysis is
dated.
This thesis is also significant because no study has looked at Common Article 1 from a
weapons law perspective. As such it fills a gap in the literature. However, despite the lack of
common understanding as to its meaning in the literature, increasingly reference is being
  
30 Tim McCormack, The Use of Force, above note 20, 250.
31 Carlo Focarelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?’ (2010) 21(1) The
European Journal of International Law 125.
32 Dormann and  Serralvo, above note 17.
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made in the international community to Common Article 133 and similar obligations34 in the
context of weapons law. The thesis demonstrates how Australia has approached weapons law
in recent negotiations. It is thereby hoped that this thesis will contribute to the literature
aimed at a better understanding of Common Article 1 and aimed at promoting opportunities
for better utilising Common Article 1 for humanitarian ends in the weapons law space.
4. Aim and objectives
The aim of this thesis is to better understand the nature and scope of the obligation to respect
and ensure respect for IHL and to practically link this obligation to its application to a part of
IHL - namely weapons law. The aim of this thesis is also to explore the ways in which
Australia has engaged with Common Article 1 in the context of its approach to recent
weapons law negotiations and to investigate whether Australia should give greater
consideration to Common Article 1 when approaching weapons law.
The objectives of this thesis are:
1. To review the case law and literature on the meaning of the obligation to respect and
ensure respect for IHL pursuant to Common Article 1
2. To explore the nature and value of the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL
pursuant to Common Article 1
3. To consider the approach taken by Australian in recent history to weapons law
negotiations
4. To determine the level of deference given by Australia to the obligation to respect and
ensure respect for IHL in the weapons law context
5. To examine whether Australia should give greater consideration to Common Article 1
when approaching weapons law, so as not to breach its obligation under Common
Article 1 and to remain a nation with credibility and influence in this space.  
  
33 Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, above note 22.
34 Arms Trade Treaty, opened for signature 3 June 2013, (entered into force 24 December 2014) art 7.
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5. Research Questions
The research questions guiding this thesis are as follows:
1. What is the nature of the obligation to respect and ensure respect pursuant to Common
Article 1?
2. What constitutes respecting and ensuring respect pursuant to Common Article 1 when
it comes to the regulation of weapons for use in armed conflict?
3. What approach has Australia taken to the regulation of weapons by international law?
4. Specifically, what approach has Australian taken to the regulation of cluster munitions,
nuclear weapons, the ATT and new weapons technologies?
5. What conclusions can be reached from this evaluation regarding the approach of
Australia to compliance with the obligation to respect and ensure respect pursuant to
Common Article 1?
6. Methodology
The methodology of this thesis is doctrinal research. Doctrinal research is defined by the
1987 Pearce Committee looking into Commonwealth Tertiary Education as ‘[r]esearch which
provides a systematic exposition of the rules covering a particular legal category, analyses the
relationship between the rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps predicts future
developments’.35  Hutchinson notes that the doctrinal method involves two parts. First,
finding the law and second interpreting and analysing the law.36
This thesis presents research into the law of both Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions and into various areas of weapons law, both in the context of international law
and Australian domestic law. The research draws on primary and secondary materials,
including international treaty and customary law, Australian domestic legislation,
government policy documents and statements (including Department of Defence (DOD)
materials), international conference preparatory materials and reports, various UN documents
including Security Council resolutions and relevant academic and professional literature in
  
35 Cited in Terry Hutchinson, Research and writing in law (3rd ed, 2010, Thomson Reuters) 7.
36 Ibid.
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order both to identify legal practice and legal principles, and to draw conclusions on
Common Article 1 and Australia’s approach to the weapons laws the subject of this thesis.
The thesis incorporates global weapons law developments and Australian legislative and
policy changes to 17 December 2015.
7. Thesis structure
Chapter one provides an introduction to the topic of the thesis. It also explains the
significance of the thesis and sets out the objectives, research questions, methodology and
structure of the thesis.
Chapter two reviews literature on Common Article 1, including its drafting history. It
answers the question what is the nature of the obligation to respect and ensure respect
pursuant to Common Article 1? It notes that, despite some uncertainty surrounding the
meaning of Common Article 1 over the years, today, it is understood as constituting a clear
legal obligation. The scope of this obligation is articulated in part (respect) by other
provisions of the Geneva Conventions themselves and the requirement to implement these
provisions in good faith, and in part (ensure respect) determined by the capacity and
influence of a state to ensure respect by a third state in a particular circumstance. The chapter
examines the application of the principles of good faith and due diligence obligation to the
interpretation of the scope of Common Article 1. It argues that Common Article 1 has an
important role to play, and that states should view it as the source of an obligation to act to
assist victims of IHL violations.  
Chapter three considers the overarching concepts and processes that contribute to a country
respecting and ensuring respect for IHL with regards to weapons law with particular
reference to Australia. It answers the question what constitutes respecting and ensuring
respect pursuant to Common Article 1 when regulating of weapons for use in armed conflict?
This chapter outlines Australia’s record of adopting weapons law treaties, its implementation
of the obligation pursuant to article 36 of AP I to review new weapons technologies in light
of their compatibility with the rules of IHL, its approach to weapons law as evidenced in
military training and military manuals and policy and the import and export control regimes
in Australia on weapons and weapons development materials.
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Chapter four provides an overview of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) 37 which
was adopted in 2008 and grounded in the rules of IHL, in particular, the principle of
distinction. It considers the approach taken by Australia to the negotiation of the CCM, and
its implementation by Australia. It answers the questions what approach has Australia taken
to the regulation of cluster munitions by international law and what conclusions can be
reached from this evaluation regarding the approach of Australia to compliance with the
obligation to respect and ensure respect pursuant to Common Article 1? It argues that at least
most of the types of cluster munitions now prohibited by the Convention are those that are
incompatible with IHL. As such Common Article 1 applies to states in respect of these
weapons. It notes that Common Article 1 has not featured in Australia’s approach to the
treaty to date. The chapter raises particular issues with Australia’s approach in light of the
Common Article 1 obligation. It argues that Australia has undermined Common Article 1 in
relation to cluster munitions by working to ensure that the CCM allows Australia to operate
with other forces using cluster munitions, even though the use of such weapons would violate
the principles of IHL.  
Chapter five provides an overview of the failure of humanity, to date, to eliminate nuclear
weapons, despite commitments outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It
notes the current international move towards a ban-treaty which would unequivocally
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The chapter adopts the view that the use of nuclear
weapons, as they are understood today, cannot comply with the principles of IHL and that, as
such, states would be taking a clear opportunity to comply with the obligation in Common
Article 1 through their positive progress towards a legally binding instrument clearly
prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.  It answers the questions what approach has Australia
taken to the regulation of nuclear weapons by international law and what conclusions can be
reached from this evaluation regarding the approach of Australia to compliance with the
obligation to respect and ensure respect pursuant to Common Article 1? It argues that
Australia is undermining efforts to unequivocally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, in
breach of its obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Australia must reconsider its
position on nuclear weapons in light of this obligation and, if it does so, it is well placed to
  
37 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008, 48 ILM 357 (entered into force 1 August 2010) Preamble
final paragraph.
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use its capacity to influence other states towards a position of respecting IHL with respect to
nuclear weapons.
Chapter six provides an overview of the newest international instrument regulating weapons,
namely the ATT, and its development. It considers the approach taken by Australia to the
negotiation of the ATT and its implementation by Australia. It answers the questions what
approach has Australia taken to the regulation of small arms and light weapons by
international law and what conclusions can be reached from this evaluation regarding the
approach of Australia to compliance with the obligation to respect and ensure respect
pursuant to Common Article 1? It notes that Common Article 1 has not featured in
Australia’s approach to the treaty to date, but that the treaty itself includes provisions (in
articles 6(3) and 7) which have strong links to Common Article 1. The real work with the
ATT begins now, in the early years of implementing the treaty. Australia has taken a leading
role in the negotiation and promotion of the treaty to date. Australia also has significant
capacity to assist other states to ensure respect for IHL. The ATT should be a vehicle for
Australia doing so.
Chapter seven provides an overview of the new weapons technologies which are currently
attracting attention from an IHL perspective. It considers the approach taken by IHL scholars
to each of these weapons concluding that the principles of IHL clearly apply to them, and it is
imperative that the principles of IHL are not compromised in the adoption of any new rules
pertaining to their use. It answers the questions what approach has Australia taken to the
regulation of these weapons  and what conclusions can be reached from this evaluation
regarding the approach of Australia to compliance with the obligation to respect and ensure
respect pursuant to Common Article 1? It notes Australia has released relatively little by way
of guidance as to its thinking on new weapons technologies, although Australian researchers
have shown great interest in this area. The chapter urges Australia to consider Common
Article 1 obligations to respect and ensure respect for IHL in relation to these weapons and
the development of legal frameworks around them going forward. By promoting the ability
of existing IHL principles to apply to new weapons technology, and promoting compliance
with Article 36 of AP I weapons review obligations, Australia can achieve this.
In the concluding chapter, Chapter eight, the analysis in Chapters two to seven is drawn on to
demonstrate the nature of the obligation to respect and ensure respect pursuant to Common
Article 1 and how the approach Australia has taken to the regulation of weapons by
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international law either ignores or undermines the scope of this obligation.  The conclusion
details the answers which have been determined to the research questions. Recommendations
for further work as well as limitations of the research are also outlined.  The thesis proposes
that Australia give greater consideration to Common Article 1 when approaching weapons
law, so as not to breach its obligation under Common Article 1 and to remain a nation with
credibility and influence in relation to IHL.
8. Preliminary points
8.1 Australia and international law
It is necessary to make a few observations about the implementation of international law
more generally in Australia’s domestic legal framework before delving to consider the
implementation of international legal obligations by Australia with respect to weapons law.
This material forms the backdrop to the more specialised discussions in all the subsequent
chapters.
Australia is a party to the Four Geneva Conventions by virtue of its signature of 4 January
1950 and its ratification on 14 October 1958.38Australia implemented its obligations as a
State Party into Australia law via the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth). Australia is a party
to AP I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 by virtue of its signature of 7 December 1978 and
its ratification on 21 June 1991.39 Australia is a party to AP III to the Geneva Conventions of
2005 by virtue of its signature of 8 March 2006 and its ratification on 15 July 2009.40 For
completeness, although AP II to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 does not include a
provision in the nature of Common Article 1, Australia is a party by virtue of its signature of
7 December 1978 and its ratification on 21 June 1991.41 Australia’s status regarding other
weapons law treaties is discussed further in Chapter two.
Cassese notes the existence of three ‘principal theoretical constructs’ regarding the
intersection of international law and domestic law,42 one theory being of the supremacy of
domestic law, one being of the primacy of international law (these both being monistic
  
38 ICRC, above note 7.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid
41 Ibid.
42 Cassese, above note 15, 213.
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conceptions) and the third being the dualist approach, whereby national legal systems
incorporate international law in order for it to have binding effect.43 The Australian legal
system is reflective of the third of these constructs. Triggs describes it as ‘axiomatic in
Australian law that a treaty to which it is a party has no direct application in domestic law in
the absence of implementing legislation’.44 While, as is noted below at 8.3, Australian’s are
entitled to assume that the Australian government will comply with its obligations under
international law, many different views have been expressed by courts in Australia regarding
the process of incorporating international obligations into domestic law. As recently as 2015
the High Court of Australia has reiterated the principle that international law is only able to
be applied by the Australian courts in so far as it is incorporated into domestic law.45 Keane J
noted ‘Australian courts are bound to apply Australian statute law even if that law should
violate a rule of international law’. 46
So how does international law become part of Australian law and therefore applicable before
Australian courts? The power of Australia to enter into international treaties has been
confirmed to be an executive power under Section 61 of the Constitution of Australia.47
(English history and its effect on common law is the main reason for this).48 However, as we
have just seen, this does not make these treaties part of Australian law. The power of the
Commonwealth parliament to pass legislation to implement the executive’s treaty
commitments into Australian law stems from the external affairs power in section 51 (xxix)
of the Constitution:
  
43 Ibid 213-5.
44 Gillian Triggs, ‘Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: A Quiet Revolution
in Australian Law’ (2003) 25(4) Sydney Law Review 507, 516.  
45 CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) 462 (per Keane J).
46 citing: Polites v The Commonwealth [1945] HCA 3; (1945) 70 CLR 60 at 69, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81; [1945] HCA
3; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen [1982] HCA 27; (1982) 153 CLR 168 at 204; [1982] HCA 27; Kartinyeri v The
Commonwealth [1998] HCA 22; (1998) 195 CLR 337 at 384 [97]; [1998] HCA 22. See also Hans Kelsen,
Principles of International Law (1952) 245 and Rosalie Balkin ‘International Law and domestic Law’ in Blay et
al (eds) Public International Law (2nd edition, OUP, 2005) 122-123 and 124-125 regarding the separation of
powers.
47 R v Burgess; Ex Parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608 per Latham CJ at 644; Polyukhovich v Commonwealth
[1991] HCA 32; (1991) 172 CLR 501, especially Mason CJ at 528; Balkin, above note 46, 134. See generally re
executive power Peter Gerangelos, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia: section 61 of the
Commonwealth Constitution, ‘Nationhood’ and the Future of the Prerogative’ (2012) 12 (1) Oxford University
Commonwealth Law Journal 97, 108; Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Looking at the Executive
Power through the High Court’s New Spectacles’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 253.
48 L Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (The Federation Press,5th edn, 2008) 358.
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The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
…
(xxix) external affairs;
… .49
The DFAT notes that ‘all treaties (except those the Government has decided are urgent or
sensitive) are tabled in both Houses of Parliament for at least 15 sitting days prior to binding
treaty action being taken’.50 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties considers the treaty.
This process, which is accompanied by a National Interest Analysis of the treaty, is,
ordinarily, put before parliament prior to the treaty being binding on Australia. 51 The process
of implementation follows, which often involves the parliament in considering and passing
legislation, for the treaty to become part of Australian law.
8.2 International and non-international armed conflicts and respect for the Geneva
Conventions or for international humanitarian law  
It is also necessary to make some comments about the application of IHL because, while a
number of provisions of IHL are applicable at all times52, the bulk of IHL is only applicable
during times of armed conflict (that is, when certain thresholds of conflict have been
reached). Different aspects of IHL may apply in certain circumstances depending on the
nature of the conflict and the legal frameworks (and sometimes policy frameworks) binding
on the parties involved. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has
held that,
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State.53
This is to be distinguished from a situation of violence that falls short of this threshold, such
as ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
  
49 Australian Constitution
50 Australian Government, Treaty making process <http://www.dfat.gov.au/international-
relations/treaties/treaty-making-process/Pages/treaty-making-process.aspx>.
51 Ibid.
52 Including many provisions discussed in this thesis such as Common Article 1, Article 36 of AP I and the
obligations to disseminate the texts of the Four Geneva Conventions and their APs.
53 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadi• (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (ICTY
Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995) [70]. See also Prosecutor v Kunarac, (Judgment) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber,
12 June 2002) [55]–[56].
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violence and other acts of a similar nature’54, which are specifically excluded from the
application of the laws of armed conflict.  
The Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and AP I thereto, apply in times of
international armed conflict. That is, when two or more states resort to armed force between
each other. Specifically, Common Article 2 of the Four Geneva Conventions provides that,
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation … even if
the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Article 3 of AP I notes that it applies ‘in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to
those Conventions’.
Common Article 3 extends a small part of the scope of the Four Geneva Conventions to
situations of armed conflicts not of an international character, and consequently Common
Article 1 to situations of armed conflicts not of an international character.55 Common Article
3 provides for minimum standards of treatment in all situations of armed conflict and
prohibits conduct such as torture, the taking of hostages and summary executions, as well as
requiring the care of the sick and wounded.56 It has been noted that, by virtue of Common
Article 3, the obligation to respect and ensure respect the subject of this thesis is applicable to
both states and organized armed groups.57  
The specific legal framework for non-international armed conflicts is provided for in AP II.
Non-international armed conflicts differ from ‘armed conflicts not of an international
character’ in that they are specifically identified, by AP II, as conflicts,
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
  
54 AP II art 1(2).
55 Crowe and Weston-Scheuber, above note 7, 150.
56 Common Article 3 (1).
57 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 17, 2.
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command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.58
AP II does not include a reference to respect and ensure respect. Further, Article 3(2) notes
that,
[n]othing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external
affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.
As such, reading the treaty law, it can be concluded that in times of international armed
conflict there is an obligation on States Party to the Geneva Conventions and AP I to respect
and ensure respect for the rules contained in those documents. However, the applicability of
this obligation to situations of non-international armed conflict, and to the field of IHL more
broadly is not so clear. Customary IHL has been held to take the obligation further than the
treaty text.
The ICRC Customary Law Study rule 139 provides that ‘[e]ach party to the conflict must
respect and ensure respect for IHL by its armed forces and other persons or groups acting in
fact on its instructions, or under its direction and control’. 59  It is also noted that case law, the
Security Council and some national military manuals and legislation extend this obligation to
ensuring that civilians also do not violate IHL.60 Rule 144 provides that ‘[s]tates may not
encourage violations of IHL by parties to an armed conflict. They must exert their influence,
to the degree possible, to stop violations of [IHL]’.61 The ICRC Customary Law Study notes
that ‘the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for [IHL] is found in numerous military
manuals’.
Further, it is clear from the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that, in so far
as the distinction between types of armed conflicts exists, it is immaterial to the application
of the customary law obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL.  The ICJ in Nicaragua,
after finding the existence of ‘an armed conflict which is “not of an international
  
58 AP II art 1.
59 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 16, rule 139.
60 Ibid, 496.
61 Ibid 509.
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character”’62, went on to find that the obligation ‘in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions, to “respect” the Conventions and even “to ensure respect” for them’ applies.63
As such, in this thesis the Common Article 1 obligation is discussed on the understanding
that it applies to all situations to which IHL applies, either by treaty or by custom.
8.3 The value of complying with Common Article 1
This thesis argues for the existence of a legal obligation under Common Article 1 and
encourages more to be done by Australia towards compliance with this legal obligation.  The
underlying principle behind making any argument that a legal obligation should be complied
with is the importance of the rule of law to our very way of life. Justification for why a nation
should comply with the rule of law is at least a thesis topic itself. It has been widely noted
that the rule of law does not have a universal definition.64 This thesis does not attempt to go
much beyond stating that because Common Article 1 imposes on Australia, as a State Party
to the Four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, a legal obligation (the
content of which is discussed in Chapter two) then Australia should comply with it. As was
noted by the High Court of Australia in Teoh,
ratification of a convention is a positive statement by the executive government of this
country to the world and to the Australian people that the executive government and
its agencies will act in accordance with the Convention.65
Further, it is clear that there is also the added value that comes with being, and being seen to
be, a good international citizen that attaches to compliance with this legal obligation. It is
clear that Australia prides itself on being a good international citizen and on respect for the
rule of law. This tradition, which is enshrined in the Australian Constitution66, is often cited
by leaders in both political and judicial life. Australian Herbert (Doc) Evatt who presided
over the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) when it adopted the Universal
  
62 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep [219]
63 Ibid [220].
64 See, eg. Kevin Lindgren, ‘The Rule of Law: its State of Health in Australia’ (Paper presented  
<http://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Lindgren-Rule-of-Law-Its-State-of-Health-in-
Australia-20121.pdf>.  
65 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353 per Mason CJ and Deane J at
365
66 But see Andrew Sykes, ‘The Rule of Law As An Australian Constitutional Promise’ (2002) 9 (1) Murdoch
University Electronic Law Journal< http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2002/2.html>.
31
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 is often remembered with great respect for his strong
belief in the rule of law.67 The Hon Murray Gleeson, then Chief Justice of Australia, quite
simply noted ‘public confidence demands that the rule of law be respected’.68 John Howard,
then Prime Minister of Australia noted ‘the strength and vitality of Australian democracy
rests on three great institutional pillars… [including] the rule of law upheld by an
independent and admirably incorruptible judiciary’.69 Debate exists from time to time in this
country as to Australia’s record of compliance with the rule of law. Former Prime Minister
Malcolm Fraser’s 2007 address noted that ‘[i]n the name of national security in the last seven
years, there has been increasing disregard for the Rule of Law’.70  However, that the rule of
law is a principle fundamental to our democracy is never in dispute.
Australia also expects compliance with the rule of law by other nations.71 The Attorney-
General’s Department declares ‘[w]e advance the rule of law internationally by actively
promoting adherence to the global rules-based system and helping to build effective
governance and stability in our region.’72 In announcing Australia’s new aid paradigm the
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced that ‘effective governance to help development
partners strengthen accountability, transparency and the rule of law’ as one of six core
priority areas for the Australian aid program.73 Further, promoting adherence to the rule of
law is also frequently cited by the ADF as a reason for its deployment. The ADF notes
‘[p]rinciples of democratic government, including a respect for the rule of law and human
  
67 George Williams, 'What would Evatt do?' (2011) 10(1) Evatt Journal http://evatt.org.au/papers/what-would-
evatt-do.html.
68 Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law’ (Speech delivered at Melbourne University Rule of Law
Series, 7 November 2001).
69 John Howard, ‘A sense of balance: the Australian Achievement in 2006’ (Speech delivered at the National
Press Club, Canberra, 25 January 2006).
70 Malcom Fraser, ‘Finding Security in Terrorism’s Shadow: The importance of the rule of law’ (Speech
delivered at The University of Melbourne, 25 October 2007).
71 Recently Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop is reported to have raised the rule of law with both Nauru
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72 Australian Government, ‘Rule of Law’, Attorney-General’s Department
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73 Julie Bishop, The new aid paradigm (Speech delivered at the National Press Club, Canberra, 18 June 2014).
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rights, as well as social equity and fairness, are important to all Australians’.74 Australia also
prides itself on a strong tradition of compliance with IHL.  Then Chief of the Defence Force,
Admiral Barrie, included compliance with the laws of armed conflict as one of the seven core
qualities of the ADF in his publication The Australia Approach to Warfare.75
In light of both these claims to compliance with legal frameworks, and the fact that Common
Article 1 is a legal obligation that Australia has agreed to be bound by, there is value in
Australia doing so.  However, this does still raise the question why should this cause be taken
up by Australia in the absence of any real capacity of the international community to enforce
compliance with Common Article 1. There is an increasing international acceptance of the
notion that the most serious violations of the laws and customs of war should induce those
states with capacity to ensure respect to do so (as evidenced by the Responsibility to Protect
notion and arguably international actions such as the UN Security Council response in Libya
in 201176). The international community remains a long way from achieving universal respect
for the Four Geneva Conventions, but states are now less able to stand by and do nothing in
the face of serious violations of international law than they were 20 years ago. However,
sadly for the victims of armed conflict, the obligation to take positive steps ‘in order to stop
severe violations’ of the Four Geneva Conventions is only actioned in some cases77 and states
can choose from a range of measures (as discussed further in chapter two) available to fulfil
this obligation – subject to their discretion and their ability to influence the violating state.78
In this sense Common Article 1 presents an opportunity for states to play a role as a force for
good in the international community in seeking to prevent violations of IHL from occurring,
both domestically and in relation to conflicts abroad. This means that, for well-resourced and
influential states, such as Australia, Common Article 1 can be seen as providing a basis for a
range of actions, both domestically and vis-à-vis other states, to respect and ensure respect
for IHL. Australia should embrace this and in doing so make a valuable contribution to
creating an international norm of effective IHL compliance.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND TO ENSURE
RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
Chapter two reviews literature on Common Article 1, including its drafting history. It
answers the question what is the nature of the obligation to respect and ensure respect
pursuant to Common Article 1? It notes that, despite some uncertainty surrounding the
meaning of Common Article 1 over the years, today it is understood as constituting a clear
legal obligation. The scope of this obligation is articulated in part (respect) by other
provisions of the Geneva Conventions themselves and the requirement to implement these
provisions in good faith, and in part (ensure respect) determined by the capacity and
influence of a state to ensure respect by a third state in a particular circumstance. The chapter
examines the application of the principles of good faith and due diligence obligation to the
interpretation of the scope of Common Article 1. It argues that Common Article 1 has an
important role to play, and that states should view it as the source of an obligation to act to
assist victims of IHL violations.  
1. Introduction
Common Article 1 provides that ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the […] Convention [and Protocol] in all circumstances’.1  This is a unique
provision in international law2 and its meaning and significance have been the subject of
some debate and evolution over the years. It has been called both ‘the nucleus for a system of
collective responsibility’3 and ‘highly problematic’.4  Common Article 1 has been proclaimed
  
1 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (hereinafter GC I); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (hereinafter GC II); Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21
October 1950) (hereinafter GC III); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (hereinafter GC IV); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter AP I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December
1978); Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an
Additional Distinctive Emblem (hereinafter AP III), 8 December 2005, 2404 UNTS 261 (entered into force 14
January 2007).
2 While the same wording is used in Article 38(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, that provision is
derivative from the IHL obligations in Common Article 1 in so far as it requires that ‘States parties undertake to
respect and to ensure respect for the rules of IHL applicable to them which are relevant to the child’. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 2 (entered into force 2 September 1990).
3 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions
revisited: Protecting collective interests’ (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67, 68.
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to have quasi-constitutional status like the Martens Clause5 and to have developed into
customary IHL.6
Debate has existed as to whether the intention behind Common Article 1 was to restate
existing principles of international law or create specific obligations.7  Focarelli has described
it as either ‘redundant’ or having ‘introduced a new concept into international law’.8  In 1999
Kalshoven wrote a comprehensive analysis of the provision. He described it as a ‘ripening
fruit’ that had emerged from a ‘tiny seed’ and noted the work of the ICRC in seeking to bring
this obligation to the attention of states.9 However, Kalshoven concluded Common Article 1
creates a moral obligation, rather than a legal one.10 Kalshoven suggested that it could be a
‘suitable “new millennium pledge”’ for the UN to adopt ‘a solemn moral undertaking to
respect and to ensure respect for [IHL].11 As recently as 2010 another comprehensive
analysis was undertaken by Focarelli. Focarelli also shies away from finding a specific legal
obligation. Focarelli notes concern over its ‘indeterminacy’12 and concludes Common Article
1 to be ‘a generic reminder of an obvious obligation to abide by the Geneva Conventions and
of the fact that all contracting states are expected to see to it that all others abide by [them]’.13
However, as outlined below, a number of factors point to a further evolution of Kalshoven’s
‘tiny seed’ since his article in 1999. These factors include the ICJ’s decision in the Wall
    
4 Carlo Focarelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?’ (2010) 21(1) The
European Journal of International Law 125, 171.
5 See Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, above note 3. Cf Focarelli, above note 4, 171.
6 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law –
Volume 1: Rules, (ICRC, 2005) (hereinafter ICRC Customary Law Study) rules 139, 144.
7 See generally, Theodor Meron,  ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 (2) American
Journal of International Law 348; Marco Sassoli, ‘State responsibility for violations of international
humanitarian law’ (2002) 846 International Review of the Red Cross 421.
8 Focarelli, above note 4, 132.
9 Frits Kalshoven, ‘The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to
Ripening Fruit’ (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3, 4, 60. See also Hans- Peter Gasser,
‘Chapter 2 Ensuring respect for the Geneva Conventions and Protocols: The role of third states and the United
Nations’ in Meyer, M (ed) (1993) Effecting Compliance: armed conflict and the new law (British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, London, Vol 2) 15, 48. Even those who dispute the legal basis for this, see
it as a moral obligation: ‘when it comes to reading into Article 1 any effect beyond the sphere of the state’s
internal affairs, it lies in adding to the state’s right as a Party to the Conventions to make other states respect
their terms, a moral incentive or ‘obligation’ to do so’.
10 Ibid. Moral rather than legal in the sense that it is not a primary obligation for which, in failing to implement
it, states can be held legally responsible.
11 Ibid 61.
12 Focarelli, above note 4, 170.  
13 Ibid.
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Advisory Opinion14, Common Article 1’s citation as a catalyst for a nuclear weapons
prohibition15, the ICRC’s continued push for recognition of the role of the Common Article 1
obligation16 and the general move by the international community towards accountability of
both states and individuals for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes as
evidenced by the development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the findings of the
ICJ in the Bosnia Genocide case17 and the establishment of the International Criminal Court
(ICC).  Further, the concern over Focarelli’s ‘indeterminacy’ of Common Article 1 is not
determinative of it not having a legal status. Rarely has an international obligation been held
to be too vague to create legal obligations.18  Despite some uncertainty surrounding the
meaning of Common Article 1 over the years, it now seems settled that states have a number
of obligations that stem, at least in part, from Common Article 1.19
This chapter explores the meaning of this provision to arrive at the conclusion that a specific
legal obligation20 exists, both within a state or on a territory, and vis-à-vis third party states21
or other actors, to respect and ensure respect for IHL. The obligation to respect IHL requires
the good faith implementation of the provisions of IHL by states. Part two of this chapter
considers the interpretation of the respect component of Common Article 1. However, while
  
14 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion)
[2004] ICJ Rep 136 [158]. Note that this decision pre-dates Focarelli’s analysis. Focarelli discusses the Wall
Advisory Opinion: Focarelli, above note 4, 168-9.
15 Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, ‘Chair’s Summary’ (Speech delivered at the Second Conference on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, Nayarit, Mexico, 14 February 2014).
16 See particularly, Knut Dormann and Jose Serralvo, ‘Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the
obligation to prevent international humanitarian law violations’ International Review of the Red Cross First
View Articles (CUP, 30 January 2015), 3.  
17 Case concerning application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgement) (2007) ICJ Rep 43.
18 The ICJ has specifically held that Common Article 1 creates legal obligations. Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 [158]. For
example a provision that has been held to be too vague contra, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) (Preliminary objections) [1996] ICJ Rep. Article 1 of the Treaty
of 1955 between Iran and the United States, ‘[t ]here shall be firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship
between the United States ...and Iran’.  The Court held (at [28]) ‘that Article 1 must be regarded as fixing an
objective, in the light of which the other Treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied’  and at [31] that
‘Article I is thus not without legal significance for such an interpretation, but cannot, taken in isolation, be a
basis for the jurisdiction of the Court’.
19 Marco Sassoli, above note 7, 421.
20 See also Cassese, who phrases this as a ‘secondary rule’ laying down ‘a general obligation relating to how all
the specific obligations laid down in the Conventions must be fulfilled by each specific contracting State both as
regards its own compliance with those obligations and compliance by other contracting States. Antonio Cassese,
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005, 2nd ed) 18.
21 See generally regarding the controversy over the third State obligations Focarrelli, above note 4, 127 and 144-
151.
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the obligation is one with clear legal parameters, that the scope of the obligation in relation to
‘ensure respect’ will vary in each circumstance depending on the capacity of the third state
and the ability of the third state to influence the transgressor state or other actor. Part three of
this chapter considers the interpretation of the ensure respect component of Common Article
1. In doing so it considers the principles of treaty interpretation and the concept of due
diligence in international law. Part four outlines the actions not envisaged by Common
Article 1. Part five notes possible actions third party states may take to ensure respect.  
2. Respect for IHL in all circumstances – good faith treaty implementation
The Geneva Conventions themselves mention a number of measures that States Party are
required to take to implement them. These include:
• disseminating the texts of the Geneva Conventions22
• protecting the red cross, red crescent and red crystal emblems23
• the requirement to enact legislation to provide effective penal sanction for breaches24
• ensuring that medical and religious personnel have adequate identification (such as a
distinctive emblem and identity card)25
• identifying potential hospital and safety zones26
• identifying medical aircraft27
• ensuring that there is the capacity and process to create a national information bureau
for prisoners of war and civilians detained.28
There is an obligation for states to ensure that their armed forces comply with IHL when
abroad29 and that legal advisors of the armed forces are available to commanders in the
  
22 GC I art 47, GC II art 48, GC III art 127, GC IV art 144, AP I art 83, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1979), art 19.
23 GC I art 53; see also AP III.
24 GC I art 49; GC II art 50; GC III art 129; GC IV art 146; AP I art 86.  
25 GC I art 40.
26 GC I art 23.
27 GC I art 36; GC II art 39.
28 GC III art 122; GC IV art 137.
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field.30 Some recommendations are also included such as ensuring that journalists have
specific identity cards should they wish to carry them.
With regard to weapons, States Party to AP I must consider the compatibility of new
weapons technologies with the fundamental principles of IHL.31 States must also ensure that
the principles of weapons law, particularly as set out in AP I, are known to the members of
their armed forces. This chapter will explore these measures in considerably more detail.
Many of these obligations apply in times of peace as well as in times of war. Meeting these
obligations is a process that requires involvement from a range of areas within government
and society including town planners, educational institutions, hospitals, the press, civil
society, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, weapons manufacturers, civil defence,
shipping and aircraft authorities and environmental advisors.32 Implementing the Geneva
Conventions requires significant expertise, resources and commitment from the
implementing state, and may include assistance from the international community,33
including that which is rendered under Common Article 1.
The obligation to respect in all circumstances also refers to actions by states themselves to
make sure those within their jurisdiction and territory respect IHL.  That is, states must take
measures to ensure that all individuals and entities within their jurisdiction and territory know
about and comply with IHL. This raises difficulties for states when trying to instill respect in
non-state armed actors and also in corporations within their territory and control.  There are a
number of initiatives by states, and international organisations, which are looking at best
practice in terms of getting non-state armed actors to comply with IHL. These including the
Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for states
    
29 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic  (Judgment) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1, 15 July 1999); see also
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Provisional Measures) [1993] ICJ Rep Order of 8 April 1993, 1, and Order of 13
September 1993, 325.
30 AP 1 art 82
31 AP I art 36.
32 Ibid 182.
33 Helen Durham, ‘From Paper to Practice: The role of treaty ratification post conflict’ in Bowden et al (eds)
The Role of International Law in Rebuilding Societies after Conflict, CUP, 2009 at p. 180. Note also the
ICESCR actually states that States must take advantage of the support of other States to achieve their
obligations.
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related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict34 and
Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment35 through which non-state actors can adopt IHL
obligations.  
Relevantly, what is required of states, in relation to discharging the respect obligation, is that
they act in good faith.36 The good faith obligation has been described as ‘one of the oldest
principles of international law’37. This principle is reflected in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’.38 Villiger notes that good faith
includes the notions that ‘legitimate expectations raised in other parties are to be honoured’
and ‘the prohibition on the abuse of rights, flowing from good faith, prevents a party from
evading its obligations’.39 Meron notes that this obligation includes not encouraging
violations of treaties but also taking extra measures to ensure no violations.40
In the 1987 Commentaries to the Additional Protocols the ICRC notes that the respect
obligation is included in the good faith obligation, in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. As such, based on the principle of good faith, all states have obligations
to implement the provisions of IHL in good faith in order to respect IHL.
2.1 A note about ‘in all circumstances’
The ‘in all circumstances’ phrase, in Common Article 1, has been interpreted many different
ways. 41  In the debates on the 1929 Geneva Conventions, it was argued that the phrase ‘in all
circumstances’ precisely intended to make clear that the Conventions did not just apply
  
34 Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict. (Swiss Government and ICRC,
2009)
35 Geveva Call, Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for
Cooperation in Mine Action (2000), Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of
Armed Conflict (2010), Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed
Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination (2012) < http://www.genevacall.org/how-we-
work/deed-of-commitment/
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 8 ILM 679 (entered into force
27 January 1980) (‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’) art 26.
37 Christopher C Joyner, International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance (Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 55
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 26.  
39 Villiger, M ‘The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, Miscarriage,? The ‘Crucible’
Intended by the International Law Commission’ in Cannizzaro, E (ed) The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna
Convention (Oxford University Press, 2011) 109
40 Meron, above note 7, 353-4.
41 See Focarelli, above note 4, 137 and 157-163.
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where all parties to the conflict were State Parties to the Conventions, but  also when one
party to the conflict was not a party to the Conventions. 42 The 1930s Commentaries also
noted that the ‘in all circumstances’ reference confirms that the Convention must be
implemented in peace time as well as in times of international armed conflict.43 The 1950s
Commentaries note these earlier interpretations. However, further to this idea, it was posited
that ‘no Power bound by the Convention can offer any valid pretext, legal or other, for not
respecting the Convention in all its parts’44 and that the Conventions apply to wars of
aggression or unjust wars just as they do to self-defence or just wars.45 The Commentary to
AP I particularly notes the idea that ‘any idea of reciprocity should be disregarded’.46 It is
noted that ‘in all circumstances’ does not apply to internal armed conflict. This is in
accordance with the fact that the Geneva Conventions (save for Common Article 3) do not
apply in times of internal armed conflict.47
Although ‘in all circumstances’ in Common Article 1 is not necessarily the only source for
the ideas in the preceding paragraph48 they continue to be understood through, among other
sources, Common Article 1. Focarrelli notes the phrase:
is frequently included in other specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions, and more
often than not its more plausible meanings in relation to common Article 1 are already
found in other ad hoc provisions of the same Conventions.49
In light of this it is clear that little turns on this phrase and that respect and ensure respect are
the key components of Common Article 1.
  
42 Focarelli, above note 4, 158.
43 Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Volume I (ICRC, 1952) 26-27.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid 27: ‘no Power bound by the Convention can offer any valid pretext, legal or other, for not respecting the
Convention in all its parts. The words "in all circumstances" mean in short that the application of the
Convention does not depend on the character of the conflict. Whether a war is "just" or "unjust", whether it is a
war of aggression or of resistance to aggression, the protection and care due to the wounded and sick are in no
way affected.’
46 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva, 1987), 37.
47 See particularly Geneva Conventions Common Article 2. This is save for the clauses contained in Common
Article 3 and those aspects which have been found to constitute customary international humanitarian law
binding in times of non-international armed conflict.  
48 Focarrelli, above note 4, 163-4.
49 Focarelli, above note 4, 163-164.
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3. Ensuring respect for IHL in all circumstances – as interpreted pursuant to treaty
interpretation rules and the principle of due diligence
The concept of ensuring respect for IHL is not as easy to articulate as the concept of respect
for IHL. However, as Sassoli notes the Common Article 1 obligation ‘is today unanimously
understood as referring to violations by other States’.50  Further, in a recent article ICRC
Chief Legal Officer Knut Dormann and his colleague Jose Serravlo stated that Common
Article 1:
goes beyond an entitlement for third States to take steps to ensure respect for IHL. It
establishes not only a right to take action, but also an international legal obligation to
do so.51
Dormann and Serralvo further note that ‘the question…is not so much whether [Common
Article 1] imposes a binding obligation, but rather what type of obligation lies beneath it’.52
In order to determine the meaning and scope of Common Article 1’s ensure respect
component the principles of treaty interpretation in the  Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties53 and the international law principle of due diligence are discussed.  
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to
the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
  
50 Marco Sassoli, above note 7, 421.
51 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 17.
52 Ibid.
53 Note that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is being used here to interpret what is both a treaty
and customary law obligation.
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4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Article 32 provides that:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Meron notes there is no evidence to suggest that Common Article 1 was intended to codify
existing principles of international law: ‘[t]hey appear to have chosen the words "and to
ensure respect" deliberately “to emphasize and strengthen the responsibility of the
Contracting Parties”’.54 Benvenuti also asserts that Common Article 1 is clearly expressing a
particular obligation through its going beyond the ordinary obligation to act in good faith to
identify a specific obligation.55 However, as the ordinary meaning is not clear, as evidenced
by the literature, and there has not been any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions, this chapter will
look at the subsequent practice in the application of the treaty56 (Article 31(3)(b)), other
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties (Article 31
(3)(c)) and the drafting history of Common Article 1 (Article 31 (4) and Article 32).
This will be followed by a consideration of the due diligence principle.
3.1 Subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
The ICRC Customary Law Study shows that most references to Common Article 1 and/or the
wording ‘respect and ensure respect for IHL’ are in the context of calls to warring parties to
comply with their obligations to respect the principles of IHL.57  For example, the wording of
Security Council Resolutions is often couched as an ‘appeal to both parties strictly to abide
by applicable rules of [IHL]’ or indeed as an appeal to the ‘leaders’ to ensure their group or
  
54 Meron, above note 7, 353.
55 Paolo Benvenuti, ‘Ensuring Observance of International Humanitarian Law: Function, extent and limits of
the obligations of third states to ensure respect for IHL’ [1989-90] Yearbook of International Law, 30.
56 This provision is customary international law: Cassese, above note 20, 129 citing a number of cases.  
57 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law –
Volume II (Part 2): Practice, (ICRC, 2005), 3156-3187.
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faction complies with IHL.58  The Council of Europe has adopted the approach of inviting
member states to ‘appeal’ to warring parties to respect the Geneva Conventions.59
At the Teheran Conference on Human Rights in 1968, attended by 84 states60, the notion of
third party states having responsibilities to ensure respect for the Conventions received
support. Resolution XXIII of the Teheran Conference held that:
States parties to the Red Cross Geneva Conventions sometimes fail to appreciate their
responsibility to take steps to ensure the respect of these humanitarian rules in all
circumstances by other States, even if they are not themselves directly involved in
armed conflict.61
However, Kessler notes that it was really in the aftermath of the International Conference for
the Protection of Victims of War in 1993 that it could be argued that ‘no State can deny any
longer the existence of a positive obligation under Common Article 1 to ensure that the
Conventions are respected’.62  The Final Declaration of the International Conference for the
Protection of Victims of War specifically referenced Common Article 1 and noted an
undertaking by the participants to:
to act in cooperation with the UN and in conformity with the UN Charter to ensure full
compliance with international humanitarian law in the event of genocide and other
serious violations of this law.63
UN General Assembly Resolution on the Decade of International Law in 1993 reminded ‘all
States of their responsibility to respect and ensure respect for IHL in order to protect the
victims of war’.64 Further, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution
on the role of universal or extraterritorial competence in preventive action against impunity
  
58 Ibid 3168-73. See also Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 12.
59 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Res 984 (30 June 1992).
60 United Nations, Proclamation of Tehran (UN Audiovisual Library of International Law) <
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/fatchr/fatchr_ph_e.pdf> .
61 International Conference on Human Rights, Held in Teheran, Iran from (22 April – 13 May 1968).
62 Birgit Kessler, The Duty to ‘Ensure Respect’ Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions: Its
Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts, 44 German Yearbook of International
Law (2001) 498, 505.
63 Final Declaration of the International Conference for the Protection of Victims of War, Geneva (30 August  -
1 September 1993). Note Kessler’s reference to this.  
64 UN GAOR, UN Doc G/R/48/30 (9 December 1993) .
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which specifically referenced Common Article 1.65 The Conference of High Contracting
Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention declared:
The participating High Contracting Parties welcome and encourage initiatives by
States Parties, both individually and collectively, according to art. 1 of the Convention
and aimed at ensuring respect...66
A Declaration made at the African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian
Law for the Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict noted a ‘determination to do
everything in our power in order that States and all parties to armed conflicts honour their
duties as regard International Humanitarian Law’. 67 The Security Council has acknowledged
its role to ‘ensure respect’ in resolutions such as SC Resolution 1502 of 2003 condemning
violence against UN and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones: ‘[r]eiterating its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, in this context, the
need to promote and ensure respect for the principles and rules of international humanitarian
law.’68
The scope of the positive obligation to ensure respect is more difficult to articulate because it
is dependent on the capacity of the third-party state in question.  Following the 1977 kidnap
of a number of French citizens in Mauritania by POLISARIO, the French Foreign Minister,
referencing Common Article 1, noted Algeria was obligated not to support a violation of the
prohibition on kidnapping.69 Palestine relies on the Common Article 1 interpretation that says
that other states are under an obligation to ensure that Israel complies with the Fourth Geneva
Convention as regards its occupation of Palestinian lands.70 In response to the Libyan conflict
in 2011, sanctions against Libyan leaders provide an example of ensuring respect for IHL.71
And similarly in respect of Syria other states have taken some measures to try and ensure
  
65 UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, preamble, Res 2000/24(18 August 2000).
66 Declaration of the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Held at Geneva
(5 December 2001) 4-5, 12 and 17.
67 Declaration made at the African Parliamentary Conference on International Humanitarian Law for the
Protection of Civilians during Armed Conflict, Held in Niger (18-20 February 2002) 4.
68 SC Res 1502, UN SCOR, 4814th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1502 (26 August 2003).
69 Kessler, above note 62, 503.
70 Kalshoven, above note 9, 57.  The SC has also acknoweldged this: see for example SC Res 681, UNSCOR,
2970 mtg, UN Doc S/RES/681 (20 December 1990). See also Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 14-15.
71 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 15.
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respect for IHL72, although the ongoing suffering in that country makes one question its
effectiveness.
3.2 Evolution under international law towards extra-territorial effect  
Pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties other relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties may be considered in
interpreting Common Article 1. Five concepts are particularly relevant to the discussion here:
jurisprudence of the ICJ; commentary of the ICRC; obligations erga omnes; widely accepted
human rights treaties which contain similar phrases and concepts; and the notion of
complicity and the duty to cooperate to end serious breaches of peremptory norms. These
concepts collectively support an interpretation of Common Article 1 having third party state
effect because they demonstrate that the international community is increasingly finding all
states have a role to play in preventing violations of the most serious of crimes. 73  
3.2.1 Jurisprudence of the ICJ
Specific obligations not to engage in particular conduct vis-a-vis third party states have also
been detailed by the ICJ with reference to Common Article 1. The Nicaragua judgment held
that encouraging violations of IHL – in particular the provision of advice on how to violate –
constitutes a breach of the Common Article 1 obligation to ensure respect for IHL.74 Further,
in the Wall Advisory Opinion case the ICJ held that all states were not ‘to recognize the
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory…’; were not to ‘render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by
such construction’; and were ‘under an obligation … to ensure compliance by Israel with IHL
as embodied in that Convention’.75 This finding was made in light of both the erga omnes
nature of the obligation of Israel to ‘respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-
  
72 Ibid 15.
73 See generally, Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 279-320. McLachlan notes
that Article 31 (3)(c) is expressing the idea that international law treaties are part of a the broader international
law system and as such should be applied in the context of each other in so far as they can be. See especially
280-281.  
74 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 388-9, [220].  But see Kalshoven, above note 9, 55-57.
75 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion)
[2004] ICJ Rep 136 [159].
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determination, and certain of its obligations under international humanitarian law’76 and the
Common Article 1 obligation.77
3.2.2 Commentary of the ICRC
It is clear the ICRC sees a broad role for Common Article 1. There are a number of instances
where the ICRC has appealed to third party states in relation to humanitarian concerns. The
1979 appeal by the ICRC with regards to the conflict in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) which
called on all parties to comply with international humanitarian law, also requested States
Party to the Geneva Conventions to take action.78 In 1983, 1984 and 1989 appeals were made
to all States Party to do their utmost to assure compliance by Iran and Iraq with international
humanitarian law.79 The August 1992 appeal of the ICRC to the parties involved in the
Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict also included a reference to the collective responsibility of
the ‘community of States party’ for compliance.80
In his 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions address Dr Jakob Kellenberger, Former
President of the ICRC, noted
it has always been the view of the ICRC that all States have an obligation not only to
respect, but also to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, as stated in
common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. One way of doing so is through
diplomatic means, whether through quiet diplomacy or in the intergovernmental
bodies just mentioned. The ICRC sees great potential in making common Article 1
more operational and there are encouraging developments in this regard …81
Some commentators have criticised the ICRC for its approach to interpreting parts of IHL
more broadly than states intended them.82 However, Kessler credits the ICRC appeals to the
international community to take action to stop violations, and the lack of criticism by states
of these calls, as having created, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a binding positive
  
76 Ibid [155].
77 Ibid [158].
78 ICRC Annual Report, 1979, 13, see further ‘Action by the ICRC in the event of breaches of International
Humanitarian Law’ (1981) 21 International Review of the Red Cross 76-83.
79 ICRC Annual Report, 1983, 56-7; Annual Report, 1984, 60; Annual Report, 1989, 85.
80 (1985) 25 International Review of the Red Cross 30-34. See also Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 13-
15.
81 Jakob Kellenberger, ‘Ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in a changing environment and the
role of the United Nations’ (Speech delivered at Ministerial Working Session, Geneva, 26 September 2009)
82 Kalshoven, above note 9; Focarelli, above note 4.  
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obligation on states to take such action to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions by
others.83
More recently, Dormann and Serralvo note that in response to the current conflict in Syria,
the European Union has held that ensure respect is ‘a collective obligation on all of us not
only to respect but also to ensure that the parties to the conflict respect their humanitarian
obligations’.84
3.2.3 Obligations erga omnes
Obligations erga omnes are those obligations which, due to their nature as the most important
of rights, concern all states when they are not protected.85 The Barcelona Traction case in
1970 established the notion of ‘obligations towards the international community as a whole’
which were, by ‘their nature …the concern of all States’ and which, ‘[i]n view of the
importance of the rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection…’ .86  The ICJ has also held for the existence of obligations erga omnes partes,
that is obligations owed to the States Party to the treaty in question, in the case concerning
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal).87  
Meron states ‘the language to ensure respect’ was a conventional precursor to the erga omes
principles enunciated by the Court in Barcelona Traction’. 88 Gasser holds that ‘a substantial
part of the rules of humanitarian character applicable in armed conflict are essential parts of
the international legal order, either because they are so basic that they express “elementary
considerations of humanity”, or because they are universally accepted as treaty law or as the
  
83 Kessler, above note 62, 504. For a list of some of the appeals see in particular footnote 29. See also Meron,
above note 7, at 354.
84 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 15-16 citing European Union Statement, with the alignment of Iceland,
Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the countries of the Stabilization and Association
Process, UN General Assembly: Humanitarian Situation in Syria (25 February 2014) <www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_14647_en.htm>.
85 See also Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility - any State, other than an injured State, is entitled
to invoke the responsibility of another State, if the obligation breached is owed to the international community
as a whole. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83, UNGAOR, 56th sess, 85th
plen mtg, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (28 January 2002, adopted 12 December 2001) annex.
86 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase, Judgment)
[1970] ICJ Rep. 32 [33].
87 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Judgment) (20 July
2012) [2012] ICJ Rep, 31-32.  
88 Meron, above note 7, 353-4.
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expression of uncontroversial custom.’89 These aspects of IHL are as such, obligations erga
omnes and all states therefore have an interest in respecting them but also in ensuring respect
for them – which includes taking steps to ensure this respect.90
The links between obligations erga omnes and Common Article 1 were given consideration
by the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion.91  
157. With regard to international humanitarian law, the Court recalls that in its
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons it stated
that "a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so
fundamental to the respect of the human person and 'elementary considerations of
humanity' . . .", that they are "to be observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible
principles of international customary law" (I. C. J. Reports 1996 ( I ) , p. 257, para.
79). In the Court's view, these rules incorporate obligations which are essentially of
an erga omnes character.
158. The Court would also emphasize that Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, a provision common to the four Geneva Conventions, provides that "The
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances." It follows from that provision that every State party
to that Convention, whether or not it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an
obligation to ensure that the requirements of the instruments in question are complied
with.92
Meron notes that the erga omnes character of much of IHL implies that third states have not
only the right to make appropriate representations urging respect for these norms to states
allegedly involved in violating them, but also a duty not to encourage others to violate the
norms, and, perhaps, even to discourage others from violating them.93 As such it is clear that
concept of erga omnes supports a third party state interpretation of Common Article 1.
  
89 Gasser, above note 9, 22-23.
90 Ibid 23.
91 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion)
[2004] ICJ Rep 136 [157-8]. Note however, the separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans at [40]-[41] regarding the
Court’s confusion between obligations erga omnes and serious breaches of preemptory norms. Note also the
observations regarding the ICJ’s eschewal of jus cogens: Andrea Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus
Cogens’ (2008) 19 (3) European Journal of International Law 491, 501-502.
92 Ibid [157-8].
93 Meron, above note 7, 355.
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3.2.4 Human rights treaties
International human rights law includes a number of provisions which contain similar
wording or concepts to the obligation to respect and ensure respect which can be considered
in light of Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 2(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides:
[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present Covenant.
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, on reading its text, requires ensuring that such freedoms are
secured within a State’s territory or jurisdiction, apparently specifically limiting its
application.94 The original intention of the provision that became Article 2(1) of the ICCPR
was to make it clear that states needed to implement the treaty into their own domestic legal
frameworks should that be required for it to become binding on them.95 However, it is clear
that a positive duty well beyond implementing legislation is now understood by that
provision.96 This duty to ensure includes the state ensuring that it can itself respect the
ICCPR but also that private actors are also prevented from ‘impeding another individual’s
enjoyment of his rights’. 97
  
94 See also the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities the phrase ‘States Parties undertake to
ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons with
disabilities’ is used. However, article 4 is followed by a list of individual-compliance mechanisms, so any
suggestion that the provision was intended to have relevance to other States is easily rebutted. Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 3
May 2008) art 4.  
95 Manfred Nowark, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary (NP Engel Publisher, 2nd
ed, 2005) 30-31 noting a US draft from 1949.  The phrase ‘[e]ach State Party hereto undertakes to ensure to all
individuals within its territory the rights set forth in this Convention’ had added to it, by suggestions from
France and Lebannon, the words respect and jurisdiction.  
96 Kabaalioglu, H ‘The obligations to ‘respect’ and to ‘ensure’ the right to life’ in Ramcharan, BG (ed) The
Right to Life in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985) 180; Klein, E ‘The duty to
protect and ensure human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in Klein, E (ed)
The duty to protect and ensure human rights (Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH, Berlin, 2000) 298.  
97 Klein, above note 96, 302. Article (2) ICCPR that it should not be confused with the ‘duty to fulfil’ (that is an
obligation on a State to transfer benefits to an individual such that they could realise a right). See also, Article 1
of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, provides that ‘The States Parties to this Convention
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognised therein and to ensure to all persons subject to their
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms’.  The Inter American Court of Human Rights
interpreted this phrase to mean that ‘to the effect that contracting states have an obligation to protect the rights
set out in the Convention not only from their own acts but also from other non-state entities’. Focarelli, above
note 4, 141.
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Further, subsequent developments have partly expanded the jurisdictional element of these
treaties.98 General Comment 31 for example makes it clear that there is an extraterritorial
nature to the ICCPR where another State Party has power or effective control.99 The
European Court of Human Rights has also rejected the notion of human rights treaties
application being territorially limited.100
The ICJ has also implied that customary international law obligations are not territorially
limited.101
Further, Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide102  imposes an obligation on States Party to ‘undertake to prevent and
punish’ cases of genocide.103 The ICJ held that this obligation:
is one of conduct and not one of result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an
obligation to succeed, whatever its circumstances, in preventing the commission of
genocide: the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonable
available to them, so as to prevent genocide as far as possible.104
The ICJ specifically noted that its decision in that case should not be seen as applicable to all
treaties which contain obligations on States to prevent the commission of certain acts.105 As
will be discussed further below at 3.4, the observations around the capacity of the State to
respond and around what constitutes due diligence by the ICJ in the 2007 Genocide case are
highly informative with regards to Common Article 1.  
This analysis supports the third party State interpretation of Common Article 1.
  
98 Contra Focarelli, above note 4, 139.
99 UN Human Rights Committee. General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant (29 March 2004) [2]-[10]. The principle of respect and ensuring the rights of
the Convention applying also ‘to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting
outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained.’
100 See El Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2012) Eur Court HR; Al Nashiri v Poland
(2014) Eur Court HR.
101 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Preliminary objections) (1996) ICJ Rep [31].
102 Convention on the Prevention of Genocide and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277
(entered into force 12 January 1951).
103 Of course indirectly Common Article 1 does this by referencing states ensure respect for the Conventions
which includes the grave breach provisions.
104 Case concerning application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgement) (2007) ICJ Rep [430].
105 Ibid [429].
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3.2.5 Complicity and the duty to cooperate to end serious breaches of preemptory norms
Conceptually similar in many ways to the idea of ensure respect in Common Article 1 are the
notions of rules of state complicity106 and the duty to cooperate to end serious breaches of
preemptory norms in international law. In respect of states that are complicit in wrongful
acts, the articles of state responsibility provide for their responsibility for being complicit.
For example, Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility107 provides that:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.108
Further, Article 41 of the Articles on State Responsibility provides that States shall cooperate
to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breaches by States of any obligations
which arise under a peremptory norm of general international law.109
In light of Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which allows reference
in treaty interpretation to ‘other rules of international law applicable between the parties’, the
development of these rules and their application110 is also reflective of an evolution under
international law towards a third party State interpretation of Common Article 1.111
3.3 Drafting history
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that ‘[a] special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended’. As will be
seen the intended meaning of Common Article 1 was not clearly articulated by the
  
106 Complicity in this context refers to a state aiding or assisting another State to carry out a wrongful act. See
Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘Equivocal helpers - complicit states, mixed messages and international
law’ (2009) 58(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 5.
107 See generally Cassese, above note 20, chapter 13; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (2008) chapter 14.
Debate exists as to the customary nature of this provision. See Nolte Aust, above note 106, 7-10.
108 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83, UNGAOR, 56th sess, 85th plen
mtg, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (28 January 2002, adopted 12 December 2001) annex.
109 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, above note 85, arts 40 and 41.
110 See generally, James Crawford, State Responsibility The general part (CUP, 2013).
111 Note Nolte and Aust, above note 106, who indicate many States preach the contrary of what they practice in
some situations. See particularly, 27, 30.
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Diplomatic Conference of 1949. Indeed, Kalshoven notes ‘how conspicuously little time and
energy the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 spent on draft Article 1’.112 As such it is not
possible to argue that a special meaning was intended by the parties in respect of this
provision.
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties113 provides that the drafting
history of a treaty provision can be considered to confirm the ordinary meaning of the
provision which has been ascertained from the application of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Subsequent practice in the application of the provision
has shown that meaning today is ‘unanimously understood as referring to violations by other
States’114. This can be confirmed by looking at the drafting history. The drafting history of
Common Article 1 demonstrates that while very little attention was paid by States Party to
this provision in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, by the time of the 1977 Additional
Protocols it was accepted that ensure respect was concerned with ensuring respect by third
party States.
From a treaty interpretation perspective there are three dates which require analysis: 1929,
1949, 1977.115  
3.3.1 1929
Article 25 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armies in the Field of 27 July 1929 and Article 82 of the Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929, both in identical terms, provide:
The provisions of the present Convention shall be respected by the High Contracting
Parties in all circumstances.
If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall,
nevertheless, be binding as between all the belligerents who are parties thereto.116
  
112 Kalshoven, above note 9, 27.
113 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 32.
114 Marco Sassoli, above note 7, 421.
115 The ICRC is currently undergoing a project to update the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and
their additional protocols to ‘reflect the experience gained in applying the Conventions and Protocols during the
last few decades’. Common Article 1 was specifically noted as being a particular area in which the
commentaries needed updating as ‘[t]he international community’s understanding of the obligation … has
significantly expanded since the 1950s and it was noted that the updated Commentaries seek to capture and
present this understanding.’: Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Bringing the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols into the 21st Century’ (Transcript of ICRC interview, 12 July 2012). The updated
Commentary on Common Article 1 was not yet available as at 17 December 2015.
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The documents - the former of which was a revision of the original First Geneva Convention,
the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,
concluded in August 1864 and the latter of which was a new development in IHL arising
principally from the maltreatment of prisoners of war during the First World War117 - are
predecessors to the current Geneva Conventions concluded in 1949 which contain Common
Article 1.
The origins of this particular wording came from an ICRC proposal (in the form of draft
Conventions submitted to the 1929 Diplomatic Conference) to abolish the si omnes concept
(that is that ‘provisions shall cease to be obligatory if one of the belligerent Powers should
not be a signatory to the Convention')118, with respect for the Conventions being required in
all circumstances except specifically between a State Party and a non- State Party. That is, the
involvement of a non- State Party would not affect the application of the rules between the
State Parties involved.  
With regards to the obligation to respect, Kalshoven argues:
paragraph 1 is the more or less accidental and, in effect, largely meaningless by-
product of a heated debate about an entirely different issue of some importance, viz.,
the application of the Conventions in a war between belligerents not all of whom are
parties to these instruments.119
That is, the wording that supports the notion of an obligation to respect the Conventions
actually came about as a result of trying to make it clear that the provisions applied to a State
even if its foe was not bound.120 However, as is evident from the 1930 Commentary to the
Conventions by the 1929 Diplomatic Conference Secretary General, the ICRC’s Paul Des
Gouttes, others read more into this. In particular, De Gouttes notes that the ‘all
    
116 Article 82 differs very slightly in punctuation in part two of this paragraph: In time of war if one of the
belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall, nevertheless, remain binding as between the
belligerents who are parties thereto.
117 Albeit drawing on earlier rules including the Hague Rules of 1899 and 1907. Gretchen Kewley, Even Wars
Have Limits The Law of Armed Conflict (Australian Red Cross, 2nd ed, 2000) 31-32.
118 Kalshoven, above note 9, 7-8.
119 Ibid 7-8.
120 Ibid 7-9. Kalshoven contrasts this provision with earlier treaties on this subject, such as the 1899 Hague
Convention on Land Warfare, which allow for non-compliance with such treaty obligations when engaging in
conflict with a non-State Party.
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circumstances’ reference is to confirm that Convention must be implemented in peace time as
well as in war time (albeit only during times of international armed conflict).121
3.3.2 1949 – the inclusion of ‘ensure respect’
The Diplomatic Conference which concluded the Four Geneva Conventions in their current
form was held from April – August 1949. 122 The obligation to respect and ensure respect was
the subject of neither the Red Cross’123 preliminary conference of July/August 1946 nor the
April 1947 conference of government experts meetings.124 However, shortly before the April
1947 conference an internal ICRC note, written by ICRC staff lawyer Claude Pilloud, raised
the issue, apparently for the first time. 125  The note proposed the inclusion in each of the four
Conventions of the first sentence of Article 25 and Article 82 – requiring respect and
ensuring respect for the Conventions in all circumstances.  The si omnes clause in Article 2
separated this issue out.126 A subsequent internal ICRC note from August 1947, raised the
question of how to bring civil war within the scope of the Conventions.  This is the first
indication of a ‘different mood’.127 Whilst it did not lead to any discussion on this point at
this time, Pilloud’s suggestion was ‘of singular importance, foreshadowing as it does the
introduction of the phrase ‘to ensure respect’’.128 A government, through signing the
Conventions, does not just bind itself to the treaty, but also in effect its citizens, and the
concept which underpins ‘ensure respect’ is that governments must not only respect the
  
121 See further, Ibid 6-10.
122 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Federal Council for the Establishment of
the International Conventions for the Protection of War Victims and Held at Geneva (21 April – 12 August
1949) vol I 47, 61, 73, 113.
123 Although national Red Crescent Societies were officially recognised from 1929, until the 26th International
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which was held in Geneva in December 1995, the
meetings refereed only to Red Cross societies. For example the 25th International Conference was known as the
25th International Conference of the Red Cross.  
124 Kalshoven, above note 9, 11.
125 Ibid.
126 Article 2 includes the following ‘[a]lthough one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.’
127 Kalshoven, above note 9, 11. However, the ICRC had long been working on increasing its involvement in
internal armed conflict. It is noted at the XVIth International Red Cross Conference that ‘the Commission
unanimously recognised that the Convention must apply to all armed conflicts between States, and that its
humanitarian principles must be respected under all circumstances’. Report on the Interpretation, Revision and
Extension of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929 (Document 11a, Sixteenth International Red Cross
Conference, London, June 1939)
<http://www.cid.icrc.org/library/docs/CDDH/CI_1938/CI_1938_DOC11_ENG.pdf>, 8.  
128 Kalshoven, above note 9, 12-13.
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Conventions but also ensure their citizens, particularly members of the military, respect the
Conventions.
The May 1948 draft of the Conventions as submitted to the Stockholm Conference contained
the following Common Article 1:
The contracting Parties, undertake, in the name of their peoples, to respect and to
ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances.129  
The preparatory materials do not shed any further light on where this wording came from130
but the ICRC notes that the drafts were the product of work by the Red Cross as well as
government experts and other humanitarian associations, and were the subject of a ‘series of
remarks’.131 The Stockholm Conference led to the deletion of the phrase ‘in the name of their
peoples’ although it is not clear why.132
At the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 draft Common Article 1 was adopted
without modification following short consideration by the Joint Committee (five committees
having been set up – one for each of the four subject areas: Sick and Wounded on Land; Sick
and Wounded at Sea; Prisoners of War; Civilians (Committees 1-4 respectively); and one for
all Common Articles – the Joint Committee) and only slightly longer consideration by a
special sub-committee of the Joint Committee designated to look specifically at non-
international armed conflict issues.133 Pilloud was the only person who requested to speak to
Common Article 1 in the Joint Committee in the main and his comments were brief and did
not add context to its drafting or inclusion.134
In the special sub-committee few further points were made. The Norwegian and United
States representatives both supported the application of the article to the ‘population as a
  
129 Draft revised or new Conventions for the protection of war victims established by the ICRC with the
assistance of government experts, national Red Cross societies and other humanitarian associations put to the
Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference, Stockholm (August 1948); Dormann and Serralvo, above note
16, 6.  
130 Kalshoven, above note 9, 13.
131 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 6-7.
132 Ibid 21. See also, ICRC, Revised and New Draft Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Texts
approved and amended by the XVIIth International Red Cross Conference (Revised Translation, Geneva, 1948),
9.
133 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Federal Council for the Establishment of
the International Conventions for the Protection of War Victims and Held at Geneva (21 April – 12 August
1949), vol IIB, 7th mtg, 17 May 1949, 26 and  9th mtg, 25 May 1949, 53; see also Kalshoven, above note 9, 19.
134 Ibid 7th mtg, 17 May 1949, 26.
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whole’ and Lamarle, representing France, considered that the meaning of ‘to ensure respect’
was the same as that intended by the deleted reference in the ICRC draft to ‘in the name of
the peoples’. 135 Pilloud referenced the universal application of the Conventions. Yingling, of
the United States, also noted that ‘Article I did not imply the obligation to enact penal
sanctions’.136 Maresca, representing Italy, made a prescient comment raising concern over the
lack of clarity of ‘undertake to ensure respect’ – noting this was either a redundant provision
‘or introduced a new concept into international law’.137  This unfortunately was not further
discussed.138
The original Commentaries to the Four Geneva Conventions139 were published in the 1950s
and 1960 by the ICRC. The Commentary to the First Geneva Convention was published in
1952 with comments to Common Article 1 written by ICRC Legal Advisor Frederic Siordet.
The Commentary clearly introduces the notion that third party States may and should play a
role in the promotion of respect for the Convention:  
The use of the words "and to ensure respect" was, however, deliberate: they were
intended to emphasize and strengthen the responsibility of the Contracting Parties… if
it is to keep its solemn engagements, the State must of necessity prepare in advance,
that is to say in peacetime, the legal, material or other means of loyal enforcement of
the Convention as and when the occasion arises. It follows, therefore, that in the event
of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied
or enemy) may, and should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the
Convention.140
This obligation is put slightly higher in Geneva Convention II and IV which articulate:
in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties
(neutral, allied or enemy) may and should endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of
respect for the Convention. The proper working of the system of protection provided
by the Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should not be content
merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power
  
135 Ibid  9th mtg, 25 May 1949, 53.
136 Ibid  9th mtg, 25 May 1949, 53.
137 Ibid.
138 See also Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 8-9.
139 The basis of this analysis relies upon the Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions, authored by the ICRC.
Whilst not strictly drafting history, they have been included here, with other information about the provision for
two reasons. The ICRC  was created sui generis and is mandated by the international community to play a
unique role in relation to the Geneva Conventions - in particular in relation to the drafting of preparatory
conferences to their creation. Second, as is pointed out by Cassese, these views were taken up by both States
Party and by the ICJ in subsequent consideration of Common Article 1 and therefore have considerable bearing
on the understanding of its interpretation. Cassese. above note 20, 18. Cf Kalshoven, above note 9.
140 Jean Pictet, Commentary GCI, above note 43, 26.
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to ensure that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied
universally. 141 (emphasis added)
In the Commentary to Geneva Convention III interestingly ‘may and should’ is replaced
simply by ‘should’ and the obligation is put in terms of universal respect not universal
application:
in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, each of the other Contracting
Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) should endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of
respect for the Convention. The proper working of the system of protection provided
by the Convention demands in fact that the States which are parties to it should not be
content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their
power to ensure that it is respected universally.142 (emphasis added)
Kalshoven is very critical of the Commentaries on Article 1 for their disregard for the
drafting history of the provision and argues they are an attempt by the authors to impose their
‘lofty views’ on the Convention as a whole (and ‘optimism about the intrinsic force of Article
1’).143 Kalshoven concludes ‘despite my thorough investigations, I have not found in the
records of the Diplomatic Conference even the slightest awareness on the part of the
government delegates that one might ever wish to read into the phrase “to ensure respect” any
undertaking of a contracting state other than an obligation to ensure respect for the
Conventions by its people “in all circumstances”.144  The recent article of Dormann and
Serralvo notes that intended universal application of Common Article 1 means that a
domestic only focus could not have been envisaged.145
The evolution of Common Article 1 and the pre-eminence with which the ICRC is held in
this field for their work – including in drafting the Commentaries, makes it clear that, ‘ensure
respect’ cannot be as narrow as Kalshoven, or indeed some at the Diplomatic Conference,
may have envisaged. Whilst it may not be clear where the authority existed in 1952 to say
that ‘it follows therefore, that in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other
Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, endeavour to bring it back to
  
141 Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Volume II  (ICRC, 1960)  25-26;
Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Volume IV (ICRC, 1958)16.
142 Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Volume III (ICRC, 1960) .
143 Kalshoven, above note 9, 30, see also 37 and 38.  Note however that while Kalshoven disputes the validity
of the approach of the ICRC and others in crafting this as a legal obligation, Kalshoven is very supportive of the
moral obligation of States to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. See further 60-61.
144 Ibid 28.
145 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 6-10.
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an attitude of respect for the Convention’, this commentary has proven accurate in practice by
subsequent events.
3.3.4 1977
The original approach to AP I, in drafts prepared by the ICRC, was that it was not necessary
to reaffirm the general principles common to the Geneva Conventions in AP I but rather that
AP I would be supplementary to the Geneva Conventions. Common Article 1 however again
became the focus of discussions relating to the nature of armed conflict – specifically the plan
to extend the scope of the Additional Protocol to cover wars of national liberation. The end
result was that this issue was dealt with in Article 2, but that Common Article 1 was included
in AP I. Commentary on why this occurred as part of the Additional Protocol is, again, sparse
and uninformative.146
The argument about the phrase relating only to internal compliance was starting to be settled.
AP II of the Conventions did not include a corollary of Common Article 1.147  This omission
is telling because if Common Article 1 was thought to be entirely about internal compliance
and ensuring respect within a State’s boundaries then logically the phrase should have been
included in Additional Protocol II as well.
In the Commentary to AP I the ICRC notes that the obligation to respect is already included
in the good faith obligation, but that obligation to ‘ensure respect’ goes beyond the simple
respect obligation because it has a third party element to it.  Specifically it requires States to
‘endeavour to bring [a State in breach of the Conventions] back to an attitude of respect for
the Convention’.148
A further sign that this point of view had widespread support was that this interpretation was
not the subject of any debate or contest; the international community also included provisions
  
146 Focarelli, above note 4, 135; Kalshoven, above note 9, 45- 47; Official records of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humantiarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts, Geneva, Meeting of Committee I, 12 March 1974 (CDDH/I/SR.4), [26].
147 Kalshoven, above note 9, 48.
148 See also Y. Sandoz et al, above note 46, 35-36.
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for facilitating the implementation of this obligation – including meetings as provided for in
Article 7 of Additional Protocol I and co-operation in Article 89 of Additional Protocol I.149
Further evidence that no State had any concerns about the ICRC interpretation came almost
three decades later when the international community adopted Additional Protocol III with
the same wording in Article 1(1) as the Conventions and Additional Protocol I. The
Commentaries to Additional Protocol III state of Common Article 1 that it is taken verbatim
from the earlier Conventions and ‘no specific comments are called for in the context’ of the
AP III. Reference can therefore be made back to the earlier commentaries and in particular
the Commentary to Additional Protocol 1.150
As such, this analysis also supports the third party State analysis of Common Article 1. This
chapter will now consider how the scope of the legal obligation to ensure respect by third
party states and other entities is determined.
3.4 Due diligence of states in respect of their international obligations
International law includes a principle of due diligence.151 This principle has been discussed in
the literature as relevant to an examination of the nature and scope of Common Article 1. The
application of this principle is different depending on the circumstances – including the
nature of the primary rule152 to which the principle is being applied to and the capacity of the
State with the due diligence obligation. As Tzevelekos points out ‘we are only now starting to
understand how this principle can find application in a wide range of areas of international
  
149 Ibid 36. The Commentary to Article 89 of AP I notes that ‘this mechanism for execution and
supervision…actually has as its purpose the ensuring of respect for the law, and more especially, the prevention
of breaches being answered by further breaches’, 1032.
150 ICRC, Commentary on Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005 (ICRC,2007).
151 Robert Barnidge, ‘The Due Diligence Principle under International Law’ (2006) 8 International Community
Law Review, 81, 121; Vassilis P Tzevelekos, ‘Revisiting the Humanisation of International Law: Limits and
Potential’ (2013) 1 Erasmus Law Review 62, 73; Oxford University Press, Max Plank Encyclopaedia of Public
International Law (at February 2010) ‘Due Diligence’.  
152 ‘[T]he solution to the problem of diligence (and fault) essentially depends on the particular content of each
primary rule’: Riccardo Pissillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International
Responsibility of States’, 35 (1992) German Yearbook of International Law, 49. Barnidge points out that the
International Law Commissions work on state responsibility shows that due diligence obligations are ‘to be
resolved by the underlying primary rules, not the secondary rules of state responsibility’: Barnidge, above note
151, 86.
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law’.153 Barnidge notes the questions of ‘how, whether, and with what breadth the due
diligence principle is applied, however, remain[] one[s] of political will’.154 The due
diligence principle has been particularly adopted by certain fields of international law
including international environmental law155, cultural property law156 and with regards to the
duty to safeguard the security of aliens.157
Tzevelekos provides a very useful summary of the principle:
for the state to escape responsibility for lack of diligence, it needs to demonstrate that
it did everything that was possible to fight wrongfulness. To comply with diligence,
states need to suitably use the pertinent means at their disposal. By definition, due
diligence generates obligations of means, that is, a concept that is directly linked to
the old idea of responsibility because of ‘state fault’ – requiring a subjective
appreciation of the available means, their suitability and the necessity to make good
use of them in order to reach the goals of due diligence.158  
The focus of the work of Pisillo-Mazzeschi is in the distinction between the concepts of
obligations of conduct (what the State does) and obligations of result (what actually
eventuates from the conduct). He concludes, ‘it is logical that international law may only
impose on the State the obligation “to make every effort” to reach [a] result; that is, only an
obligation of diligent conduct’. In further unpacking the scope of the rule Pisillo-Mazzeschi
notes that the standard to which due diligence is required is ‘the average general standard of  
behavior by the “civilized” or “well-organized” State’.159
A caution in relation to the due diligence concept is offered by Hessbruegge when speaking
about its application to weak states. He notes, ‘[t]he law cannot indefinitely set off the
relocation of functions to the non-state sector by burdening weak states with increased duties
of due diligence and an ever-increasing ambit of state responsibility’.160 While this was being
discussed in the context of preventing terrorism, this warning must also apply to Common
  
153 Tzevelekos, above note 151, 73. For a comprehensive discussion of the application of the due diligence
principle in a number of cases see Barnidge, above note 151, 91-121.
154 Barnidge, above note 151, 121.
155 Oxford University Press, Max Plank, above note 151, [3].
156 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, opened for signature 24 June
1995. 34 ILM 1322 (entered into force 1 July 1998) art 4(4).
157 Pissillo-Mazzeschi, above note 151, 22.
158 Tzevelekos, above note 151, 73 (citations omitted).
159 Pissillo-Mazzeschi, above note 152, 45. See also 41-44.
160 Jan Arno Hessbruegge, ‘The Historical development of the doctrines of attribution and due diligence in
international law’ (2003-4) 36 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 265, 306.
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Article 1.  It has also been held by the European Court of Human Rights that such obligations
must not impose an ‘impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities’.161
So the question is: what is required by a State in order to meet its due diligence obligations
under Common Article 1?
The answer is that the obligation is one that is related to capacity and influence. States are
required to do what is reasonable to ensure respect and their own capacity is perhaps the most
significant aspect of reasonableness. As noted above, the approach of Pisillo-Mazzeschi in
considering some international obligations in terms of a ‘duty of diligent conduct’162
(discussed above) has been adopted by the ICRC in talking about Common Article 1.163
Dormann and Serralvo  have specifically considered due diligence in relation to Common
Article 1, finding the obligation is one which must be determined on a case by case basis.164  
The ‘capacity to influence’ and the ‘seriousness of the potential violation’ are the two key
factors requiring consideration.165  For example, a small, non-influential State, removed from
the conflict region would have a due diligence obligation to ensure respect that would include
actions such as supporting UN General Assembly resolutions calling on parties to respect
IHL. Whereas, ‘a State with close political, economic and/or military ties (for example,
through equipping and training of armed forces or joint planning of operations) to one of the
belligerents has a stronger obligation to ensure respect for IHL by its ally’.166
This idea that States are required to ‘make every effort’ is helpfully understood with
reference to the ICJ decision in the 2007 Genocide Case where the due diligence standard for
States adopted by the Court was described as depending on ‘the capacity to influence
  
161 In Osman v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights was called upon to consider the level of
vigilance a State must show in seeking to protect its citizens. The context was that a man had been murdered by
a stalker in circumstances where that stalker had been reported to the police by the family. The court held that
the obligations of the police in these circumstances were  ‘such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which
does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities’. Case of Osman v The United
Kingdom, [1998] Eur Court HR, [116].
162 Riccardo Pissillo-Mazzeschi, above note 152, 97.
163 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16.
164 Dormann and Serralvo, above note 16, 19.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid 18. See also, Nathalie Weizmann ‘What happens if American-Trained Rebels commit War Crimes’ Just
Security (online) (18 August 2015).
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effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide’.167
Capacity was said to depend on factors including ‘geographical distance’, ‘strength of
political [and other] links’ and ‘legal position’.168 Due diligence is a concept that requires its
parameters to be considered in the circumstances of a particular case.169
4. Actions not encapsulated by the Common Article 1 ensure respect obligation
There is clearly not an obligation for States to take all possible and imaginable measures
capable of inducing transgressor States to compliance.170 As Focarelli puts it, ‘[an]
unqualified list of possible measures supposedly envisaged by Common Article 1 is not
satisfactory unless an inquiry is conducted into whether these measures are per se lawful or
unlawful and whether contracting States are required, empowered, or only invited to take
them’. 171 Focarelli makes this point even clearer by noting that  to read Article 1 as imposing
an obligation to ensure respect, results in 193 breaches of Common Article 1 every time the
Conventions are breached - which is not the practice of States and seems implausible.172  
The other extreme is doing nothing in response to a violation. Third party States doing
nothing is also neither the intention, nor the practice, in today’s world. The terrible atrocities
that continue to be inflicted upon the Syrian people in 2016, following the outbreak of war in
Syria in 2012,173 are evidence that the world is often not able to do what is necessary to
prevent atrocities. However, it is clear that third state responsibility for humanity is
increasingly a part of the modern day legal, if not always political, landscape. This is
illustrated by the concept of erga omnes, the establishment of the ICC174 and by the
  
167 Case concerning application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgement) (2007) ICJ Rep [430].
168 Ibid.
169 Robert Barnidge, above note 151, 118.
170 Focarelli, above note 4, 167.
171 Ibid 146.
172 Focarelli, above note 4, 171.  However, that is not to say that the obligation does not exist.
173 ‘Syria: The Story of the Conflict’, BBC News (online), 11 March 2016 www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-26116868
174 The idea of an international criminal court dates from at least 1872 when Gustave Moynier proposed the
establishment by treaty of an international tribunal. Christopher Hall, ‘The first proposal for a permanent
international criminal court’ (1998) 322 International Review of the Red Cross. The ICC, which came into being
in 1998 with, albeit limited, jurisdiction over those individuals most responsible for the most serious of
international crimes – including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is demonstrative of the
increasing international interest in preventing such atrocities. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
17 July 1999, 37 ILM (1998) 999 (entered into force 1 July 2002) arts 12-15. The validity of this mechanism is
shown by the fact that the jurisdiction of the court has been exercised twice in response to referrals by the UN
Security Council..  SC Res 1593, UN SCOR, 5158th mtg, UN DOC S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005); UN SCOR,
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development of the notion of Responsibility to Protect.175 The ICC and these concepts seeks
to provide the international community with solutions in the face of the most serious of
violations by individuals (in the case of the ICC) and States (in the case of erga omnes and
the Responsibility to Protect) against holders of rights. They find their genesis in the
underlying principles first set out in Common Article 1 and rely on the idea of a state being
obliged to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions. The obligation to respect and
ensure respect is not one owed by a state to another state but rather to the international
community as a whole.176
In accordance with the UN Charter two actions are clearly not permitted. First, unilateral
military action to ‘ensure respect’ for the Conventions is not made lawful by Common Article
1.177 This would be in breach of the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.178  Second,
pursuant to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter there is a prohibition on intervention in the
domestic affairs of a State. That being said, as the ICTY has noted armed conflict constitutes
a threat to international peace and security179 and therefore actions relating to armed conflict
(including non-international armed conflict) are not the internal affairs of a State.  Indeed, a
State which is in conflict cannot legitimately accuse a third party state to be acting unlawfully
in interfering (through lawful measures) to ensure respect for IHL.180
Gasser makes an important point that ‘influencing the way humanitarian obligations are
carried out by a belligerent party must necessarily be clearly explained, convincingly justified
    
6491th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011). While this court is concerned with individual criminal
responsibility, when seen in context with the development with other concepts like the Responsibility to Protect
it goes to the pattern of less international acceptance of mass atrocity crimes.  
175 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect Report
(International Development Research Centre, Canada, 2001) VII The Responsibility to Protect idea, that ‘the
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise th[e] responsibility’ ‘to
protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’2005 World
Summit Outcome Document, UN GAOR, 60th session, UNDoc A/Res/60/1, (15 September 2005). See also
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect Report
(International Development Research Centre, Canada, 2001); SC Res 1674, UN SCOR, 5430th mtg, UN Doc
S/RES/1674 (28 April 2006).
176 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and others (Judgment) (ICTY, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14
January 2000) [519]. Also note the discussion by Sassoli, above note 7, 422-3, as to whether Article 1 creates a
right of action (as understood in the State Responsibility sense articulated by Draft Article 42 which requires the
obligation breached to be owed to the State individually rather than the international community as a whole) and
his conclusion that breaches of international humanitarian law treaties do not create this right of action.
177 Gasser, above note 9, 29; Kalshoven, above note 9, 53, Kessler, above note 62, 500, Umesh Palwankar,
‘Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law’
(1994) 298 International Review of the Red Cross 9, 13.
178 UN Charter Article 2(4)
179 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic  (Judgment) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1, 15 July 1999), 43.
180 Benvenuti, above note 55, 33.
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and properly carried out if such action is not to be misunderstood as improper interference in
the internal affairs of a sovereign State’.181 What these measures may be will now be
discussed.
5. Different measures states could take to ensure respect
A number of authors have given consideration to measures a state can take to ensure that a
third state respects the Geneva Conventions – both in times of peace and in times of
conflict.182  In peace time States’ actions could include the provision of legal advisors to
assist in developing or adapting national legislation and penal codes for effective
implementation of IHL, training legal advisors within the armed forces, teaching IHL as part
of military co-operation, holding regional and international seminars with the participation of
States to discuss the issues and helping set up regional databanks on various aspects related to
national measures and their implementation.183 The ICRC Customary Law Study concludes
that state practice ‘shows an overwhelming use of (i) diplomatic protest and (ii) collective
measures through which States exert their influence, to the degree possible, to try and stop
violations of [IHL]’.184
States can also help to ‘ensure respect’ by offering humanitarian assistance. The Geneva
Conventions require states in receipt of such assistance to facilitate relief operations.185 A
number of provisions of Geneva Convention IV require States to ‘allow the free passage’ of
relief consignments, and ‘agree to relief schemes…and … facilitate them’. 186 Article 69 of
AP I and Article 18 of AP II add to these provisions – although state consent for the relief
activities is required where civilians are suffering undue hardship in situations of non-
international armed conflict. 187 Further, Article 64 of AP I relating to civilian civil defence
organisations of neutral or other states requires that the Parties to the conflict receiving
assistance under this provision ‘should facilitate international cooperation’.
  
181 Gasser, above note 9, 27.
182 Ibid 29; Kalshoven, above note 9, 53, Kessler, above note 62, 500, Palwankar, above note 176, 13.
183 Umesh Palwankar, above note 177, 11. See also Gasser, above note 9, 25.
184 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, 512.
185 Kessler, above note 62, 502; See for example GC IV art 23.
186 GC I art 23; GC II art 59(3); GC III art 61(3); GC IV arts 70(2), 70(3).
187 See further Schindler, D ‘Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Interference and International Law’ in
Macdonald, R (ed) Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1994) 689, 696-7; SC Res,
UN SCOR, 2941th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/668 (20 September 1990) and GA Res 45/170 (18 December 1990)
condemned the refusal of humanitarian assistance by Iraq, from both humanitarian organisations, and in the case
of the General Assembly resolution, from the Government of Kuwait.
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Some provisions of the Conventions are themselves mechanisms for ensuring respect for
IHL. Examples include Article 7 of AP I which provides for meetings to be convened
addressing concerns about the application of the Protocol, Article 89 AP I pertaining to joint
or individual action in cooperation with the UN in situations of serious violations of the
Conventions, and Article 90 AP I pertaining to the establishment of an International Fact
Finding Commission.188  
Further, although, as is noted by Dormann and Serralvo, the Common Article 1 obligation is
one that is distinguishable from the obligation in Article 48 of the Articles on State
Responsibility, invoking Article 48 could constitute an appropriate “ensure respect” action.189
Article 48 allows states, other than an injured state, to invoke the responsibility of another
State, if the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole (erga
omnes).
There is therefore no checklist for states in the implementation of Common Article 1. Good
faith and due diligence are both required and naturally the actions which must be taken
depend on the circumstances.
Clearly one of the challenges is convincing states to take seriously their ensure respect
obligations. Convincing states to comply with IHL has long been premised on the military
value of compliance. Principles such as economy of effort, the potential for prosecution for
individual criminal responsibility, that the prohibition on unnecessary suffering is about
protecting military personnel themselves and that states do not want to see media reports of
their soldiers committing war crimes (the CNN factor) have long convinced military
personnel of their interest in complying with the rules of war.  Indeed IHL was created on the
battlefield and it makes sense for military reasons. Making Common Article 1 relevant to
states involves a slightly different approach in so far as it, like other areas of international
law, appeals to a sense of right rather than a sense of self-interest.
6. Conclusion
The obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL is clearly one that has evolved over time.
Despite some uncertainty surrounding the meaning of Common Article 1 over the years,
  
188 The ICRC is currently engaged in a project on ‘Strengthening legal protection for victims of armed conflict’
See < https://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/other-activities/development-ihl/>.  
189 Dormann and Seralvo, above note 16, 17.
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today it is understood as constituting a legal obligation to respect and ensure respect for
IHL.190 The scope of this obligation is articulated in part by other provisions of the Geneva
Conventions themselves (and the requirement to implement in them in good faith), and in
part determined by the capacity of a state, and its influence, to ensure respect in a particular
circumstance. While it was not necessarily envisaged that states not involved in the conflict
would have obligations vis-a-vis third states, today this aspect of the provision is confirmed
by an analysis of the subsequent practice, a discussion of comparable international legal
developments in respect of erga omnes and human rights law, and an evaluation of the
drafting history of the provision.  
The obligation is not an obligation for States to take any set measures or specific steps in
relation to violations of the Geneva Conventions by other States or non-State actors, but
rather to take those measures required by due diligence and which are within their capacity
and influence. There are a range of ways that a State may endeavour to bring States which are
not respecting or ensuring that their armed forces respect the Geneva Conventions back to an
attitude of respect for them.
The obligation to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions can therefore be seen as
providing a source of opportunity for states to assist others in achieving compliance with the
Geneva Conventions.  What is meant by this is that effectively, for influential and well-
resourced states, such as Australia, Common Article 1 can be seen as providing a basis for a
range of actions, both domestically and vis-à-vis other states to respect and ensure respect for
IHL.
Common Article 1 provides scope for third-party states to play a role as a force for good in
the international community in seeking to prevent violations of IHL from occurring. While
the ‘indeterminacy’ of Common Article 1 cannot be overlooked just by giving the concept
preeminent status191, the potential power of Common Article 1 as the source of an
opportunity for states to improve humanitarian outcomes is clear. States that engage in
  
190 Cassese, above note 20, 18; Dormann and Serravlo, above note 16, 16. Contra Kalshoven, above note 9, and
Gasser, above note 9. Gasser notes that ‘it is hard to defend the position that all third party states are under a
legal obligation to take action if humanitarian law is being seriously violated’ at 48. However, this comment
was made in 1993 and Kalshoven’s analysis dates from 1999. It is clear that progress has since been made
towards a fuller realisation of this obligation and its corresponding rights. Note also the Separate Opinion of
Judge Kooijmans in the Wall Advisory Opinion [46]-[50].
191 Focarelli, above note 4, 170.
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activities that are consistent with the notion of respecting and ensuring respect for the Geneva
Conventions have an opportunity to prevent breaches of IHL.  
In light of this understanding of Common Article 1 as a legal obligation which is defined by
the exercise of good faith and the capacity of a state and its ability to influence a transgressor
state, the thesis seeks to examine Australia’s approach to respect and ensure respect with
regards to weapons law. The chapters which follow in this thesis explore examples of how
one state, Australia, is approaching the implementation of IHL.  Common Article 1 requires
that reasonable measures, within the context of their capacity and ability to influence, are
undertaken by states to ensure respect for IHL. Australia is a state with considerable capacity
and as such the argument is made that when and where it has influence, it must use this
capacity to ensure respect. The next chapter, chapter three, specifically looks at the
overarching obligations on states with respect to weapons law and how Australia acts in
response to those obligations.
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CHAPTER THREE:  PROCESSES DESIGNED TO ENSURE AUSTRALIA COMPLIES
WITH THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR IHL WITH
RESPECT TO WEAPONS LAW
Chapter three considers the overarching concepts and processes that contribute to a country
respecting and ensuring respect for IHL with regards to weapons law with particular
reference to Australia. It answers the question what constitutes respecting and ensuring
respect pursuant to Common Article 1 when regulating weapons for use in armed conflict?
This chapter outlines Australia’s record of adopting weapons law treaties, its implementation
of the obligation pursuant to article 36 of AP I to review new weapons technologies in light
of their compatibility with the rules of IHL, its approach to weapons law as evidenced in
military training and military manuals and policy and the import and export control regimes
in Australia on weapons and weapons development materials.
1. Introduction
Throughout this thesis different types of weapons are assessed as case studies to demonstrate
Australia’s approach to the obligation to respect and to ensure respect for IHL with respect to
weapons law. There are, however, some overarching concepts and processes that contribute
to respecting and ensuring respect for IHL from a weapons law perspective, that require
consideration at the outset. In this chapter those processes will be explored. As mentioned in
chapter two, some of these processes are specifically detailed in the Conventions and
Protocols themselves, such as the obligation pursuant to Article 36 of AP I to review new
weapons technologies in light of their compatibility with the rules of IHL. Others are implied
by the Conventions and their Protocols and include the adoption of weapons law treaties
which have found particular weapons to be contrary to humanitarian principles, the approach
to weapons law as evidenced in military training and military manuals and policy, national
import and export controls on weapons and weapons development materials and the
criminalisation of offences relating to weapons law.  
2. Australian view on Common Article 1
It has not been possible to ascertain what the Australian government’s view of Common
Article 1 is as such. It would appear that this is not a provision that has been considered by
the Australian government specifically. The ADF, as the relevant part of the DOD, has noted
that ‘[u]nder current doctrine Common Article 1 is not referenced as a specific obligation’
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however the ADF ‘complies with its obligations under Common Article 1. This includes
compliance with Article 36 of [AP I]. We note however that the obligation to ‘ensure respect’
extends beyond the ADF to encompass the Government of Australia’.1
3. Weapons law treaties and Australia’s record on paper
As detailed in the introduction, Australia is a party to the Four Geneva Conventions by virtue
of its signature of 4 January 1950 and its ratification on 14 October 1958.2 Implementing
legislation, the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth), has been enacted. Australia is a party to
AP I by virtue of its signature of 7 December 1978 and its ratification on 21 June 1991. 3  
Implementing legislation has also been enacted. Australia is a party to Additional Protocol III
to the Geneva Conventions of 2005 by virtue of its signature of 8 March 2006 and its
ratification on 15 July 2009. 4 Again, implementing legislation has been enacted.
Australia is also a party to all major international weapons law treaties.5  As discussed further
in chapter three, Australia signed the CCM on 3 December 2008 (the treaty was adopted in
May 2008) and became a state party on 8 October 2012.6  As discussed in detail in chapter
five, Australia signed the most recent international treaty relating to weapons (an arms
control treaty), the Arms Trade Treaty, when it opened for signature on the 3 June 2013.
Ratification processes were completed on 3 June 2014 and Australia was consequently a state
party when the treaty entered into force on 24 December 2014.7  
With regard to other significant treaties the details are set out below:
  
1 Email COL PA Cumming to E Massingham, 12 January 2016 (on file with author).
2 ICRC, States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 13-
Apr-2015 (6 August 2015) ICRC <https://www.icrc.org/IHL>.
3 Ibid. The adoption of the Additional Protocols by Australia was contentious with at least one military officer
making a very public case against ratification.  In an article published in The Australian newspaper in July 1988
Brigadier PJ Greville wrote of the ratification of AP I ‘I believe its ratification would be very dangerous’:  PJ
Greville, ‘Protocols that spell disaster’, The Australian (Australia, 11 July 1988) 9 (on file with author).
4 ICRC, States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 13-
Apr-2015 (6 August 2015) ICRC <https://www.icrc.org/IHL>.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 ICRC, Arms Trade Treaty, 2 April 2013 States Parties <
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelect
ed=630>.
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Treaty Details
Declaration renouncing the 
Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles under 400 
Grams Weight
(St Petersburg, 11 December 
1868)
Australia, despite becoming an independent nation
at Federation on 1 January 1901, was represented,
as part of the British Empire, by the United
Kingdom at international conferences until after
the First World War. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles
marked Australia’s first signature of an
international treaty.8  However, this treaty is noted
as being ‘Applicable to Australia’.9
1899 and 1907 Hague
Declarations concerning the
likes of asphyxiating gases,
expanding bullets and
explosives from balloons
Applicable to Australia.10
Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and
Warfare (Geneva, 17 June
1925).
Instrument of accession deposited for Australia:  
22 January 1930.
Entered into force in Australia: 24 May 1930.11
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons
(London, Moscow and
Washington, 1 July 1968)
Entry into force for Australia on 23 January
1973.12
Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction
(London, Moscow and 
Washington, 10 April 1972)
Signed for Australia at London, Moscow and
Washington on 10 April 1972.
Instrument of ratification deposited for Australia at
London, Moscow and Washington on 5 October
1977.13
  
8 See further, David Donovan, ‘Australia’s last brick of nationhood’, The Drum (7 December 2010).
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-12-07/australia27slastbrickofnationhood/41892>.
9 Australian Treaty Series 1901, No. 25 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1901/125.html.
10 Australian Treaty Series 1907, No. 7 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1907/7.html; Australian
Treaty Series 1907, No. 8 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1907/8.html.  
11 Australian Treaty Series 1930, No. 6 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/1930/6.html.
12 Australian Treaty Series 1973, No. 3 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1973/3.html.
13 Australian Treaty Series 1977, No. 23 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1977/23.html.  
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Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to 
have Indiscriminate Effects, 
and Protocols I, II and III
[Protocol I on Non-Detectable 
Fragments; Protocol II on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby Traps 
and other Devices; Protocol III 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Incendiary 
Weapons]
(Geneva, 10 October 1980)
The Convention was signed for Australia 8 April
1984.
Instrument of ratification deposited for Australia
14 May 1983.
On ratification Australia notified its consent to be
bound by Protocols I, II and III.
The Convention entered into force for Australia on
29 March 1984.14
Additional Protocol [Protocol 
IV on Blinding Laser Weapons] 
to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which 
may be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to 
have Indiscriminate Effects of 
10 October 1980
(Vienna, 13 October 1995)
Notification of consent to be bound by the Protocol
was deposited for Australia on 22 August 1997.
The Protocol entered into force for Australia on  
30 July 1998.15
Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of 
Mines, Booby-Traps and other 
Devices, as amended (Protocol 
II, as amended) annexed to the 
Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to 
have Indiscriminate Effects of 
10 October 1980
(Geneva, 3 May 1996)
Notification of consent to be bound deposited for
Australia 22 August 1997. The Protocol, as
amended, entered into force for Australia and
generally, as between the parties, 3 December
1998.16
  
14 Australian Treaty Series 1984, No. 6 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1984/6.html.
15 Australian Treaty Series 1998, No. 8 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1998/8.html.
16 Australian Treaty Series 1998, No. 17 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1998/17.html.
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Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on their Destruction
(Paris, 13 January 1993)
Signed for Australia 13 January 1993.
Instrument of ratification deposited for Australia
on 6 May 1994.
The Convention entered into force for Australia
and generally on 29 April 1997.17
Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction
(Oslo, 18 September 1997)
Signed for Australia 3 December 1997.
Instrument of ratification deposited for Australia
on 14 January 1999.
The Convention entered into force for Australia on
1 July 1999.18
Protocol V on Explosive
Remnants of War to the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons
which may be deemed to
be excessively injurious or to
have indiscriminate effects
Geneva, 28 November 2003
Consent to be bound by Australia on 4 January
2007.
Entry into force for Australia on 4 July 2007.19
Australia is not a party to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.20 Australia signed this Protocol on  
21 December 2001 but has not ratified it. 21 This failure to ratify will be addressed further in
chapter five.
Given this comprehensive list, Australia has a good record of ratifying international
instruments which regulate weapons. Effective national implementation of the obligations in
these treaties is important to comply with the obligations contained therein but also with the
  
17 Australian Treaty Series 1997, No. 3 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/1997/3.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=chemical%20weapons.
18 Australian Treaty Series 1999, No. 3 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1999/3.html.
19 Australian Treaty Series 2007, No. 14 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2007/14.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=Explosive%20Remnants%
20of%20War.
20 31 May 2001, 2326 UNTS 208 (entered into force 3 June 2005.); adopted by GA resolution 55/255 of 31 May
2001.
21 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Status as at 26/09/2008
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-firearmsprotocol.html>.
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obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions.  However, the processes
for national implementation are rarely comprehensively detailed or specified in international
legal frameworks22 and states often do not give them the attention that is necessary.23  This is
a concern with a number of weapons law treaties. For example, the Fifth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
identified the lack of effective national implementation measures as being an issue of concern
for States Party to address.24  
4. Article 36 AP I weapons reviews
A key element of the “ensure respect” obligation in Common Article 1, in so far as it pertains
to the approach of states to the use of weapons in armed conflict, can be found in Article 36
of AP I. Article 36 of AP I provides:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.
This provision is closely linked to Article 35 of AP I, which provides that choice of means
and methods states can employ in times of armed conflict are not unlimited – in particular
such weapons must not cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.25
This rule is binding on Australia as a party to the 1977 AP I.26 Scholars have also argued that
it constitutes a customary international law obligation binding on non-States Party to AP I.27
  
22 T. Dunworth, R. Mathews and T. McCormack, 'National Implementation of the Biological Weapons
Convention' (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 93, 95.
23 See for example, Andreas Persbo and Angela Woodward, National Measures to Implement WMD Treaties
and Norms: the Need for International Standards and technical Assistance (Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission, Stockholm, May 2005) 1.
24 Final Document, BWC/
CONF.V/17 (Geneva, 19 November–7 December 2001, 11–22 November 2002) [18(a )(i)]; T. Dunworth et al,
above note 22, 94.
25 AP I art 35, See also Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva,
1987) 421-422.
26 ICRC, States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 13-
Apr-2015 (13 April 2015) ICRC <https://www.icrc.org/IHL>.
27 See Wing Commander Duncan Blake and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Imburgia, ‘“Bloodless Weapons”? The
need to conduct legal review of certain capabilities and the implications of defining them as “weapons”’, The
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It is a provision that is attracting more attention, at least from IHL scholars, in recent years in
light of the challenges that technological developments such as cyber warfare, autonomous
weapons, non-lethal weapons and nanotechnology are posing for IHL principles.28  It is
however, a provision that has not been well implemented by most states to date. 29 The
parameters of Article 36 and its general application will be considered below, before turning
to analyse the Australian application of the article.
4.1 Article 36 AP I in general terms
The Commentary to AP I notes that this provision was quite contentious with some states
going so far as to make its inclusion a condition precedent to their acceptance of the treaty as
a whole, while other states felt it an inappropriate clause in so far as it ‘seemed to imply
disarmament’ – an issue outside the scope of the treaty negotiations.30 The idea for the
facilitation of compliance with Article 36 was originally that a Committee of States Party be
established to consider the legality of the use of new weapons. However, this proposal did not
gain the required two-thirds majority and was not incorporated into the Protocol.31
A predecessor of sorts to the Article 36 concept can be found in the St Petersburg
Declaration:
[t]he Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an
understanding whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn up in view of future
improvement which science may effect in the armament of troops, in order to
maintain the principles which they have established, and to conciliate the necessities
of war with the laws of humanity.32
Hays Parks also asserts that the good faith obligation with respect to treaties would have
obliged States Party to the Hague Convention IV (and other treaties) to ensure that those
    
Air Force Law Review Vol 66 (2010) 163-166; William Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 341.
28 See for example Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson, ‘New capabilities in warfare: an overview of
contemporary technological developments and the associated legal and engineering issues in Article 36 weapons
reviews’, (2012) 886 International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 886, 483.
29 ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare (ICRC, January 2006)
< http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0902.pdf> 5.
30 Sandoz et al, above note 25, 422.
31 Ibid 422–423.
32 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, St
Petersburg, 1868.
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military weapons and munitions used by the Party were compliant with the laws, and as such
Article 36 codified an existing good faith obligation.33
The Commentary to AP I notes that some states already had internal processes of this nature
prior to the treaty negotiations.34 Sweden and the United States were two countries that did.
This is discussed further below.
The Commentary further notes:
[t]his obligation was defined by the Rapporteur of Committee III as follows:
The determination of legality required of States by this article is not intended to create
a subjective standard […]. Determination by any State that the employment of a
weapon is prohibited or permitted is not binding internationally, but it is hoped that
the obligation to make such determinations will ensure that means or methods of
warfare will not be adopted without the issue of legality being explored with care.
[…] A State is not required to foresee or analyse all possible misuses of a weapon, for
almost any weapon can be misused in ways that would be prohibited.35
Two further points made in the commentary include that states are not obliged to make their
Article 36 findings public36 and that the obligation concerns the normal use of the weapon
(and not any possible misuse).37 There is no agreed format for the conduct of Article 36
reviews38 and although many suggest an independent and objective system of review would
be the best approach, states are not interested in such an approach.39
4.2 The application of Article 36 AP I
Over the years the ICRC has taken a number of measures in an attempt to encourage states to
adopt formal systems for compliance with Article 36. The 27th International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 1999 and the 28th Conference in 2003 both ‘called on
states to establish mechanisms and procedures to determine the conformity of weapons with
  
33 W. Hays Parks, ‘Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews’ (2005) 8 Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law 55, 57.
34 Sandoz et al, above note 25, 423.
35 Cited in Ibid 424.  
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid 427. See also Blake and Imburgia, above note 27, 168; Boothby, above note 27.  
38 See Boothby, above note 27, chapter 19 for a suggested approach to reviews.
39 Ibid 344; Y Dinstein , The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (CUP, 2004)
80.
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international law’.40 The 2006 publication, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons,
Means and Methods of Warfare41, was designed to assist states to establish weapons review
mechanisms. It looks at both the interpretation of Article 36 as well as providing some
guidance for states as to the procedural issues which need to be considered. Lawand notes
that:
The obligation to review the legality of new weapons implies at least two things.
First, a state should have in place some form of permanent procedure to that effect, in
other words a standing mechanism that can be automatically activated at any time that
a state is developing or acquiring a new weapon. Second, for the authority responsible
for developing or acquiring new weapons such a procedure should be made
mandatory, by law or by administrative directive.
Other than these minimum procedural requirements, it is left to each state to decide what
specific form its review mechanism will take.42  However, to date this method of regulation
has proved somewhat lacking in effectiveness as only a handful of states have such
mechanisms in place.43
Guidance on the legal review of weapons is provided in the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the
Nuclear Weapons Case which has been interpreted as relating to all weapons, not just nuclear
weapons, in so far as it notes that in the absence of a specific prohibition on a particular
weapon (either in treaty or customary law), the second step is to consider whether there is a
general prohibition (again either in treaty or customary law) against the weapon.44
Daoust, Copeland and Ishoey provide some guidance on the process for conducting a review,
noting that the provision ‘implies, as a first step in the review, an examination of the specific
prohibitions found under international law to which the reviewing State is a party and which
bans or restricts the use of a weapon or method of warfare’.45 States must also consider any
binding customary international law – specifically the principle of distinction, its concomitant
  
40 Kathleen Lawand, ‘Reviewing the legality of new weapons, mean and methods of warfare’ (2006) 88(864)  
International Review of the Red Cross,  926. Note that the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement is attended by representatives of the Governments of the States Party.
41 ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, above note 29.
42 Lawand, above note 40, 927.
43 ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, above note 29, 5; See
also Tim McCormack, Report Commissioned by the Group of Government Experts of the States Parties to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (2006); Boothby, above note 27, 341.
44 Bruce Oswald, ‘The Australian Defence Force Approach to the Legal Review of Weapons’, Australian and
New Zealand Society of International Law 2001 Proceedings Papers, 63. Note the assessment in the  Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] I.C.J. Rep [53]-[63].
45 I Daoust, R Copeland and R Ishoey, ‘New Wars, new weapons? The obligation of States to assess the legality
of means and methods of warfare’ (2002) 846 International Review of the Red Cross 345, 349.
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prohibition on indiscriminate attack and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering46, and the
obligation in Article 35(3) not to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment.47  The fifth and final category for consideration, as articulated by
Daoust, Copeland and Ishoey, is ‘the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience’, also
known as the Martens Clause.48 The application of the Martens Clause to new weapons
technology was held in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion to have ‘continuing
existence and applicability’ and which has ‘proved to be an effective means of addressing the
rapid evolution of military technology’.49
Considerations, they note, should include:
• The intended use of the weapon in various contexts
• Whether other means or methods of warfare could achieve the same military purpose
• The implications of the weapon’s proliferation.
An expert meeting organised by the ICRC in January 2001 to consider the legal review of
weapons in light of the ICRC’s project on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering noted
that legal reviews needed to be both particularly rigorous and multidisciplinary especially
when weapons injure by means other than explosives, projectile force or burns and cause
unfamiliar effects and that the effects of weapons attributable to their design be taken into
account in reviews.50  
Retired Royal Air Force legal officer Dr William Boothby has also undertaken to promote the
case for Article 36 reviews. His book Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict makes the
case for Article 36 reviews and provides guidance on their conduct by states.51 Boothby’s
approach adds a couple of additional considerations – although these go to practical
  
46 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] I.C.J. Rep [78]; see also Daoust
et al, above note 45, 350.
47 Daoust et al, above note 45, 350.
48 Ibid 351.
49 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] I.C.J. Rep [78], [87]; see also
Daoust et al, above note 45, 351.
50 Daoust et al, above note 45, 353-4; Summary Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting, Switzerland (29-31
January 2001).
51 Boothby, above note 27, see particularly chapter 19.  
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considerations rather than lawful ones – such as future legal developments.52 An important
part of the legal review of weapons, the consideration of whether a weapon causes
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, was given particular attention by the ICRC’s
Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering Project, the SIrUS Project.53
Another important consideration is the application of Article 36 weapons reviews to
weapons, means or methods of warfare used in non-international armed conflict. Additional
Protocol 1 applies in times of international armed conflict and not in non-international armed
conflict, however, the customary legal review obligation arguably applies in both
international and non-international armed conflict. Blake and Imburgia cite the ICTY in
Tadic with the statement that ‘what is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in
international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife’ in support of this
argument.54
In 1974 Sweden established the Delegation for IHL Monitoring of Arms Projects55 to review
all ‘mainly anti-personnel56’ weapons to be used by Swedish armed forces. The Delegation,
consisting of representatives from the legal, military, medical and arms technology fields
meet three to four times annually. 57 Decisions are made by consensus. 58 The United States59
Weapons Review Program was also established in 1974. Like the Swedish Delegation the
Program was inspired by the Vietnam War. The Judge Advocate General of the relevant
military department (or, if more than one military department is involved the department with
primary responsibility) acquiring any weapon conducts the review using expertise obtained
from medical, environment and engineering experts and in some cases specific further
testing.60 The Norwegian system for the legal review of weapons involves a Committee
  
52 Ibid 346.
53 ICRC, The SIrUS Project: Towards a Determination of Which Weapons Cause ‘Superfluous Injury or
Unnecessary Suffering’(ICRC, 1997). See also Robin Coupland, ‘Review of the legality of weapons: a new
approach The SIrUS Project’ (1999) International Review of the Red Cross 835.
54 Blake and Imburgia, above note 27, at 167 citing ICTY Tadic, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction para 119. 127.
55 Legal Examination of Weapon Projects Act (Sweden); see also Marie Jacobssson, ‘Modern Weaponary and
Warfare: The Application of Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 by Governments’ in A. Helm (ed), The Law of
War in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use of Force (2006) 183 at 185.
56 Note that Daoust et al note from discussions with the Chair of the Delegation that ‘mainly’ is to be interpreted
broadly, see Daoust et al, above note 45, at 355.
57 Daoust et al, above note 45, at 355.
58 Ibid.
59 The United States is not a party to AP I.
60 Daoust et al, above note 45, at 357.
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chaired by the Legal Services Office of the Defence Command which, since 1999, has
conducted reviews of all weapons used in the Norwegian Armed Forces.61 In the United
Kingdom, the following statement about Article 36 was recently made to the parliament:  
[t]here are [weapons…] in the UK armed forces inventory which were brought into
service before the obligation to legally review against Article 36 [AP I …] came into
force. The obligation is not retrospective. Since 1999 all weapons and equipment
entering service have been subject to a formal legal weapons review in accordance
with Article 36.62
4.3 The application of Article 36 AP I in Australia
The adoption of a formal process for conducting Article 36 reviews in Australia is a relatively
recent development, dating only from 2005. It is also one that would appear only to extend to
the new weapons aspect of Article 36 – rather than also to a consideration of new means and
methods of warfare.63 Then Deputy Director of International Law (Defence Legal, Canberra),
noted in 2001 that the ADF was ‘currently in the process of drafting a Defence Instruction on
‘Legal Review of New Weapons’. ‘The draft Defence Instruction requires all actions by the
ADF with respect to the study, development, acquisition, adoption of new weapons to be
consistent with Australia’s international obligations.’64 A ‘Defence Instruction (General)’ was
issued pursuant to section 9A of the Defence Act 1903 on 2 June 2005 (applicable to all
weapons developed, acquired, adapted or modified after 1 June 200565).
The Defence Instruction requires the Director-General ADF Legal Service ‘to review all
proposed new weapons in accordance with this instruction to determine whether the new
weapons or their intended use in combat are consistent with the obligations assumed by the
Australian Government under all applicable treaties to which Australian is a party and with
customary international law.66 The Defence Instruction notes Article 36 AP I as the basis for
this requirement. 67 The requirement is noted as extending to ‘all new weapons to be studied,
developed, acquired, adopted or modified by the ADF’.68 As to weapons in use before this
  
61 Ibid 358.
62 Parliamentary Answer 7 December 2013, Armed Forces Minister, United Kingdom.
63 DOD, Defence Instruction General 2005 (on file with author).
64 Oswald, above note 44, 64.
65 DOD, Defence Instruction General 2005, [5].
66 Ibid [4].
67 Ibid [1].
68 Ibid [2].
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time Blake and Imburgia note that the ‘customary international law requirement for a
weapons legal review created a rebuttable presumption of legality of pre-existing weapons
and munitions’.69
Annex A to the Defence Instruction provides a form for the legal review of weapons, which
in addition to weapon identification information includes the following questions for
consideration:
• Intended use of the weapon
• Intended effect of the weapon on material and personnel
• Reason for acquiring the weapon
• Injuries that are likely to be caused by the normal use of the weapon
• Other weapons capable of fulfilling the same purposes as those envisaged for the
weapon
• Other armed forces or agencies in Australia or overseas that have the weapon in their
inventory or are considering introducing the weapon into service
• Evaluation of the weapon available from the armed forces of other countries or from
other agencies in Australian or overseas.
The Directorate of Operations and Security Law (DOSL) is currently undertaking a process
of reviewing the Defence Instruction. The Directorate of Operations and Security Law 
(DOSL) has advised the following in relation to their review:
‘DOSL is in the process of reviewing the Defence Instruction because it no longer 
accurately reflects how weapons reviews are conducted; as a result of lessons learnt and 
advances made over the last 10 years, the current process is more comprehensive than 
that described in the existing Defence Instruction. The experience of legal reviewers 
indicates that this policy may benefit from considering:
· reference to best practices from current reviews;
· formalising the involvement of legal officers earlier in the weapons development 
process
  
69 Blake and Imburgia, above note 27, at 166-7.
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· investigating whether use of appropriate legal and other subject matter experts would 
enhance the efficiency and quality of legal reviews;
· adding extra functionality and procedural control;
· whether the process could more effectively address the review of the means and 
methods of warfare and, if so, at what level; and
· referencing dissemination, training, standardisation and quality control mechanisms 
(such as accessibility and a search function of the database of reviews).’70
On balance it is clear that Australia has one of the more robust systems of weapons review
for compatibility with the Geneva Conventions around the world and it is seeking to further
improve this process. Through doing so, Australia is showing strong respect for IHL in
relation to new weapons technology under consideration for possible ADF acquisiton.
5. Australian approach to weapons law as evidenced in military training and
Australian military manuals and policy
Teaching soldiers, sailors and airforce personnel about the rules of armed conflict is an
obligation placed on all governments pursuant to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocols I and III.71 That is, as widely as possible, including to military personnel
and medical personnel, States Party to the Conventions must disseminate the texts ‘so that the
principles thereof may become known to the entire population’.72 Further, pursuant to AP I
article 82, States Party are required to ‘ensure that legal advisers are available, when
necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the
Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to armed
forces’.73  These are clearly articulated provisions that go to the obligation to respect and
ensure respect for IHL.
Formal training on the laws of armed conflict was introduced into the Australia Defence
Force in February 1983.74 This was specifically stated as being to meet the requirements in
IHL including the Geneva Conventions.75 Standard Laws of Armed Conflict presentations by
  
70 Email COL PA Cumming to E Massingham, 12 January 2016 (on file with author).
71 GC I art 47; GC II art 48; GC III art 127;  GC IV art 144; AP I art 83; AP II art 19.
72 Ibid.
73 AP I art 82.
74 ICRC, ‘Customary IHL Australia Practice Relating to Rule 142. Introduction of International Humanitarian
Law Training within Armed Forces’ [VI].
75 Ibid.
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military legal officers note the prohibition on certain types of weapons and the principles of
targeting law.76
The ICRC’s Customary Law Study has recorded significant information about the Australian
Military’s Law of Armed Conflict Manual, which dates from 2006, and the Australian
Commanders’ Guide, which dates from 1994. The information for this Study was provided to
the ICRC by the Australian government via a report prepared by McCormack.77 The
following information is included, with regard rule 139 ‘Respect for International
Humanitarian Law’, which deals specifically with knowledge of IHL.
Australia’s Commanders’ Guide (1994) states that “Australia is responsible for
ensuring that its military forces comply with LOAC” and that “all ADF members are
responsible for ensuring that their conduct complies with the LOAC…
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states:…[T]he first step to enforcement of the
LOAC is to ensure as wide a knowledge of its provisions as possible both within and
outside the armed forces.78
The ICRC also notes that Australia referenced its armed forces’ service in East Timor and in
the Solomon Islands as being ‘distinguished by the respect for the principles of international
humanitarian law’.79
With regard to rule 142 ‘Instruction in International Humanitarian Law within Armed
Forces’, the study cites:
Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) [which] states:
13.2 All ADF members are responsible for ensuring that their conduct complies with
LOAC. They are to be trained in its basic principles and avoid breaches of these laws.
…
Australia’s Defence Training Manual (1994) states that one of the tasks of the legal
adviser of the armed forces is to “supervise the organisation of instruction in
subordinate units, and to ensure that the levels of understanding are obtained”.
…
  
76 See, eg. Squadron Leader Dale Hooper, ‘The principles of IHL’ (Speech delivered at Red Cross IHL Course
for ADF, Brisbane, May 2014); Lietuenant Colonel Damian Copeland ‘Exploring weapons law’ (Speech
delivered at Red Cross IHL Course for ADF, Brisbane, May 2014) (on file with author).
77 Tim McCormack, 'An Australian perspective on the ICRC customary international humanitarian law study' in
A. Helm (ed), The Law of War in the 21st Century: Weaponry and the Use of Force (2006) 81, 84-5.
78 ICRC, ‘Customary IHL Australia Practice Relating to Rule 139. Respect for International Humanitarian Law’
[B III].
79 Ibid [VI].
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Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states: “Military commanders of all Services and at
all levels bear responsibility for ensuring that forces under their control comply with
LOAC.”
The 2006 ADF Publication Law of Armed Conflict is currently under review. A release date
is yet to be confirmed. This publication requires updating for a number of reasons including
the ADFs operational experience since 2006 and in light of trends in emerging
technologies.80
On the question of compliance with the laws of armed conflict DOSL has noted:
The ADF obligation to comply with LOAC is not conditional upon an enemy’s 
compliance: unilateral compliance by the ADF is required. ADF members are open to 
prosecution for beaches of LOAC. Individual responsibility for compliance cannot be 
avoided and ignorance is not a justifiable excuse. ADF members will be held to account 
for any action that leads to a breach of LOAC, including where appropriate prosecution 
under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth). If such acts are committed, 
compliance with unlawful orders of a superior officer is not a justifiable excuse. If an 
order is ambiguous, clarification should be sought. If clarification is unavailable, any 
action taken must comply with LOAC. ADF members are obligated to report any breach 
of LOAC whether by ADF forces, coalition or allied forces as soon as practically 
possible.81
6. Import and export controls on weapons and weapons development materials
States should consider the legality of any weapons that they export in line with the obligation
to respect and ensure respect for IHL.82 This is because, given the centrality of weapons to
the conduct of armed conflict, it is important for the fulfillment of Australia’s Common
Article 1 obligations that Australia is not facilitating the use of inherently unlawful weapons
by third states through its imports and exports. While there is no evidence that Australia
specifically considers this with reference to Common Article 1, in implementing a number of
other treaty obligations83, and in the national interest, Australia has a number of controls on
import and export. Australia also has shown some leadership in this area globally.
  
80 Email COL PA Cumming to E Massingham, 12 January 2016 (on file with author).
81 Email COL PA Cumming to E Massingham, 12 January 2016 (on file with author).
82 Daoust et al, above note 45, 352.
83 The requirement for import and export controls may also come directly from a variety of international treaty
law obligations such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. See for example Article three of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction prohibits, by any State Party, the ‘transfer to any recipient
whatsoever …  [of] any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery’ covered by that
83
In 1985, following the finding by the United Nations of the use of chemical weapons during
the Iran-Iraq war, the Australian Government proposed an international meeting of nations
interested in strengthening and harmonizing export controls.84 Fifteen nations and the
European Commission met in Brussels in June 1985 under the name the Australia Group.
Today the group, which meets in Paris, includes over 40 nations as well as the European
Union. 85 The Australia Group states its principal objective as being ‘to use licensing
measures to ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use
chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the
spread of [chemical and biological weapons]’. 86
Australia is also a member of a number of other frameworks aimed at harmonisation and
restrictions on weapons related export controls. For example, by virtue of being a state party
to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Australia is a member of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.87 Since 1990 Australia has been a member of the Missile
Technology Control Regime.88 The Missile Technology Control Regime was an initiative of
the Canadian, French, German, Italian, Japanese, United Kingdom and United States
governments.89 Established in 1987 the Regime’s members ‘share the goals of non-
proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction’. The work of the Missile Technology Control Regime is around the coordination
of national export licences to ensure that systems capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction are not exported.90
    
Convention. That same article also prohibits any assistance or encouragement to others to manufacture said
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery. For a discussion of this in the American context see
Blake and Imburgia, above note 27, 197-200.
84 Australia Group. The origins of the Australia Group, (2007) <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.html>.
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid. The group maintains five export control lists: Chemical Weapons Precursors; Dual-use chemical
manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology and software; Dual-use biological equipment and
related technology and software; Human and Animal Pathogens and Toxins; Plant pathogens.
87 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Member State - Australia
<http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/member-states-by-region/western-europe-and-other-
states/member-states-australia/ >.
88 Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR Partners  <http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html>.
89 Missile Technology Control Regime, The Missile Technology Control Regime
<http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html>.
90 Ibid.
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Australia is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Australia is one of 41 participating member
states of the Wassenaar Arrangement91 (discussed further in chapter five).
Australia is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.92 Participating states in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group implement in their domestic setting the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Guidelines. These Guidelines are complementary to other legal frameworks pertaining to
nuclear weapons, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and require that transfers of
the relevant goods and materials are only ever authorised if the transferring state is ‘satisfied
that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons’.93
Domestically Australia has a number of measures, overseen by the Defence Export Control
Office (DECO), to restrict supply and transfer of weapons and materials for weapons. The
Australian Government notes that the Australian Customs Services works with the DOD to
ensure that Australia complies with its international obligations in relation to the transfer of
materials, equipment and technology which could contribute to the development of
weapons.94 DECO describes the government policy as being ‘to encourage the export of
defence and dual-use goods where it is consistent with Australia's broad national interests’. It
notes the export policy criteria as including considerations regarding international
obligations, human rights, regional security, national security and foreign policy
considerations.95 A Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Defence Exports, consisting of
representatives from the Departments of Defence, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Attorney-General and Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
also exists for the purpose of considering particularly sensitive export issues.96
  
91 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,
Frequently Asked Questions <http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html>.
92 Nuclear Suppliers Group, Participants <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/participants1>.
93 Nuclear Suppliers Group, About the NSG <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-us>.
94 Australian Government, Export Controls for Defence and Strategic Goods, <
http://www.border.gov.au/EnteringorleavingAustralia/Documents/Export%20Control%20for%20Defense%20st
rategic%20goods.pdf#search=export%20controls >.
95 DOD, About the Defence Export Control Office, <http://www.defence.gov.au/DECO/AboutUs.asp>; See also
Explanatory Memorandum., Defence Controls Bill 2011.
96 DOD, Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Defence Exports
<http://www.defence.gov.au/DECO/SIDCDE.asp>.
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The Customs Act 1901 (Cth) provides the legal framework for goods whose importation and
exportation to or from Australia is either restricted or prohibited.97 As DECO notes, this
includes allowing for ‘controls on the export of tangible defence and strategic dual-use goods
and technologies’.98 The Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 (Cth) set up the
need for permits or licences for exporters of controlled goods. Regulation 13E provides for
the possibility of written authorisation by the Minister of Defence for members of the ADF to
grant licences or give permission to export from Australia goods which are listed in the
Defence and Strategic Goods List. For some goods, customs officers are also given this
power. The Defence and Strategic Goods List (dated November 1996, as amended) deals
with both military goods (including both munitions and non-lethal military goods) (part 1)
and dual use goods (part 2).  Components, testing and production equipment and software
and technology related to these goods are also controlled. The DECO website notes that it
assesses around 4500 applications for export permits each year.99
In 2012, measures to strengthen Australia’s defence exports controls were introduced in the
form of the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (Cth). As the explanatory memorandum to the
Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011 notes, by 2011 Australia’s export control legislative
regime dating from the early to mid 1990s required some amendments to ensure best practice
with international standards was maintained.100 The Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (Cth)
had two purposes.  The first was to fill identified gaps in the existing export control regime
(gaps which had been identified for some time and the closing of which would prepare
Australia to give effect to the Arms Trade Treaty101) namely relating to
• intangible transfer of technology;
• provision of services relating to defence and strategic goods and technology;
• brokering of supply of these goods, technology and related services; and
  
97 See particularly Paragraph 112(2A)(aa) regarding Defence goods.
98 DOD, The Customs Act 1901 <http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/CustomsAct.asp>.
99 Ibid.
100 Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011, 4-5. For example, regulation 13E was
originally introduced into the Regulations by the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations Amendment 1987
(Cth) (Regulation 115 of 1987).  
101 Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011, 11. See further chapter six for a discussion of
this.
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• exportation of goods intended for a military end use that may prejudice Australia’s
security, defence or international relations.102
The second was to implement the Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation which
was agreed to in 2007 to ‘create a framework for two-way trade between Australia and the
United States of America (US) in defence articles between “trusted communities” without the
need for export licence’.103 A subsequent Implementing Arrangement (IA) was finalised on
14 March 2008.104 The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill 2015, which proposes a
number of amendments to the Defence Trade Control Act 2012 (Cth) is currently before
parliament following public consultation processes in January 2015.105 The Bill is effectively
designed to deal with a number of practical and other concerns associated with implementing
the Defence Trade Control Act 2012 (Cth) which have arisen during the two year transition
period built into that Act.106 For completeness it is noted that the Customs (Prohibited
Exports) Regulations 1958 also specifically includes a number of restrictions on exports of
arms to particular countries including, as at March 2015, Iran, Eritrea, the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Sudan.107 The Regulations define arms or related material to include
weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare
parts for weapons, ammunition and military vehicle and equipment.108
As a general rule Australia prohibits the supply and export of goods and services that may be
used to contribute to a weapons of mass destruction program through the administration of
the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (Cth).109 However,
if the view that any use of a weapon of mass destruction would violate IHL is accepted, of
concern from a Common Article 1 perspective is section 13 of the Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (Cth). Section 13 provides that if a person
wishes to supply or export goods or services that may be used in a weapons of mass
  
102 Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011, 5.
103 Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011, 4.
104 Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011, 30.
105 DOD, ‘Public comment sought on Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill 2015’ (Media release, 17
December 2014).
106 DOD, Public presentation <http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/_Master/docs/Consultation-Docs/Public%20---
%20Consultation-Slides.pdf>.
107 Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958, Regulation 13CK-CT.
108 Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958, Regulation 13E s 2(1).
109 Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (Cth) ss 9-12.
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destruction program then that person may apply for a permit to do so. If the Minister ‘is
satisfied that the supply or export of the goods or the provision of services … would not be
contrary to Australia’s international or treaty obligations or the national interest’110 the
Minister may issue a permit. While Australia’s domestic laws are therefore very broad (and
indeed broader than required by virtue of Australia’s international obligations), in that they
cover any goods or services that may be used in a weapons of mass destruction program, the
discretional element means they are not absolute.
Some concern has been expressed by some interest groups about Australia’s arms exports.
The Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Australia) notes that Australia allows the
purchase of restricted defence goods by a number of countries with concerning human rights
records.111  It is clear that Australia could benefit from considering Common Article 1
obligations in the import and export control legal frameworks it has established as a form of
check and balance on the import and export decisions it makes. This is to ensure that such
decisions do not help facilitate the failure by other states to respect and ensure respect for
IHL.
7. Criminalisation of weapons law violations
In addition to robust legislation and comprehensive education about that legislation, effective
weapons laws require the application of penalties for violations. It is therefore necessary to
briefly outline the mechanisms in place which enable Australia to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute violations of these laws. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols are implemented in Australia through the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth) and
the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), particularly as amended by the International Criminal Court
Act 2002 (Cth) and the International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002.
These later two acts introduce the possibility of prosecutions in Australia for international
crimes. 112 Chapter 8, Division 268 of the Criminal Code deals with Offences against
  
110 Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (Cth) ss 13 (d).
111 Medical Association for the Prevention of War, Australia’s arms industry
<https://www.mapw.org.au/australian-issues/australias-arms-industry>.
112 Gillian Triggs, ‘Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: A Quiet
Revolution in Australian Law’ (2003) 25(4) Sydney Law Review 507. Note the assessment in section 5 that the
previous Australian criminal laws have ‘failed either to prompt persecutions or to gain convictions’ and at
section 8  ‘[n]o prosecutions of offences had been initiated under the Geneva Conventions Act 1958 in relation
to war crimes committed after 1945’. Note also the concerns of Tim McCormack that while ‘[a]ny alleged war
crimes, crimes against humanity or acts of genocide committed anywhere in the world after 1 July 2002 (the
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humanity, specifically genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against the
administration of the justice of the ICC.
Significant penalties of up to 25 years imprisonment113 apply to the weapons specific war
crimes of:
• employing poison or poisoned weapons (Section 268.55)
• employing prohibited gases, liquids, materials or devices (268.56)
• employing prohibited bullets (268.57).
Similarly, employing lawful weapons in an unlawful manner, for example destruction and
appropriation of property114, attacking civilians or civilian property115, attacking personnel or
objects involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission116, attacking
undefended places117 are all criminalized through this legal framework.
Australia’s record on bringing prosecutions for war crimes has not been a good one. A
comprehensive discussion of this is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, repression of
IHL violations are fundamental to the concept of respect for IHL and as such this topic is
briefly addressed here. With the exception of some war crimes trials immediately post World
War II, Australia has not successfully prosecuted any war criminals and in more recent times
has demonstrated a concerning approach to the application of IHL in Australian criminal
cases.118 In 2010 the Director of Military Prosecutions controversially (and ultimately,
according to the military’s chief judge advocate, incorrectly) charged Australian commando
soldiers with manslaughter by negligence over an attack in Afghanistan which resulted in
    
commencement date of the legislation) can now be prosecuted in Australian courts’, gaps remain in our pre 1
July 2002 legal framework: Tim McCormack, Investigating and Prosecuting War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, (2 June 2010, Human Rights Law Centre) <http://hrlc.org.au/investigating-and-prosecuting-war-
crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/ > . See also T. McCormack, 'The contribution of the international criminal
court to increasing respect for international humanitarian law' (2008) 27 University of Tasmania Law Review 22,
44-46.
113 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Cf penalties for other war crimes in division 268 such as 17 years for
outrages upon personal dignity and 15 years for pillaging.
114 Ibid s. 268.
115 Ibid ss. 268.35 and 36.
116 Ibid s. 268.37.
117 Ibid s. 268.39.
118 Georgina Fitzpatrick et al (eds), Australia’s War Crimes Trials 1945-1951 (Brill Nijhoff, 2016)
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civilian casualties.119 Manslaughter, while a crime under domestic law, is not a concept
known to the laws of armed conflict. If a war crime had been committed, then charges of that
nature were appropriate. Manslaughter charges were not. As McCormack has articulated,
‘negligence has never been an acceptable fault element for the perpetration of a war crime’
and that he hopes we never again see such charges being laid without reference to IHL, the
legal framework applicable in armed conflict.120
Professor McCormack has also expressed, on a number of occasions, his frustration at failure
by both sides of government to tackle the issue of war criminals living freely in Australia.121
Journalist Mark Aarons has also drawn attention to the issue of war criminals living in
Australia with impunity.122 In December 1998 the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) was amended
to allow for prosecutions of World War II war criminals living in Australia. This came
following the publication of a report looking at allegations that Nazi war criminals had been
helped to settle in Australia by the Australian Government and international attention to the
issue of war criminals 123 A cabinet minute from 19 February 1987 detailing the government
response to the Menzies report provided for the establishment of a Special Investigations Unit
to look at possible prosecutions of war criminals in Australia.124 Attorney-general Lionel
Bowen told cabinet in March 1988 that the original number of suspected war criminals had
gone from more than 70 to more than 450.125 Ivan Polyukhovich was the first to be
prosecuted under the laws, with proceedings taking place between 1990 and 1993. Ultimately
  
119 Lyn McDade, ‘Statement by the Director of Military Prosecutions: 12 February 2009 civilian casualty
incident in Afghanistan’  (Media release, MSPA 458/10, 27 September 2010).
120 Tim McCormack, ‘Commandos finally get justice’, The Age (online), 25 May 2011
<http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/commandos-finally-get-justice-20110524-1f2dl.html >.
121 Mick Bunworth, Interview with Tim McCormack (Television interview, 29 May 2001); Tim McCormack,
‘Investigating and Prosecuting War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, (Human Rights Law Centre, 3 June
2010). See also Gideon Boas, ‘Australia left wanting when allegations of war crimes arise’ Sydney Morning
Herald (online), 4 April 2011) <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/australia-left-
wanting-when-allegations-of-war-crimes-arise-20110404-1cxe3.html>.  
122 Mark Aarons, War Criminals Welcome: Australia, a Sanctuary for War Criminals Since 1945 (Black Inc,
2001)
123 ACC Menzies, Review of Material Relating to the Entry of Suspected War Criminals into Australia
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987). See also Gillian Triggs, Australia’s War Crimes
Trials: A moral necessity or legal minefield? (1987) Melbourne University Law Review, 382, 382-383; Unit
failed to nail war criminals, The Australian (online), 2 January 2014 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-
depth/cabinet-papers/unit-failed-to-nail-war-criminals/story-fnkuhyre-1226793357314>.
124 Cabinet Submission 4576 ‘Government response to Menzies' Report - Decision 8958’. (Contents range 09
Feb 1987 - 19 Feb 1987, NAA: A14039, 4576).  
125 Damian Murphy, ‘Cabinet papers 1988-89: Nazi war crimes trials; rise of extreme racism’ , The Sydney
Morning Herald (online) 1 January 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/cabinet-
papers-198889-nazi-war-crimes-trials-rise-of-extreme-racism-20141231-12atsu.html> ; Unit failed to nail war
criminals, The Australian (online), 2 January 2014 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/cabinet-
papers/unit-failed-to-nail-war-criminals/story-fnkuhyre-1226793357314.
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he was acquitted of the 6 murders he stood trial for (other charges relating to the mass murder
of 850 Jews from Serniki in Ukraine not being able to be substantiated). A lack of evidence
and clear testimony being available, so long after the fact, made this trial very problematic.126
These problems also plagued two subsequent trials, before the Special Investigations Unit
was closed down, and more recently the government has shown a continued reluctance to
prosecute war criminals living in Australia.127  
As such, while the legal frameworks exist, Australia does not have a good record of ensuring
respect for IHL in the future by ensuring that those who violate it are brought to justice. If a
Common Article 1 analysis was required in considering how best to approach the issue of
war criminals living in Australia, Australia may be forced into a different approach. As Boas
points out  ‘we have a great anxiety about the resources involved in such prosecutions and an
even greater anxiety that the Australian public does not really support prosecuting people
who committed crimes — even war crimes — in other countries’.128 This ‘anxiety’ means
that Australia either does not live up to its obligations of prosecuting those who commit war
crimes and/or it hampers other states in their efforts to do so. Australia is better resourced
than most states to carry out these prosecutions and should be doing so pursuant to a range of
obligations, including Common Article 1 and therefore making a valuable contribution to
creating an international norm.  
8. Conclusion  
Common Article 1 requires that states implement the primary provisions of the Four Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols domestically. On paper, in terms of incorporating
the provisions of IHL into Australian law, Australia has a strong record of treaty ratification
  
126 See David Bevans, A case to Answer: The story of Australia’s first European War Crimes Prosecution
(Wakefield Press, 1994).
127 See Vasko Nastevski, ‘The Australian experience of conducting war crimes trials’ in Petrovic, J (ed)
Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Essays in Honour of Tim McCormack,
(Routledge, 2015) 214; Gideon Boas, ‘Australia left wanting when allegations of war crimes arise’ Sydney
Morning Herald (April 4 2011) <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/australia-left-
wanting-when-allegations-of-war-crimes-arise-20110404-1cxe3.html> . Note however that in July 2015
Australian citizen Dragan Vasiljkovic was extradited from Australia to face war crimes charges in Croatia after
he was refused leave to appeal to the high court. ‘Australian Dragan Vasiljkovic extradited to Croatia on war
crimes charges’ The Guardian (online) 8 July 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2015/jul/08/captain-dragan-vasiljkovic-extradited-australia-croatia-war-crimes-charges>.
128 Gideon Boas, ‘Australia left wanting when allegations of war crimes arise’ Sydney Morning Herald (April 4
2011) <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/australia-left-wanting-when-allegations-of-
war-crimes-arise-20110404-1cxe3.html>
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and domestic laws incorporating criminal obligations and export control obligations in
particular. Australia also has a strong record with regard to review of weapons for
compatibility with IHL. However, there are a number of instances identified in this chapter
where consideration of Common Article 1 obligations in the implementation of these
domestic laws would be of value and provide a source of further strength  - in particular with
regards to war crimes prosecutions and ministerial discretion around exports.  In all these
cases, requiring a Common Article 1 analysis or check would strengthen Australia’s record in
terms of compliance with IHL and therefore help contribute to global humanitarian security
outcomes. As such it is clear that Australia could benefit from greater consideration of
Common Article 1 as the overarching obligation by which all IHL related decisions are made.
Doing so would not only ensure that Australia demonstrated consistency in its approach to
IHL issues but would also be a valuable contribution to creating an international norm of IHL
compliance. In this thesis, further analysis in this regard will be made in respect of four
particular weapons law case studies.
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CHAPTER FOUR: AUSTRALIA, CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND THE OBLIGATION TO
RESPECT AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Chapter four provides an overview of the CCM1 which was adopted in 2008 and grounded in
the rules of IHL, in particular, the principle of distinction. It considers the approach taken by
Australia to the negotiation of the CCM, and its implementation by Australia. It answers the
questions: what approach has Australia taken to the regulation of cluster munitions by
international law; and what conclusions can be reached from this evaluation regarding the
approach of Australia to compliance with the obligation to respect and ensure respect
pursuant to Common Article 1? It argues that at least most of the types of cluster munitions
now prohibited by the Convention are those that are incompatible with IHL. As such
Common Article 1 applies to states in respect of these weapons. It notes that Common Article
1 has not featured in Australia’s approach to the treaty to date. The chapter raises particular
issues with Australia’s approach in light of the Common Article 1 obligation. It argues that
Australia has undermined Common Article 1 in relation to cluster munitions by working to
ensure that the CCM allows Australia to operate with other forces using cluster munitions,
even though the use of such weapons would violate the principles of IHL.  
1. What are cluster munitions?
A cluster munition is a weapon which consists of a casing which contains within it a number
of submunitions. The submunitions are intended to scatter when the casing opens, and to
explode on impact with the ground. The number of submunitions contained within the casing
can be up to 600.2 Cluster munitions are primarily deployed using either air power or artillery
fire and are designed to cover a large area. They are often directed against large targets such
as airfields, and against moving targets such as tanks or troops.3 Cluster munitions were first
used during World War II.4
  
1 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008, 48 ILM 357 (entered into force 1 August 2010) (‘CCM’)
Preamble final paragraph.
2 ICRC, Cluster munitions: what are they and what is the problem? (August 2010)
<www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/cluster-munitions-factsheet-2010.pdf>.
3 Bonnie Docherty, The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster Munitions Convention, (2007) 20
Harvard Human Rights Journal 53, 61.
4 The Cluster Munition Coalition notes the use in 1943 by German and Soviet forces of SD-1 and
SD-2 butterfly bombs: Cluster Munition Coalition, A history of harm,  
<http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-problem/history-harm/>; ICRC Mines-Arms Unit, Explosive
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Cluster munitions have two design aspects that give rise to humanitarian concern. The first is
the difficulty of limiting the dispersal of the submunitions to purely military objectives.
Secondly, the submunitions do not always explode when intended and so, like landmines,
they continue to pose a threat to the civilian population long after a conflict has ended. This
will be discussed in more detail below at part 4 of this chapter.
The ICRC reports that ‘[c]redible estimates of the failure rates of these weapons in recent
conflicts have varied from 10% to 40%’.5 Where they have been used, including in the last
decade in Lebanon in 20066, Georgia in 2008, Cambodia in 2011, Libya in 2014/5, Syria
since 2012, Ukraine in 2014/5, Yemen and Sudan in 20157, they have caused large numbers
of civilian casualties. This has been both through deliberate targeting of civilians and through
civilians being killed or wounded unintentionally – either as lawful or as unlawful collateral
damage, or from civilians becoming the victims of explosive remnants of war (ERW)8. The
death toll from cluster munitions up to 2006 was estimated at around 100,000 people.9
Handicap International Reported in 2006 that civilians comprised 98 percent of the casualties
of cluster munitions.10 Some 26 countries, at least, remain affected by cluster munition
ERW.11 There are billions of submunitions that have not yet exploded.12
From 1 August 2010, the CCM prohibited the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of
cluster munitions. The CCM has 91 States Party (as at the March 2015).  The CCM defines
cluster munitions in the following way:  
    
Remnants of War: Study on Submunitions and other unexploded ordinance (August 2000), 10; Nout van
Woudenberg, ‘The long and winding road towards an instrument on cluster munitions’ (2008) 12:3 Journal of
Conflict and Security Law (2008) 447, 447.
5 ICRC, Cluster munitions: what are they and what is the problem?, above note 2.
6 BBC News, UN denounces Israel Cluster bomb use (30 August 2006)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5299938.stm>.
7 Cluster Munition Coalition, A timeline of cluster bomb use (2015) http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-
gb/cluster-bombs/use-of-cluster-bombs/a-timeline-of-cluster-bomb-use.aspx ; See also at Henry Dowlan,
‘Cluster Munitions’ in Brooks et al (eds) Ryans Ballistic Trauma (Springer, 2011) 58-60.
8 See also S Cumberland, Banning Cluster Munitions (2009) 87(1) Bulletin of the World Health
Organisation, 8.
9 Nout van Woudenberg, above note 4, 449. Handicap International have a slightly more conservative tally  of at
least 16,921 confirmed globally, through the end of 2010 and noting, as many casualties go unrecorded, an
estimated global total of cluster munition casualties is estimated at between 20,000 and 54,000. Landmine and
Cluster Munition Monitor, Major Findings Cluster Munition Convention 2011 Report, <http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=cmm/2011/CMM_Major_Findings_2011.html>.
10 Handicap International, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions (2006) 42.
11 As at 1 July 2013, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Contamination and Clearance <http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=cmm/2013/CMM_Contamination_And_Clearance_2013.html>.
12 M Hiznay, ‘Operational and technical aspects of cluster munitions’ (2006) 4 Disarmament Forum, 15.
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“Cluster munition” means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or
release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes
those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:
(a) A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or
chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
(b) A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects;
(c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed
by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
(i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
(ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
(iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single
target object;
(iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-
destruction mechanism;
(v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-
deactivating feature;13
3. History of cluster munitions in Australia
In April 2010, the DOD advised ‘[t]o the best of our knowledge, the ADF has not used
cluster munitions as a weapon of war, and have never had operational stocks of the cluster
munitions to use’.14 Australia had ‘limited numbers’ of Karinga15 cluster bombs in the 1970s
and 1980s.16 Only 10-20 Karinga clusters were ever tested.17  In the 1970s and 1980s
Australia also possessed some United States CBU-58 cluster bombs for the purpose of ‘base
lining’ the Karinga munitions performance.18 Most Karingas and US CBU-58 cluster bombs
were destroyed in the 1990s.19 It is unclear why Australia never used the Karinga or other
cluster munitions. There is no evidence as to whether the reasons were related to
  
13 CCM, above note 1, art 2(2).
14 Mines Action Canada, Cluster Munitions Monitor 2010 Report, 122; See also in 2007 the DOD stated ‘[t]he
ADF does not presently use or produce cluster munitions’ - DOD, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into the Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Bill 2006, 27 February
2007, 3; National Interest Analysis, Convention on Cluster Munitions [2009] ATNIA 5 (11 March 2009).
15 The Karinga was an experimental cluster bomb developed by the Australian Defence Science and Technology
Organisation for employment by F111 strike aircraft. Australian War Memorial Collection, Cluster Bomb
Karinga <http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/REL/04840>.
16 Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 22 June 2009, 12 (Mr
Murry Perks); Mines Action Canada 2010, above note 14, 122.
17 Mines Action Canada, Cluster Munitions Monitor 2011 Report, 189.
18 Mines Action Canada 2010, above note 14, 122.
19 Mines Action Canada 2011, above note 17, 189.
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humanitarian concerns or simply the fact that this type of weapon did not provide a military
utility in the context of Australia’s arsenal.
Australia retains ‘representative samples of cluster munitions - most of them inert - solely for
research and testing’.20 Australia has two live cluster bombs of Soviet Union origin (which
contain several hundred live submunitions), and which were collected on the battlefield in
Afghanistan in 2001, and 13 inert cluster bombs and 2,320 inert submunitions which are
employed at various ADF training establishments across Australia.21 One American Rockeye
cluster bomb dispenser and some inert Rockeye munitions have also been noted to be held as
samples.22
Further, Australia has stated it does not intend to acquire an operational stockpile of cluster
munitions.23 Australia currently possesses some24 SMArt 155 weapons which they go to
some lengths to note are not cluster munitions within the definitional scope of the CCM
(indeed the Convention was drafted to exclude such weapons). SMArt 155 weapons contain
within them two submunitions.25 SMArt 155 weapons are anti-tank artillery rounds. The
DOD’s October 2007 press release describes the weapons:
[t]he ‘SMArt 155’ artillery round is a sensor-fused precision munition … for use
against tanks and other armoured vehicles in all weather and terrain environments.  
Each SMArt 155 artillery shell delivers two sensor-fused projectiles.  
The SMArt 155’s capacity for autonomous target detection makes it very accurate
against specific targets. … As a result, it poses little risk to non-combatant civilians.  
…  If a target is not detected, the SMArt 155 has redundant mechanisms that will
cause it to self-destruct, thus eliminating the threat to civilians from explosive
remnants of war.  …
In addition to Australia’s position on not acquiring or stockpiling its own cluster munitions,  
the Australian Government has stated it will not approve the stockpiling of cluster munitions
  
20 Mines Action Canada 2010, above note 14, 122. Article 3(6) of the CCM allows the retention of ‘a limited
number’ of munitions for the purpose of training in detection and counter-measures.  See further Leonard
Blazeby, ‘The Convention on Cluster Munitions and its Domestic. Implementation’ (2009) 35:9 Commonwealth
Law Bulletin, 721-726.
21 Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 22 June 2009, 12 (Mr
Murry Perks), 12.
22 Mines Action Canada 2011, above note 17, 189.
23 Mines Action Canada 2011, above note 17, 189; Commonwealth, Government and Defence statement in
response to Parliamentary Question on Notice, Parl Paper No. 2616 (7 November 2006).
24 Numbers are not disclosed. The contract value was noted as being $14m. DOD (Cth), ‘Defence purchases
new anti-tank artillery round’ (Media Release, CPA 346/07, 3 October 2007).  
25 These weapons fall outside the scope of the CCM as having less than 10 submunitions.
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in Australia by foreign governments.26 Then Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Senator
Feeney, stated that ‘[t]here are currently no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in
Australia. As a matter of policy, the government has not and will not authorise such
stockpiling’.27
4. Cluster munitions and international humanitarian law
Any analysis of the compatibility of any weapons system with IHL requires consideration of
the following four weapons law criteria28:
• whether the weapon is specifically regulated by treaty law;
• whether the weapon inherently has indiscriminate effects29;
• whether the weapon inherently causes unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury30;
and
• whether the weapon inherently causes widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment.31
4.1 Specific regulations in treaty law
In relation to cluster munitions, two treaties are relevant. The Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW), Protocol V on ERW (which was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in
2006)32 and  CCM (which was adopted in 2008 and entered into force in 2010)33.  
Protocol V on ERW began life at an expert meeting in 2000 where the ICRC made a call to
States Party to the CCW to explore the idea of a new protocol on ERW. ‘The purpose was to
  
26 Bob Carr, Stephen Smith, Mark Dreyfus, ‘Cluster Munitions’ (Joint Media Release, 1 April 2013).
27 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 21 August 2006, 80 (Senator Feeney).
28 Kathleen Lawand, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare (ICRC,
2006), William Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2009), 345-6: See
also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law –
Volume 1: Rules, (ICRC, 2005) (‘ICRC Customary Law Study’), rules 70 and 71 as well as rules 72-86.
29 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (‘AP I’) art
48 and 51(5).
30 AP I art 35(2), see also ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 28, rule 70.
31 AP I art 35(3), see also ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 28, rule 45 establishing these principles as a
rule in ‘international armed conflict, and arguably also in non-international armed conflict’.
32 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW Convention), 28 November 2003,
(entered into force 12 November 2006) (‘Protocol V CCW’).
33 See also, for a summary of the key articles, Leonard Blazeby, above note 20.
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reduce the threat posed by unexploded artillery shells, mortar shells, hand grenades, cluster
munitions, bombs and similar weapons often found after the end of active hostilities’.34
Australia ratified Protocol V in January 2007.35  Protocol V does not regulate the use of
cluster munitions in any way.  However, it does require signatories to ensure that ‘[a]fter the
cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible, each High Contracting Party and party
to an armed conflict shall mark and clear, remove or destroy explosive remnants of war in
affected territories under its control’.36
The CCM regulates the use of cluster munitions. Australia became a state party on 8 October
2012.37 The treaty requires that Australia ‘never under any circumstances … use cluster
munitions, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer … cluster
munitions…’ nor ‘assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited’ [to
a Convention State Party].38
The key obligations are to:
• ‘destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions…as soon as possible but not
later than eight years after the entry into force of th[e] Convention for that State
Party’39;
• ‘clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition
remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or
control’ – generally within 10 years40;
• provide assistance to cluster munitions victims  - including rehabilitation and
psychological care41; and
  
34 ICRC, Treaties and State Parties to Such Treaties, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/610>.
35 ICRC, Listing of States Parties: Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW
Convention,  
<http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelec
ted=610>.
36 Protocol V CCW art 3(2).
37 ICRC, Listing of States Parties: Convention on Cluster Munitions,
<http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelec
ted=620>.
38 CCM, art 1.
39 Ibid Art 3 (2).
40 Ibid art 4 (1).
41 Ibid art 5.
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• adopt national legislation (including penal sanctions) and other implementing
measures.42
States Party ‘in a position to do so’ are to provide technical, material and financial assistance,
including assistance with the implementation of Article 5, to States Party affected by cluster
munitions.43 The CCM allows the retention or acquisition of a limited number of cluster
munitions for training purposes including detection, clearance and destruction techniques, as
well as for the development of cluster munition counter measures.44  
The First Review Conference to the CCM was held in Croatia from 7-11 September 2005.45
The resultant Dubrovnik Declaration reaffirmed the commitment of States Party to fully
implement their obligations under the Convention including those pertaining to stockpile
destruction, survey, clearance, risk reduction education and those made to victims and
survivors.46 The Dubrovnik Declaration also noted the commitment to ‘ensure that cluster
munitions remain a stigmatized weapon’.47
The most contentious part of the CCM is the interoperability provision. Article 21 provides:
Relations with States not party to this Convention
1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify,
accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence
of all States to this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this
Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this
Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to
discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance
with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may
engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention
that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party:
  
42 Ibid art 9.
43 Ibid art 6.
44 Ibid art 3 (6).
45 UNDP, Review Conference < http://www.clusterconvention.org/meetings/1rc/>.
46 Draft 2015 Dubrovnik Declaration: Spectemur agendo (judged by our actions), CCM/CONF/2015/WP4, 1st
Rev Con, Item 9 (30 July 2015).  
47 Ibid.
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(a) To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions;
(b) To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions;
(c) To itself use cluster munitions; or
(d) To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of
munitions used is within its exclusive control.
This provision is concerned with ensuring that States Party, when working with counterparts
from states not signatory to the CCM, will not be acting in violation of the Convention if
those counterparts use cluster munitions in their operations. A fairly broad interpretation of
this provision has been taken in some jurisdictions although the ICRC has expressed the view
that domestic implementing legislation which would ‘permit the armed forces to be directly
involved in the use, possession and transport of cluster munitions taking place in the context
of military cooperation and operations’ is of increasing concern to the fulfilment of the
objective ‘to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster
munitions’ and the universality of the Convention.48  
This clause lies at the heart of the issue regarding Australia’s conduct and its Common
Article 1 obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL as it creates a tension with the
obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Without subsection 3 Australia well may not
have joined the Convention.49 This will be discussed further below.
4.2 Indiscriminate effects
A weapon which has inherently indiscriminate effects, as opposed to one that can be used in
an indiscriminate way, is unlawful. The principle of distinction between military and civilian
objects is fundamental to IHL. Article 48 of AP I provides that:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.50
  
48 ICRC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Interoperability and National Legislation The View of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (12 September 2012),
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2012/cluster-munitions-interoperability-icrc-2012-09-12.pdf>.
49 Naj Taylor, An inventory of Australian WikiLeaks cables relating to cluster munitions negotiations, Crikey,
(28 November 2011), <http://blogs.crikey.com.au/this-blog-harms/2011/11/28/an-inventory-of-australian-
wikileaks-cables-relating-to-cluster-munitions/>.
50 AP I art 48.
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The distinction principle forms a part of customary IHL as a norm applicable in both
international and non-international armed conflicts.51
Two further concepts, found in Article 51(5) of AP I, are relevant to cluster munitions:  
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
1. an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives
located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of
civilians or civilian objects
2. an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
There are two clear schools of thought on the legality of cluster munitions under IHL
principles. The first is that they are inherently unlawful by virtue of their indiscriminate
nature because of their large footprint and their high failure rates leaving ERW on the ground
for many years after their use.52 The second is that their use in certain circumstances, in
particular for wide area military targets and moving military targets can be lawful provided
their use complies with the law of targeting.53
Boothby notes there is:
an important distinction between weapons that are indiscriminate by nature and those
that have potentially indiscriminate effects. It is the former that breach the
discrimination principle as it applies to the law of weaponry, in that they are not
capable of discriminating use. … Their lawful use, their misuse, or the failure to take
appropriate action after their operational purpose has ended, may result in undesired
casualties. That does not of itself render them as weapons that are inherently
indiscriminate….54
  
51 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 28, rule 1. It is further described as a ‘cardinal rule’ of IHL in
Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 257.
52 Virgil Wiebe, ‘Footprints of Death: Cluster bombs and Indiscriminate Weapons under International
Humanitarian Law’ (2000), 22 Michigan Journal of International Law 85. For further discussion of these
arguments see also Thomas J Herthel, ‘On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of War’ (2001)
51 Air Force Law Review, 229, 249. Note that Herthel does not however, support the argument that cluster
munitions are indiscriminate.
53 See William Boothby, above note 28, 81-82; Meredith Hagger and Tim McCormack, ‘Regulating the Use of
Unmaned Combat Vehicles: Are General Principles of International Humanitarian Law Sufficient?’ (2012) 21
(2) Journal of Law, Information and Science, 74, [4]. Herthel, above note 52, 264.  
54 Boothby, above note 28. 81.
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The problem with the first approach is that it does not fully recognise the great number of
different types of cluster munitions, which have varying numbers of submunitions with
varying capacity for accuracy and varying failure rates. Human Rights Watch notes that 208
different types of cluster munitions exist.55 Some of these weapons are ones which have very
high failure rates, very high numbers of sub-munitions and no precision guidance. These
weapons are inherently indiscriminate. However, other cluster munitions may have very low
failure rates, small number of submunitions and/or precision guidance such that they can be
used to achieve the neutralisation of a military objective in accordance with the principles of
IHL.
The question of where the line is drawn between lawful and unlawful cluster munitions was
therefore the subject of debate during the Oslo process. Concerted discussions of the global
community have concluded that those weapons with more than ten explosive submunitions
are prohibited and that, if there are fewer than ten explosive submunitions, they must have
precision guidance and self-deactivation mechanisms in order to be lawful.56 The fact that the
States Party decided to frame the treaty is this way is not necessarily an indication of their
views on where the line is drawn between the types of cluster munitions that breach the
principles of IHL and those that don’t. However, in light of the fact that this treaty was
developed to address this specific humanitarian consequence, an inference can be drawn that
this is at the very least a good indication of where this line is drawn. Further, even if this view
is seen as too narrow, and arguments can be made that some cluster munitions falling outside
of this definition are still able to comply with the principles of IHL, and could lawfully be
used by non-state parties, the reality is that a great number of types of cluster munitions
cannot comply with the principles of international law. It is on this basis that this chapter
argues that supporting states in the use of inherently unlawful cluster munitions is in breach
of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL.  
4.3 Unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury
Article 35 (2) of AP I provides that ‘[i]t is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering’. This provision is applicable in both international and non-international armed
  
55 Human Rights Watch, ‘Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions’,
May 2002, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/arms/submunitions.pdf>, 1.
56 See CCM art 1(2)(2)(c).  
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conflict.57  The rationale behind this rule was articulated in the preamble to the 1868 St
Petersburg Declaration which notes that the ‘object [of disabling enemy combatants] would
be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled
men, or render their death inevitable’.58
A few key points can be made about this principle:
• the inclusion of both the phrases superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering reflect
the fact that ‘both physically observable and psychological elements are included’59;
• the rule is concerned with the objective nature of the weapon rather than the subjective
intention of those employing the weapon60;
• horrendous suffering is not necessarily unnecessary suffering61; and
• weapons the subject of specific treaty or customary rule which prohibits or restricts
their use are not necessarily weapons which inherently cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering62 (ie. their use may have been regulated or restricted for other
reasons).
Superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering are comparative and not absolute concepts and
it is therefore necessary to ascertain the nature of the comparator. Boothby concludes that the
‘purpose for which the weapon is being employed’ must be the comparator. Boothby uses the
‘the nature and scale of the generic military advantage to be anticipated from the use of the
weapon in the applications for which it is designed to be used’ as articulating this purpose
when compared with ‘the pattern of injury and suffering associated with the normal, intended
use of the weapon’ as the comparator.63 There are some theoretical arguments in relation to
  
57 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 28, rule 70.
58 William Boothby, above note 28, 55. Jonathan Crowe and Kylie Weston-Scheuber, Principles of
International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar, 2013) 51-52.
59 William Boothby, above note 28, 58-59.
60 Y Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2004) 59.
61 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (Judgment) [1996] ICJ Rep [13] (Judge
Higgins).
62 William Boothby, above note 28, 60.
63 William Boothby, above note 28,  63 citing WJ Fenrick, ‘The Conventional Weapons Convention: A modest
but useful treaty’, (1990) 279 IRRC 498, 500; William Hays Parks, ‘Means and methods of warfare’,
Symposium issued in Honour of Edward R Cummings (2006), 38 GW ILR 511, (fn 25); M Bothe, KJ Partsch,
and WA Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1982) 200–1.
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how this should be done but, in effect, the current weapon choice which will potentially be
replaced by the new weapon is likely to be the comparator. If a weapon which is under
review would cause greater injury or suffering than the weapons systems already available
and used by the military, and if the weapon under review does not provide any additional
military advantage to the attacking forces then the new weapon probably falls foul of the rule
prohibiting superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.64
Applying this concept to cluster munitions the comparator is likely to be existing artillery
rounds or airborne missiles. There is nothing in the nature of a cluster munition compared to
these other types of explosives that causes any more or less injury or suffering than any other
explosive rounds of the same size and explosive material.65 Even the fact that one cluster
munition will, in theory, cause hundreds of small explosions does not change this.
Cluster munition injuries are horrendous. For example:  
[i]n 50% of cases the traumatic consequences are fatal. The damage done to the body
by these weapons is not only caused by the explosion itself but also by the earth,
bacteria, pieces of clothing and fragments of metal and plastic that find their way into
the body tissue. Not only can they lead to the amputation of the limb(s) affected but
they may also cause permanent damage to the hands, arms, genitalia, face, eyes and
ears.66
However, unlike the weapons this rule was originally codified to prohibit – bullets which
explode within the body to cause great suffering through militarily unnecessary internal
injury67 – these munitions do not inherently cause unnecessary suffering in the sense of the
blast impact itself. As Herthel notes, ‘whether cluster munitions cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering can only be determined on a case-by-case basis and in light of current
military necessity’.68
  
64 William Boothby, above note 28, 346.
65 See generally Herthel, above note 52, 257-259.
66 Handicap International, The impact of landmines and cluster munitions, <http://www.handicap-
international.org.uk/what_we_do/landmines_cluster_munitions/impact> ; see also that similar conclusions are
found in a study conducted between 2006 and 2012 by the Faculty of Medical Sciences of the Lebanese
University which looked at 350 victims of submunition explosions and the injuries included blast injuries with
fragmentation or shrapnel penetrating the head, face, torso, abdomen, pelvis and/or extremities. When cluster
submunition fragments become lodged in the body it can cause tissue damage and infectious complications:
Fares et al, ‘Trauma-related infections due to cluster munitions’ (2013) 6(6) Journal of Public Health 482, 483.
67 Crowe and Weston-Scheuber, above note 58, 51.
68 Herthel, above note 52, 259.
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4.4 Widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment
Weapons which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the natural environment are prohibited by Article 35(3) AP I.69 Cluster
munitions need to be considered here in two respects, their initial use, and the consequences
of munitions which fail to detonate when intended. Clusters munitions themselves are not
intended to cause damage to the natural environment. Rather they are intended to attack
targets dispersed over a wide area and have a militarily utility against targets such as ‘soft-
skinned vehicles, accumulations of troops and other military assets, and certain types of
armour’.70 Further, should all the munitions detonate when intended it could not be said that
they may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment. If all the munitions detonate when intended, a cluster munition’s environmental
effects are no different to other forms of explosive weapons. Their impacts, therefore, do not
fit within the definition of Article 35(3) which requires widespread, long-term and severe
damage.
However, the fact is that cluster munitions do not always work as intended.  The life
expectancy of a submunition in the soil can be significant. The submunitions dropped in
Laos, for example, have a life expectancy of approximately 100 years.71 The UN Mine
Action Service environment impact study from 2007 notes that removal operations
significantly damage the environment, and long-term damage arises from destruction of flora,
contamination of water systems, and damage to the natural habitats of wildlife.72
Giving further weight to this argument, the ICRC describes Article 35(3) in terms of
protection for the climate, ecosystems and the ‘balance of the natural living and
environmental conditions’73 and the deliberate modification of the environment.74 Dowlen
  
69 AP I art 35. Other provisions of AP I also protect the environment against attack, such as AP I art 55(1),
however while art 35 is addressed solely to environmental protection, AP I art 55 is concerned with the ability
of the civilian population to retain the use of the natural environment for their survival. Note AP 54, 55(1).
Crowe and Weston-Scheuber, above note 58, 68; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 28, 146.
70 William Boothby, above note 28, 255.
71 Henry Dowlen, ‘Cluster Munitions’ in AJ Brookes et al (eds) Ryan’s Ballistic Trauma (Springer, 2011), 61.
72 United Nations Mine Action Service, Safety & occupational health – Protection of the environment.
International Mine Action Standard (2007)
<http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MAS/documents/imas-international-
standards/english/series-10/IMAS-10-70-Ed1.pdf> ; ibid.
73 Y Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva, 1987) [1444].
74 Ibid [1451].
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points out that ‘ERW degrade habitats by altering food chains, making conservation of
protected areas difficult, and polluting the soil and water supplies.75
Again, whether cluster munitions violate this principle must therefore be considered on a
case-by-case basis.
4.5 Cluster munitions and targeting law
Given that not all cluster munitions are not inherently unlawful, a few comments will be
made about cluster munitions and targeting law to see whether their use in a particular
situation is compatible with the rules of IHL more generally.  This requires consideration of
the principles of distinction and proportionality. For Australian use, this only needs
consideration for munitions with fewer than 10 submunitions because Australia is precluded
from using any munition with a greater number of submunitions by virtue of its CCM
oblgiations. For interoperability a broader approach is necessary to take into account when
Australian forces are operating with a non-State Party to the CCM.
The principle of distinction requires that in deciding to attack with cluster munitions only
military objectives be the object of attack. This is possible with cluster munitions, provided
they are correctly used in the circumstances prevailing at the time.  Significantly, however,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which had cause to consider
the legality of the use of cluster munitions during attacks on Zagreb (Croatia) in May 1995 in
the Martic judgment, held that, by using cluster munitions, the defendants evidenced an
intention to target civilians.76 In this case, cluster munitions were deliberately used in an area
with a concentration of civilians in breach of the principle of distinction.  
The principle of proportionality provides that it is prohibited to launch an attack that may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian
property that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.77 This principle is also reflected in customary IHL for both international and non-
  
75 Henry Dowlen, above note 71, 62. Although it is noted that concerns about cluster munition ERW are not
considered as significant as for other ERW and that some argue that ERW can be protective of the environment
against development.
76 See further Virgil Wiebe, ‘For Whom the Little Bells Toll: Recent Judgments by International Tribunals on
the Legality of Cluster Munitions’ (2007-8) 35 Pepperdine Law Review, 895, 898-9.
77 AP I arts 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii).
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international armed conflict.78 Cluster munitions require additional considerations to be taken
into account when deciding if using them on a target is proportionate.
The question is whether, when a weapon is properly targeted against a military
objective, the risk that munitions will fail to explode when intended and thereby
create a potential danger to civilians is sufficient to render indiscriminate or
disproportionate an attack which would not be otherwise so regarded… If there is
known to be a serious risk that a significant percentage of the munitions or
submunitions used against a target will not explode and will remain dangerous and
those explosive remnants of war will cause civilian casualties, then the resulting risk
to the civilian population is a factor which may have to be taken into account in
applying the proportionality test.79
In findings reflecting 33 state responses to a questionnaire on the applicability of IHL
principles to ERW, compiled by McCormack for the Group of Governmental Experts of the
States Party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 97% of respondent states
indicated the rule on proportionality was relevant to the use of cluster munitions that may
result in ERW.80
There is also the argument that cluster munitions cause damage to the natural environment so
as to affect the ability of the civilian population to survive, through the rendering of vast
tracts of land unusable for civilian purposes on account of the dangers of cluster munition
ERW, in breach of Article 55 of AP I. That is, cluster submunitions which fail to function as
designed and do not explode on impact, and which do not have a self-neutralisation
mechanism, require costly, time consuming, specialist skills to remove them before land can
be returned to civilian purposes including agriculture. Van Woudenberg notes that there are
some differing opinions on whether the longer term and environmental consequences need to
be taken into account in the proportionality equation.81  McCormack, as well as others
including the ICRC, take the view that as the long-term consequences are foreseeable they
should be considered by the Commander.82
  
78 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 28, rule 14.
79 Christopher Greenwood, Legal Issues Regarding Explosive Remnants of War, CCW/GGE/I/WP,10/ (22 May
2002); Van Woudenberg, above note 5, 461-2.
80 Van Woudenberg, above note 4, 461.
81 Ibid 463.
82 Tim McCormack, International Humanitarian Law Principles and Explosive Remnants of War,
CCW/GGC/XI/WG.1/WP.18. (15 August 2005).
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4.6 Conclusion on legality of cluster munitions
It has been argued here that, while some cluster munitions could be used in such a way as to
comply with IHL, most cluster munitions are inherently unlawful. As such, unrelated to the
existence of the CCM, states have an obligation not to use those inherently unlawful cluster
munitions, but also to ensure that other states do not use them. As we will now see, Australia,
in approaching the CCM, specifically sought to ensure that other states could continue to use
inherently unlawful weapons and it appears to be continuing to do so. As will be discussed
further below, a clarification that would prevent Australia from facilitating the use of non-
IHL compatible cluster munitions by other states would have been an appropriate approach
for Australia to take in enacting their obligations under the CCM. On account of this
omission, this chapter asserts that Australia is undermining its obligations under Common
Article 1 in relation to cluster munitions.
5. Australia’s approach to the preparatory steps to a ban on cluster munitions
The 2008 CCM was a culmination of various attempts dating from the 1960s to regulate the
use of these weapons.83 Sweden, leading Eygpt, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Switzerland and
Yugoslavia, proposed in 1974, and then again in 1976, with the support of six additional
nations, that the use of ‘anti-personnel cluster warheads’ be prohibited.84  The issue of the
humanitarian concern caused by cluster munitions and other ERW was, around this time, also
under consideration from the UN. A report of the UN Environment Program on ERW that
noted among other points that ‘high explosives should be designed to have built in
mechanisms that render the munition harmless in due course’ was endorsed by the UN
General Assembly in 1983.85
Australia was not behind any of the early attempts by various groups of states to introduce a
ban on cluster munitions. Herby and Nuiten note that an informal Australian paper presented
  
83 Early attempts came in response to the use of the weapon in Indochina during the 1960s and 1970s: ICRC,
Submunitions and other unexploded ordinance: Explosive Remnants of War ( ICRC, Geneva, 2000) 29.
Between 1954 and 1973 it is estimated that between six and seven million bombs (an unknown number of
bomblets) were dropped on Laos.  
84 Peter Herby and Anna Nuiten, ‘Explosive Remnants of War. Protecting Civilians through an Additional
Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ (2001) 841 International Review of the Red
Cross, 195-205. See also van Woudenberg, above note 4, 468; Wiebe, above note 52, 154-5; Herthel above note
52, 250-2.
85 Peter Herby and Anna Nuiten, above note 84, 195-205 citing UN Secretary General, Report – Problem of
Remnants of War, UNGA/A/38/383 (19 October 1983).
108
at an ICRC expert meeting on certain weapon systems in May 1994 stated that submunitions
could be used provided an attack complied with the law on targeting, and that a self-destruct
mechanism on submunitions should be obligatory.86
At the Second Review Conference of the CCW, a Group of Government Experts with a
mandate on ERW was established. This group met in December 2001 and reached a
consensus on a mandate to negotiate a new international instrument on ERW.87 This led to
the adoption of Protocol V on ERW in November 2003 with a focus on obligations to clear
and facilitate the clearing of areas of ERW as ‘as soon as feasible’ and ‘after the cessation of
active hostilities’.88  Van Woudenberg notes that while the negotiation for Protocol V did not
result in any consensus on regulating the use of weapons which produce ERW, ‘states did
undertake to discuss this in the future’.89 Australia ratified Protocol V to the CCW on 4
January 2007.90
At the Third Review Conference of the CCW in November 2006 Norway and 24 other
countries submitted a declaration calling for a ban on the use of cluster munitions within
‘concentrations of civilians’.91 Australia was not a part of this group. Agreement was not
reached on this, but rather on the holding of a further discussion of experts in June 2007.92
Norway’s response to this was to take the process outside the CCW framework and convene
a meeting in Oslo in February 2007 towards a cluster munitions ban. Forty-nine states
attended this meeting. This did not include Australia. Initially, Australia resisted going
outside CCW to the Oslo processes – interoperability as well as a preference for the
consistency of the CCW approach being the primary reasons behind this.93
  
86 Ibid 195-205. The 1974 Conference was the Conference of Government Experts on Weapons That May
Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects and its follow up conference was held in 1976.
87 Van Woudeberg, above note 4, 469; see also Corsi, J, Towards peace through legal innovation: The Process
and the Promise of the 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention (2009) 22 Harvard Human Rights Journal 145, 148.
88 Protocol V CCW art 3.
89 Van Woudenberg, above note 4, 471-2.
90 ICRC, Listing of States Parties: Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 CCW
Convention, above note 38.
91 Van Woudenberg, above note 4, 473.
92 At the June 2007 Group of Government Experts on the CCW meeting Germany proposed a 6th Protocol to the
CCW which would cover cluster munitions, restrict their use ‘within or near populated areas’ and ban the use of
‘unreliable’ cluster munitions. The proposal did not get the necessary support: Van Woudenberg, above note 4,
474.
93 John Borrie, How the Cluster Munitions Ban Was Won: Oslo Treaty Negotiations Conclude in Dublin
(Acronym Institute for Disarmament Policy, 1 August 2008) <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd88/88jb.htm>.
109
The Oslo process committed the participating countries to:
1.Conclude by 2008 a legally binding international instrument that will:
(i) prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and
(ii) establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate
provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and their communities,
clearance of contaminated areas, risk education and destruction of stockpiles of
prohibited cluster munitions.
2. Consider taking steps at the national level to address these problems.
3. Continue to address the humanitarian challenges posed by cluster munitions within
the framework of international humanitarian law and in all relevant fora. 94
The Oslo meeting was followed by conferences in Lima in May 2007 and in Vienna in
December 2007 to discuss the intended convention. Australia attended these meetings. The
Australian delegation was in favour of cluster munitions with a ‘self-destruct mechanism’
being excluded from consideration by the discussions95 and joined with those pointing out
that the desired outcome was not one of a total ban, but rather that restricted cluster munitions
‘that cause unacceptable harm to civilians’.96
Australia remained engaged in the process as the CCM developed but Wikileaks cables from
2008 indicate Australia’s willingness to withdraw from the Cluster Munitions Convention
negotiations if the Convention was to result in all cluster munitions being banned or if
Australian concerns over interoperability were not adequately dealt with by the Convention.97
A cable from the US Embassy Canberra, Australia, dated 26 November 2008 notes
‘Australian representatives informed United States counterparts that Australia will take a
broad view of the activities permitted because of Article 21 of the CMC’ and noting ‘[t]he
official interpretation concerning interoperability/combined operations is that the only
prohibited action would be for embedded or third-party force Australian personnel to
physically fire or drop cluster munitions’.98  
  
94 Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions Declaration (22-23 February 2007)
<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/ud/vedlegg/oslo%20declaration%20(final)%2023%20february%202007.pdf
>.
95 Van Woudenberg, above note 4, 480.
96 Ibid 481.
97 Naj Taylor, An inventory of Australian WikiLeaks cables relating to cluster munitions negotiations, Crikey,
(28 November 2011), <http://blogs.crikey.com.au/this-blog-harms/2011/11/28/an-inventory-of-australian-
wikileaks-cables-relating-to-cluster-munitions/>.
98 Ibid.
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During the 2015 First Review Conference of the CCM, Australia, along with Canada and the
United Kingdom, was reported to have been attempting to have the Dubrovnik Declaration
wording weakened.99 These efforts were not successful with the amendments being rejected
by other States Party. 100
6. Australia’s approach to the CCM negotiations and legislation
Australia’s implementing legislation for the CCM entered into force on 1 April 2013.101 This
was the culmination of a quite lengthy process, which commenced prior to the CCM actually
being conceived.  The Australian Democrats and Australian Greens in 2006 co-sponsored a
Bill (the Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Bill 2006) which would have prevented ADF
members from deploying cluster munitions.102 The DOD, in addressing the Senate Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, raised a number of concerns with the Bill
including:
· that global efforts to conclude regulation were currently underway and should not be
anticipated by this legislation103;
· the Bill would potentially prevent the ADF from acquiring any advanced new
generation sub-munition capability and the concern  ‘that the Bill would exclude
Australia’s potential to exploit new emergent technologies that would be more
capable, discriminating and reliable than existing munitions’104; and
· that the Bill would create operational concerns in contributing to Headquarters, calling
in fire support and working with nations using cluster munitions.105
  
99 Cluster Munition Coalition, ‘Closing Press release Dubrovnik Review Conference’ (Press Release, 11
September 2005) http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/media/news/2015/closing-press-release-
dubrovnik-reveiw-conference.aspx; Human Rights Watch, ‘Cluster Munitions Used in 5 Countries in 2015: But
Treaty grows stronger as countries join, destroy stockpiles’ (3 September 2015)
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/03/cluster-munitions-used-5-countries-2015>.
100 Ibid.
101 DFAT, Convention on Cluster Munitions, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/cluster_munitions.html>.
102 Senator Lyn Allison, leader of the Australian Democrats, introduced the Bill into the Australian Senate on 5
December 2006.
103 DOD, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into the
Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Bill 2006, 27 February 2007, 1-2.
104 Ibid 3-4.
105 Ibid 4-5.
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The DOD noted ‘[i]f enacted, the Greens Bill will put Australia at a serious military
disadvantage to our national interest’106. The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade recommended that this Bill not be passed and that the ‘Government
consider foreign legislation that has been enacted or is currently before foreign parliaments
that relates to the use of cluster munitions with a view to introducing similar legislation that
would be relevant to Australia's circumstances’.107 The Bill was not passed.
Subsequent to the conclusion of the CCM and signature by Australia of that document on 3
December 2008 the process of ratification of the CCM commenced.  The CCM was tabled
before the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on 13 May 2009 and a public hearing on the
Convention was held on 15 and 22 June 2009 by the Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties.108 Concerns related to Article 21 on interoperability, as they had done through the
negotiation process. Air Vice Marshall Brown stated before the Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties:
The interoperability issue is most likely to become relevant if Australia becomes
involved in a major conflict against conventional forces, particularly against armoured
forces. That is the most likely circumstance under which our partners and allies would
use cluster munitions. Cluster munitions were used by the United States and other
nations in the initial conflicts in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Even taking
this into account, this convention will allow Australia to continue to work effectively
in a coalition during a major conflict. I think the simplest way to understand the
interoperability provisions in the convention is that ADF personnel should [sic] not be
the first or the last in the chain of command when cluster munitions are used. That is,
ADF personnel must not be engaged in actually deploying the cluster munitions—an
example I gave last time was that of a pilot actually dropping cluster munitions—nor
should they be at the top of the chain of command with ultimate responsibility and
exclusive control over the choice of using cluster munitions.109
In August 2009 the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommended that ‘binding treaty
action’ be taken to implement the CCM and that in doing so, regard be had to preventing
inadvertent participation or assistance in the use of cluster munitions and preventing
  
106 Ibid 6.
107 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia,
Recommendations - Inquiry into the Cluster Munitions (Prohibition) Bill 2006 (31 May 2007) [5.58].
108 See also undated letter from McLelland, Rudd and Smith to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade Senator Mark Bishop
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/13
may2009/hearings.htm>.
109 Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 22 June 2009, 10 (Air
Vice Marshall Brown).
112
investment in companies developing cluster munitions.110 The Government response to the
Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was dated 13 May 2010. The
Government view included that ‘the Convention does not prohibit inadvertent participation in
the use, or assistance in the use, of cluster munitions’111 prohibiting only use and assistance in
the use of cluster munitions pursuant to Articles 1 and 21 of the Convention. The
interoperability approach taken by the Government is that as long as the Australian military is
not expressly requesting the use of cluster munitions where the choice of munitions is within
Australia’s exclusive control112 Australian personnel are not committing a crime through their
involvement.
The subsequent Bill, the Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill
2010, was introduced into the House of Representatives in October 2010. It was then referred
to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee. The Bill attracted a
number of submissions from individuals and organisations including those concerned with
the interoperability provisions113. A public hearing on the Bill was held on 3 March 2011.
The Bill also attracted a proposed amendment by the Australian Greens’ Senator Ludlum and
a dissent view presented in Senator Ludlam’s capacity as a member of the Senate Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee. 114 These processes did not result in any
amendments to the Bill and it was passed on 21 August 2012 by the Senate with the support
of the Government and Opposition of the time. The Second Reading Speech was however,
not without debate. In the Senate, the Australia Greens labelled the Bill ‘deceptive,
misguided and outright offensive’115 and noted the Bill had been drafted in such a way as to
  
110 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report on the Review into treaties tabled on
12 March and 13 May 2009, (2009) chapter 3, recommendations 2 and 3. See also undated letter from
McLelland, Rudd and Smith to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/13
may2009/hearings.htm>.
111 Undated letter from McLelland, Rudd and Smith to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Senator Mark Bishop
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jsct/13
may2009/hearings.htm>,  2.
112 Ibid 3.
113 For the full list of submission see
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Co
mpleted%20inquiries/2010-13/ccabcmp2010/submissions>.
114 Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Bill 2010 (Cth).
115 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 21 August 2012, 73 (Senator Ludlum).
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be ‘essentially in violation of the objectives of the convention itself’116. Senator Ludlum went
on to quote former Prime Minister Fraser and former Chief of the Defence Force General
Gration’s comments that the Bill ‘directly undermine[s] the spirit and intention of the
convention’ and ‘goes well beyond [that required for interoperability]’ respectively. 117 The
Greens’ particular concerns were that the Bill allowed Australian military personnel to assist
during an interoperability mission in which cluster munitions are being used (they just can’t
pull the trigger) and that it did not expressly prohibit stockpiling cluster weapons on
Australian soil or investment in companies which make these weapons.
The amendments contained in the Bill were introduced to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
by the resulting Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 (Cth),
effectively coming into force on 1 April 2013. Relevantly, the Act includes provisions on
interoperability and stockpiling on Australia soil. Section 72.41 provides:
A person who is an Australian citizen, is a member of the Australian Defence Force
or is performing services under a Commonwealth contract does not commit an
offence against section 72.38 by doing an act if:
(a) the act is done in the course of military cooperation or operations with a foreign
country that is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions; and
(b) the act is not connected with the Commonwealth:
(i) using a cluster munition; or
(ii) developing, producing or otherwise acquiring a cluster munition; or
(iii) stockpiling or retaining a cluster munition; or
(iv) transferring a cluster munition; and
(c) the act does not consist of expressly requesting the use of a cluster munition in a
case where the choice of munitions used is within the Commonwealth’s exclusive
control.
Section 72.42 provides:
(1) Section 72.38 does not apply to the stockpiling, retention or transfer of a cluster
munition that:
(a) is done by:
  
116 Ibid 76.
117 Ibid 73.
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(i) a member of the armed forces of a foreign country that is not a party to the
Convention on Cluster Munitions; or
(ii) a person who is connected with such forces as described in subsection (2)
and is neither an Australian citizen nor a resident of Australia; and
(b) is done in connection with the use by those forces of any of the following in
Australia in the course of military cooperation or operations with the Australian
Defence Force:
(i) a base;
(ii) an aircraft of any part of those forces or an aircraft being commanded or
piloted by a member of those forces in the course of his or her duties as such a
member;
(iii) a ship of any part of those forces or a ship being operated or commanded
by a member of those forces in the course of his or her duties as such a
member.
(2) This subsection covers a person with any of the following connections with the
armed forces of a foreign country that is not a party to the Convention on Cluster
Munitions:
(a) the person is employed by, or in the service of, any of those forces;
(b) the person is serving with an organisation accompanying any of those forces;
(c) the person is attached to or accompanying those forces and is subject to the law of
that country governing any of the armed forces of that country.
7. Australia, cluster munitions and the obligation to respect and ensure respect for
international humanitarian law
Australia has engaged in a number of actions both prior to and after the formation of the
CCM which demonstrates respect and ensuring respect for IHL with regards to cluster
munitions. This includes the fact that Australia does not possess operational stocks of cluster
munitions, has never used them as a weapon of war, does not intend to acquire them and only
retains a limited number of cluster munitions for training purposes. That Australian military
personnel are trained in the laws of armed conflict and that Australia conducts article 36
reviews on the acquisition of weapons and this includes weapons such as the Smart 155
munitions also respects IHL.
Further, Article 21 of the CCM requires Australia to ‘encourage States not party to this
Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention’. Although, after the fact,
this would include statements such as expressing support for the ratification of the CCM by
115
other nations. For example in 2010 then Foreign Minister Smith, issued a press release
congratulating ‘the Government of the United Kingdom on the entry-into-force on 25 March
of its legislation banning the use, production and stockpiling of cluster munitions’118.
A significant aspect of ensuring respect for international law, in so far as cluster munitions
are concerned, relates to the obligation to‘[a]fter the cessation of active hostilities and as soon
as feasible, each High Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall mark and clear,
remove or destroy explosive remnants of war in affected territories under its control’119 and
‘clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnant
located in cluster munition contaminated areas’120.
More directly Australia has obligations under Article 6 to provide technical, material and
financial assistance, including assistance with the implementation of the Convention, to
States Party affected by cluster munitions. As such, the approach of Australia to clearing
cluster munition contamination is an important part of measures by Australia to ensure
respect for Australia’s IHL obligations. In 2009, then Foreign Minister Smith, launched the
Mine Action Strategy 2010-2014, which through the commitment of $100 million over the
five years, aims to achieve improved quality of life for victims of, and reduced number of
deaths and injuries from, landmines, cluster munitions and other ERW as well as enhanced
capacity of countries to manage their mine action programs.121 The Strategy notes that
‘Australia has been a committed donor to partner governments in 16 affected countries across
the Asia–Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. We have contributed more than $175 million to
mine action over the past 12 years’122 including $75 million through the aid program under
the Mine Action Strategy 2005–10.123  This action includes activities such as the Aus-AID
(now DFAT) funded explosive ordinance training school in Palau that was opened in 2013.124
  
118 Stephen Smith, ‘Australia welcomes UK legislation banning cluster munitions’ (Australian Government
Media Release, Foreign Minister, 2010) <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/MediaReleases/Pages/Australia-welcomes-UK-
legislation-banning-cluster-munitions.aspx>.
119 Protocol V CCW art 3 (2).
120 CCM, art 4 (1).
121 DFAT, Mine Action Strategy for the Australian aid program towards a world free from landmines, cluster
munitions and other explosive remnants of war 2010–14, (AusAID, 2009), 1.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid Ministerial Forward.  
124 DFAT, Palau and AusAID announce new funding for removal of unexploded remnants of war (Media
release, 29 April 2013).
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However, when viewed from the perspective of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, the
most significant aspect of the Australian approach to the Cluster Munitions Convention, is
the efforts undertaken by Australia to ensure that another nation is not hampered in its desire
to use cluster munitions, even if the use of those weapons is in violation of the principles of
IHL. Australia has enacted domestic legislation, through the Criminal Code Amendment
(Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 (Cth) to implement its international obligations
under the CCM. As has been outlined, the implementation of this legislation was not without
controversy and that approach taken undermines Common Article 1, as well as the CCM.
This implementation of the interoperability provisions in Article 21, through section 72.41
and the provisions in section 72.42, means that Australia can support the use of weapons by
other states which do not comply with IHL principles and specifically permits the presence of
cluster munitions on a military base, an aircraft or ship in Australian territory by foreign
nationals on non-State Parties.125 The effect of this is to allow countries, not party to the
Convention, to use Australian soil to stockpile, retain or transfer cluster munitions. No
distinction is made by Australia, in taking this approach, as to whether those weapons
stockpiled, retained or transferred on Australian soil are lawful or inherently unlawful
weapons. This is a significant failing. These provisions are not, in this author’s view,
demonstrative of respect for IHL because they directly violate Australia’s obligations under
Common Article 1 to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Further, the provisions undermine
the Conventions’ objective to rid all State Party Countries of cluster munitions and are
contradictory, given the above statements by the Australian Government that they will not
permit the stockpiling of cluster weapons on Australian soil.  
Noam Shifrin writes:
The reason … appears to be the unquestioning adherence to US military policy  …
Australia wants to be able to fight with US forces wherever and whenever those who
take such decisions think it in the national interest. They want as little impediment
when doing so as possible. If that means allowing Australian officers to advance their
careers by being seconded to headquarters run by US military personnel who may
sometimes plan operations involving the use of cluster munitions or having Australian
soldiers assist US military personnel transporting cluster munitions so be it.126
  
125 Criminal Code Amendment (Cluster Munitions Prohibition) Act 2012 (Cth) s 72.42.
126 Noam Shifrin, ‘Legislative cluster bomb’ The Drum (online), 19 July 2011
<http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/2800864.html>.  
117
Throughout the process of negotiating the cluster munitions convention, Australia has gone to
considerable efforts to assist another nation, specifically the United States, to not be
hampered by the introduction of this legal framework. As recently as September 2015
Australia has again taken up the task of trying to assist other nations use cluster munitions. 127
In taking this approach Australia cannot be said to have lived up to its obligation to ensure
respect for IHL. Australia, as a coalition partner with a number of other states in a number of
military operations, has capacity and influence over its coalition partners in relation to cluster
munitions use. This is because Australian policies can make it either harder or easier for third
party states to use these weapons when operating with Australians. Australia has not sought
to exercise this influence in accordance with its legal obligation under Common Article 1.
Had Australia considered Common Article 1 in its approach to Article 21 it could have
worked to respect and ensure respect IHL by arguing for an amendment of Article 21.  A
clarification that Article 21 only applied in circumstances where the cluster munitions, being
used by the non-State Party, were not the sort of cluster munitions that fell foul of compliance
with principles of IHL, regardless of the Convention definition of cluster munitions, would
have been appropriate. Instead, no reference is made in Article 21 to compliance with the
principles of IHL. This allows Australia to assist the United States to deploy weapons which
breach the rules of IHL and provides an example of Australia undermining Common Article
1.
8. Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the approach that Australia has taken to the Cluster Munitions
Convention. It would appear that Australia has not considered Common Article 1 obligations
in its approach to the Cluster Munitions Convention and that, although Australia itself does
not see the military utility in cluster munitions (having made a decision not to stock them
even prior to global action to prohibit them), it puts great stock in ensuring that its allies,
particularly the United States, can still deploy them.  
  
127 Cluster Munition Coalition, ‘Closing Press release Dubrovnik Review Conference’ (Press Release, 11
September 2005) http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/media/news/2015/closing-press-release-
dubrovnik-reveiw-conference.aspx; Human Rights Watch, ‘Cluster Munitions Used in 5 Countries in 2015: But
Treaty grows stronger as countries join, destroy stockpiles’ (3 September 2015)
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/03/cluster-munitions-used-5-countries-2015>.
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Air Marshall Brown’s comments that an Australian pilot must not actually be the one
dropping the cluster munitions and ‘nor should they be at the top of the chain of command
with ultimate responsibility and exclusive control over the choice of using cluster
munitions’128 leaves a concerning amount of space for Australian involvement in the
deployment of cluster munitions.
Giving consideration to Common Article 1, in this instance, would have required the
Australian Government to consider whether such involvement by an Australian would be in
breach of the requirement to ensure ADF personnel respect IHL. It would also have required
consideration of whether such support for the United States and other allies using cluster
munitions would be ensuring respect for IHL. The conclusion to this analysis would have
required, at the very least, Australia to have advocated for the amendment of Article 21 to
recognise that interoperability must mean that State Parties’ military personnel could never
operate with non-state parties’ militaries when they are using the sorts of cluster munitions
that fall foul of compliance with principles of IHL, regardless of the CCM definition of
cluster munitions.
Whilst some cluster munitions may not be inherently unlawful weapons, there are very
narrow circumstances in which targeting law under the Geneva Conventions would allow
their use. The international community has agreed that their humanitarian consequences
outweigh their military utility and prohibited them accordingly. Australia has agreed to this
prohibition on their use and is bound by the customary obligation to respect and ensure
respect for IHL. As such Australia should be doing more to encourage states not party to the
Convention to join up. Australia should not be undermining Common Article 1, by enabling
the use of these weapons by other states, as it is currently doing. In order to facilitate this,
Australia should employ a Common Article 1 analysis in relation to its approach to cluster
munitions.
  
128 Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 22 June 2009, 10 (Air
Vice Marshall Brown).
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CHAPTER FIVE: AUSTRALIA, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE OBLIGATION TO
RESPECT AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Chapter five provides an overview of the failure of humanity to date, to eliminate nuclear
weapons despite commitments outlined in the NPT. It notes the current international move
towards a ban-treaty which would unequivocally prohibit the use of the nuclear weapons. The
chapter adopts the view that the use of nuclear weapons, as they are understood today, can in
no conceivable way comply with the principles of IHL and that, as such, states would be
taking a clear opportunity to comply with the obligation in Common Article 1 through their
positive inclusion in progress towards a legally binding instrument clearly prohibiting the use
of nuclear weapons.  It answers the questions what approach has Australia taken to the
regulation of nuclear weapons by international law and what conclusions can be reached from
this evaluation regarding the approach of Australia to compliance with the obligation to
respect and ensure respect pursuant to Common Article 1? It argues that Australia is
undermining efforts to unequivocally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, in breach of its
obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Australia must reconsider its position on
nuclear weapons in light of this obligation and, if it does so, it is well placed to use its
capacity to influence other States towards a position of respecting IHL with respect to nuclear
weapons.
1. Introduction
In March 2013 representatives of 127 governments met in Oslo, Norway, to discuss the
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.1 The conference constituted the first ever
meeting of governments to discuss the humanitarian consequences of these weapons. The
agenda was a dialogue on the immediate and long term effects of nuclear detonation and
whether there was any possibility of a viable response to such a calamity by emergency
services and medical personnel.2  In February 2013, in Nayarit, Mexico, 146 governments
  
1 Norwegian Government, Conference: Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (11 March 2013)
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/humanitarian-efforts/humimpact_2013.html?id=708603>.
2 The key findings of the conference being that it is ‘unlikely that any state or international body could address
the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and
provide sufficient assistance to those affected. Moreover, it might not be possible to establish such capacities,
even if it were attempted. The historical experience from the use and testing of nuclear weapons has
demonstrated their devastating immediate and long-term effects. While political circumstances have changed,
the destructive potential of nuclear weapons remains. The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, irrespective of
cause, will not be constrained by national borders, and will affect states and people in significant ways,
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met to continue these discussions.3  The Chair’s summary of that second conference made
clear that not everyone was just discussing humanitarian consequences.4 Many were working
towards a legally binding instrument to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.
These developments, which also included a further follow up intergovernmental meeting in
Vienna, Austria in December 2014,5 strongly urged on by the work of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement6 and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear
Weapons, demonstrate a growing interest in a campaign that has seen, and continues to see,
many variants over the years aimed at the eradication of nuclear weapons.7 As at late 2015
this interest is demonstrated in the form of a Humanitarian Pledge8 for the prohibition and
elimination of nuclear weapons, endorsed by 121 nations.9 The Humanitarian Pledge is now
also the subject of a UN General Assembly resolution10 and an ‘open-ended working group’
will look at ‘concrete effective legal measures … to attain … a world without nuclear
weapons’11, commencing in February 2016. As will be discussed later in this chapter,
Australia is not on board with this initiative.
The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that led to this humanitarian need are well
documented. Australian school children have these horrors described to them through images
and words of the picture book of Hiroshima survivor and Sydney resident, Junko Morimoto:  
    
regionally as well as globally.’ Norwegian Government, Chair’s summary Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons (5 March 2013) <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/nuclear_summary/id716343/>.
3 Mexican Government, Nayarit Conference
<http://mision.sre.gob.mx/oi/intranet/proyectos/index.php?id_proyecto=4&idioma=en>.  
4 Ibid.
5 See further Vienna Conference of the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons website at
http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-
weapons-and-nuclear-terrorism/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/.  
6 In particular Resolution 1 of the 2011 Council of Delegates which appealed to all states ‘to pursue in good
faith and conclude with urgency and determination negotiations to prohibit the use of and completely eliminate
nuclear weapons through a legally binding international agreement, based on existing commitments and
international obligations’. ICRC Council of Delegates 2011: Resolution 1 (26 November 2011)
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/council-delegates-resolution-1-2011.htm>.
7 For a discussion of some of these campaigns see Nina Eisenhardt and Tim Wright ‘Generations of change:
persuading post Cold-War kids that disarmament matters’ (2010) 4 Disarmament Forum 15.
8 Note verbale dated 24 August 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General
of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the humanitarian pledge supported by 114 Members
of the United Nations, CD/2039, (28 August 2015).
9 ICAN, Humanitarian Pledge, (5 November 2015) ICAN <http://www.icanw.org/pledge/>.
10 Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, UN GA, 1st Comm, 70th sess,
Agenda item 97(b) Doc A/C.1/70/L.38 (21 October 2015).  128 states voted in support of this resolution, 29
voted against the resolution and 18 abstained.  
11 UN GA Meetings Coverage, On Recommendation of First Committee, General Assembly Adopts More than
50 Drafts, Including New One on ‘Ethical Imperatives’ for Nuclear Disarmament 7 December 2015,
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11735.doc.htm>. 130 states voted in support of this resolution, 48 against
the resolution and 8 abstained.
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I saw a girl with skin hanging from her nails. There was a child, screaming, trying to
wake up her dead mother. […] I heard people screaming and moaning in pain, and
there was a horrible smell of burnt skin. […] I found the bones of many of my
friends.12
The reflections of ICRC delegate in the Far East, Dr Marcel Junod, the first non-Japanese
doctor to witness the aftermath of the dropping of the atomic bomb, on 6 August 1945, on
Hiroshima have also been widely shared with the public:
We (…) witnessed a sight totally unlike anything we had ever seen before. The centre
of the city was a sort of white patch, flattened and smooth like the palm of a hand.
Nothing remained. The slightest trace of houses seemed to have disappeared. The
white patch was about two kilometres in diameter. Around its edge was a red belt,
marking the area where houses had burned, extending quite a long way further (…)
covering almost all the rest of the city.13
The evidence presented by Tillman Ruff and Ira Helfand in recent international fora –
including the Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna conferences – is very alarming. Helfrand reports on
modelling that shows global temperature declines from a small scale nuclear war resulting in
massive impacts on global food production and the collapse of ecosystems.14 Ruff reminds us
that the 15kt highly enriched uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima was ‘[b]y today’s
standards…a “small” tactical-size weapon’ which ‘is estimated to cause up to 870,000 death
in the first weeks’ in a densely populated city. 15
The calls to prevent the use of nuclear weapons came soon after the weapons were dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. In a public statement on 5 September 1945 the
ICRC called on states to take ‘all steps to reach an agreement on the prohibition of atomic
weapons’ noting ‘[s]uch arms will not spare hospitals, prisoner of war camps and civilians.
Their inevitable consequence is extermination, pure and simple…. [Their] effects, immediate
and lasting, prevent access to the wounded and their treatment.’16  In the years since, many
others have made the call that nuclear weapons must be eliminated - including the British and
American Medical Associations and the World Health Organisation, noting there is no
  
12 Junko Morimoto, My Hiroshima (Hachette Australia, 2014).
13 Statement by Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, (20 April 2010,
Geneva).
14 Australian Red Cross, nuclear weapons: a unique threat to humanity (Australian Red Cross, 2011) 7-9.
15 Ibid 10.
16 Francois Bugnion, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross and nuclear weapons: From Hiroshima to
the dawn of the 21st century’ (2005) 87 (859) International Review of the Red Cross 511, 517.
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possibility of an adequate medical response to the use of a nuclear weapon.17  While nuclear
weapons have not been used again in conflict, they have been extensively tested –
particularly in the Pacific – and many still suffer the health and environmental impacts of
this.
The possession of nuclear weapons and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence have played
incredibly significant roles in world history during the latter part of the 20th century. Nuclear
weapons states have shown little inclination to eliminate them.18 However, Oslo, Nayarit and
Vienna have shown growing support for the idea of a legally binding instrument to prohibit
the use of nuclear weapons. This chapter will look at the existing legal frameworks pertaining
to nuclear weapons and discuss the compatibility, or otherwise, of their continued existence
with the obligations on states pursuant to Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. The
chapter adopts the view that the use of nuclear weapons, as they are understood today, can in
no conceivable way comply with the principles of IHL and that as such, states would be
taking a clear opportunity to comply with the obligation in Common Article 1 through their
positive inclusion in progress towards a legally binding instrument clearly prohibiting the use
of nuclear weapons.  It argues that Australia is undermining efforts to prevent the use of
nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Australia
must reconsider its position on nuclear weapons in light of this obligation and, if it does so, it
is well placed to use its capacity to influence others towards a position of respecting IHL with
respect to nuclear weapons.
2. What are nuclear weapons?
The Oxford Dictionary of Physics defines nuclear weapons as ‘[w]eapons in which an
explosion is caused by nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or a combination of both’.19
Specifically it is noted:
In the fission bomb (atomic bomb or A-bomb) two subcritical masses … of a fissile
material (uranium–235 or plutonium–239) are brought together by a chemical
  
17 British Medical Association’s Board of Science and Education, The Medical Effects of Nuclear War (John
Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1983) 117; Report of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association
(1981) cited in IPPNW Physicians and nuclear war <http://www.ippnw.org/physicians-for-prevention-nuclear-
war.html>.
18 Although efforts have been made to reduce stockpiles and South Africa gave them up prior to its signature to
the NPT in July 1991. See generally Haralambos Athanasopulos, Nuclear Disarmament in International Law
(McFarland & Company, 2000) 133,151.
19 A Dictionary of Physics (Oxford University Press, 6th ed, 2009).
123
explosion to produce one supercritical mass. … The fusion bomb (thermonuclear
weapon, hydrogen bomb, or H-bomb) relies on a nuclear-fusion reaction, which
becomes self-sustaining at a critical temperature.20
The main way in which a nuclear weapon differs from a conventional weapon is that the
magnitude of the explosion of a nuclear weapon is thousands of times greater than that
caused by conventional weapons.21
In October 1939, economist Alexander Sachs and United States President Roosevelt met
regarding a letter physicist, Albert Einstein, had written about the potential for the creation of
extremely powerful bombs. The letter noted it was ‘probable … that it may become possible
to set up a nuclear chain reaction … by which vast amounts of power … could be
generated’.22 This led to President Roosevelt setting up uranium research and the beginning
of the American atomic bomb development – the Manhattan Project.23  The Manhattan
Project led to the testing of the first nuclear weapon at Almagordo Air Base, New Mexico
(United States) on 16 July 1945. It was a 19kt bomb named ‘Trinity’.24 ‘Fat Man’ and ‘Little
Boy’, the weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were developed by the Manhattan
Project by the end of July 1945 and then United States President Truman, considering the use
of such weapons as the only way to shorten the war, made the decision to authorise the use of
the weapons.25 The B-29 bomber ‘Enola Gay’ dropped ‘Little Boy’ over Hiroshima on 6
August 1945 and three days later, on 9 August 1945, another B-29 Bomber ‘Bock’s Car’
dropped ‘Fat Man’ on Nagasaki.26
The devastating consequences of these weapons on these cities have been well documented in
writing and in film. Photos of the cities before and after the bombing show destruction of a
magnitude never before seen.  Sixty per cent of Hiroshima was destroyed.27 Thirty per cent of
the population were killed and another 30 per cent injured.28 The Hiroshima Red Cross
  
20 Ibid.
21 Joseph M Siracusa, Nuclear Weapons A very short introduction (Oxford University Press, 2008) 5.
22 Einstein’s warning came from his knowledge that German physicists Hahn and Strassmann had split the
uranium atom in December 1938. See further Athanasopulos, above note 18, 7.
23 Siracusa, above note 21, 12-13.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid 20-23.
26 Ibid 23.
27 Ibid.
28 United States Government, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of Atomic Bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946) 6.
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Hospital29 astonishingly remained standing, as did one other hospital, ‘but there was such
severe interior damage that neither was able to resume operation as a hospital for some
time’.30 Finding doctors and nurses was a huge challenge. For example, of 1,780 nurses 1,654
were killed or injured.31 Health effects were also ongoing due to radiation exposure. Five
years later fatality numbers had risen to over 200,000 for Hiroshima and over 140,000 for
Nagasaki.32  The Japanese Red Cross Society Hiroshima Atomic-bomb Hospital sees an
average of 2,408 new atomic bomb survivors each year.33
During the war years, Britain, Japan and Germany also had efforts underway to develop
atomic weapons34 and in the years after the war, a number of nations - initially the USSR and
the United States - and later the United Kingdom and France, carried out a large number of
tests.35  There have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date.36
‘Puny and primitive’37, the weapons dropped on Japan in 1945 are small by today’s
standards.  A ‘small’ nuclear warhead by today’s standards has the explosive yield of around
20 times the Hiroshima bomb. 38 Today the destructive force of the world’s nuclear arsenal is
equivalent to approximately 150,000 Hiroshima bombs.39 About 22,000 nuclear weapons
reportedly remain in our world today.40
3. History of nuclear weapons in Australia
Australia does not possess and has never possessed nuclear weapons. However, nuclear
weapons with yields of between 1 and 60 kilotons have been tested in Australia. These tests
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30 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, above note 28, 6.
31 Ibid.
32 ICRC, ‘The effects of nuclear weapons on human health’ (2013)
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33 Japanese Red Cross Society, Outline of Atomic-bomb survivors hospital division, <http://www.hiroshima-
med.jrc.or.jp/english/atomic_bomb.html>.
34 Siracusa, above note 21, 14-16.
35 Sir Philip Baxter, (1973) ‘Nuclear Testing’ 6(2) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 89-95; Anonymous,
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36 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Nuclear weapons
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were carried out by the United Kingdom between 1952 and 1963. The first test was
conducted in the Monte Bello Islands off the northern coast of Western Australia on 3
October 1952, with the Monte Bello Islands also being used for two explosions in May–June
1956. Others were conducted in South Australia, at Emu Field in October 1953 and near
Maralinga in September–October 1956 and September–October 1957. Hundreds of minor
trials, mostly involving components of nuclear weapons, took place at Emu Field and
Maralinga between 1953 and 1963.41
The report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia notes that in
September 1950 the British identified the Monte Bello Islands as a suitable test site for their
developing nuclear program.42 This ‘top secret’ information was conveyed to Australian
Prime Minister Menzies as a personal message from British Prime Minister Attlee on 16
September 1950.43 Of Menzies’ immediate agreement to the proposal, the Royal Commission
report notes ‘no evidence in the documents produced to Royal Commission which would
indicate that he consulted any of his Cabinet colleagues’44 and:
[i]n taking it upon himself to embrace British interests as being synonymous with
those of Australia, and to expose his country and people to the risk of radioactive
contamination, Menzies was merely acting according to his well-exposed
Anglophilian sentiment. It was consistent with this approach when, as Prime Minister
in 1939, he announced that as Britain was at war with Germany, Australia also was
automatically at war with the same enemy.45
In March 1951 the British proposed the use of the Monte Bello Islands for a test to be
conducted in October 1952, noting that there was a possibility that agreement could still be
reached with the Americans that Britain could use their test sites. 46 Britain sought Australian
agreement and co-operation on logistical matters. The March 1951 note alerted Australia to
the fact that the test would make the area uninhabitable for a period of three years due to
contamination. The report goes on to describe this as a ‘considerable underestimation’.47 An
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42 Ibid 10.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid 11.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid 13. Britain’s clear initial preference, given the ‘waste and duplication of effect’ was to reach a suitable
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47 Ibid 12-14.
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Australian election in May 1951 caused a short delay in responding to the British, however,
upon re-election Menzies agreed to the test.48 The project was later described by Howard
Beale, Minster of Supply in the Menzies government in May 1955 as ‘a striking example of
inter-Commonwealth co-operation …to help the Motherland’.49  
Operation ‘Hurricane’ saw the first nuclear test in Australia, a weapon of approximately 25kt,
conducted at 0800 hours on 3 October 1952. The explosion was eight and half feet below the
waterline in a Royal Navy frigate. Australian support was considerable, and two Australian
representatives attended the test as observers but no knowledge of weapon design or function
was shared with Australia.50 In September 1952, a request was made by the Director of the
United Kingdom’s Atomic Energy Research Establishment to assess the feasibility of Emu
Field in the Great Victorian Desert (South Australia) as a site for further land based tests
following the Monte Bello test ‘Hurricane’.51 Australian agreement to this test site followed
in December 1952. The explosions of 10kt and 8 kt respectively, occurred on 15 and 27
October 1953.52  Again no knowledge of weapon design or function was shared with
Australia.53
Agreement was reached in May 1955 on further testing in the Monte Bello Islands – this time
two and a half times larger at 60kt. Two weapons – a 15kt weapon and a 60kt weapon were
exploded on 16 May and 19 June 1956 respectively – on islands in the Monte Bello Islands.54  
For these tests Australia did set up an official Australian Atomic Weapons Test Safety
Committee.55  The final tests then took place at Maralinga in September–October 1956 and
September–October 1957.56
The idea of Australia acquiring nuclear weapons was regularly discussed in the 1950s and
1960s by government ministers and officials ‘primarily to offset our country's limited
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52 Ibid 140.
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conventional capability and as a demonstration of Australia's growing international
prestige’.57
Thanks to the Royal Commission the effects on both Aboriginal people and service personnel
involved in the testing has been well documented.58 It is clear that long term health and
environmental effects have been experienced by Australians as result of these tests. While the
purpose of this chapter is not to focus on these effects, they are undoubtedly horrific and
should be acknowledged.
The findings from the report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in
Australia, published in 1985, included that:  
• ‘The Monte Bello Islands were not an appropriate place for atomic tests owing to the
prevailing weather patterns and the limited opportunities for safe firing’59; and
• ‘The decision to use the mainland for atomic tests was made without specific
consideration by Australian scientists…Consideration was limited to the fact that Emu
was a remote location.’60
The general sentiment of the conclusions include the view that the Australian Prime Minister
accepted the British proposals having been in receipt of very little information on the likely
scale and consequences of the tests, and that the Australian public, Australian media and
possibly the Australian Cabinet were given no opportunity to voice their opinion on the
issues.61  The report recommended a clean-up of the sites, to be paid for by the British
Government, and that the Australian government compensate those military and civilian
personnel who were exposed during the testing, as well as, the traditional owners of the land
on which the testing took place.62
As British nuclear testing was coming to an end in Australia, another nuclear armed state,
France, was beginning a series of tests in the Pacific. From 1966 to 1996 French nuclear
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59 Ibid 109.
60 Ibid Conclusion 9.
61 See particularly Ibid Conclusions 1-8.
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testing in Polynesia included at least 42 atmospheric tests and 141 underground tests.63  That
these tests have had profound and serious health and environmental consequences for
Polynesians must also be acknowledged. 64 It is clear that, by this time, the Australian attitude
to nuclear testing had changed considerably from Menzies’ immediate agreement to British
testing in Australia. ‘In April 1963, the Australian Government conveyed to the French
Government its deep regret at the decision which the French Government was then on the
point of taking, namely, to move its nuclear testing to the Pacific area’.65 The French
expressed surprise at the anti-nuclear testing sentiment newly adopted by Australia, which
Australia attributed to increased scientific knowledge of the inability to predict effects of
radioactivity and the recent test-ban treaty developments.66
Diplomatic communications in the late 1960s and early 1970s between Australia and France
noted Australia’s protest to the tests and in particular the concern ‘amongst the peoples of the
area’.67 Efforts in April 1973 to have French and Australian scientists ‘discuss and attempt to
resolve problems of scientific evaluation of the dangers of radio-active fall-out from French
nuclear tests in the Pacific’68 failed. In May 1973 Australia and New Zealand instituted
proceedings in the ICJ asking for cessation of the tests.  The judgments of December 20,
1974 were in effect ‘no-judgment judgments’, the issue having been resolved by France
having announced its intention to cease tests.69
Australian public opinion also voiced its strong opposition to nuclear weapons on different
occasions. In the early 1980s 350,000 Australians turned out in support of nuclear
disarmament demonstrations.70 In protest to the 1995 French nuclear tests resuming in the
Pacific, the Roland Garros club flag was flown at the 1996 Australian Open Tennis
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Championships instead of the French Flag.71 More recently Australian Red Cross, a
significant player in the current push of the International Red Cross Red Crescent
Movement’s work to encourage states to work towards a legally binding instrument to
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, noted a social reach of over 1 million to its Make
Nuclear Weapons the Target Campaign.72
Australia has vast reserves of uranium73 and in 2013 was the world’s third largest producer of
uranium, all of which was exported.74 As such, the issue of uranium mining and export by
Australia is also a factor of influence in Australia’s nuclear policy. Although Australian
uranium was mined before 1977, the industry grew significantly at that time.75 Clarke has
argued that former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser’s 1977 decision to expand the uranium
industry in Australia had a significant ‘international dimension’, specially one of establishing
Australia’s influence but also of supporting American interests.76 Fraser framed the
Australian approach to uranium export (at least in so far as the United States was interested in
that approach) as being one that was a part of the NPT responsibilities in combating the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
Prime Minister Fraser established Australia’s nuclear safeguards policy which included not
selling uranium to states who had not signed the NPT and ensuring that the International
Atomic Energy Association safeguards would apply to the material for the full life of the
material.77
The export of Australian uranium will decrease the risks of further proliferation of
nuclear weapons and will support and strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. It will help to make a safer world. The advent of Australia as a major supplier
of uranium will make certain that Australia’s voice on this most vital problem of
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international affairs — nuclear weapons proliferation — will be heard and will be
heard with effect.78
This approach remained the cornerstone of Australia’s uranium export policy until 2007
when the government of then Prime Minister John Howard authorised the sale of uranium to
non NPT state India.79 Today the policy is that Australian only sells uranium to ‘countries
with which Australia has a nuclear cooperation agreement, to make sure that countries are
committed to peaceful use of nuclear energy’.80
4. Nuclear weapons and international law
In 1946 plans were afoot in New York for the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons and the
establishment of the UN Atomic Energy Commission designed only to ensure control of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes.81 UN General Assembly Resolution 1, adopted on 24
January 1946, called for the ‘elimination from national armament of atomic weapons and of
all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’.82 Later that year an American plan
banning atomic weapons was adopted by the General Assembly but deemed unacceptable to
the Soviet Union. A subsequent Soviet plan, which would have also seen the prohibition on
nuclear weapons, was deemed unacceptable by the United States.83
In the years that have followed this failure to agree on disarmament plans, a clear legal
prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons in international law has continued to plague
international law and international relations. Processes to reduce nuclear weapons stocks
have been ongoing84, however, there remains strong opposition to any ban on nuclear
weapons from some quarters, and around 22,000 nuclear warheads are in existence today.
Further, promises continue to not be kept. At the first special session on disarmament of the
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UN General Assembly in 1978 all countries agreed on the goal of the elimination of nuclear
weapons through a comprehensive disarmament programme.85
Today there are three main pillars to the approach of international law to nuclear weapons:
the NPT (including regional agreements); proposals for a specific legally binding instrument
to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons; and IHL. The decision of the ICJ in its 1996 Advisory
Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons adds a further layer of
complexity to the IHL analysis.86
Particularly significant to this discussion is the reference in the Chair’s summary at the
Second Intergovernmental Meeting on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons in
Mexico, that the move towards a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapon use
is ‘consistent with our obligations under international law, including those derived from the
NPT as well as from Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions.’87 Even in the absence
of a clear ban, if the use of nuclear weapons would be a breach of the Geneva Conventions
(as is argued here), then supporting their continued existence would be in violation of the
obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions. This thesis adopts the
view that the use of nuclear weapons, as they are understood today, can in no conceivable
way comply with the principles of IHL (see further below) and that as such states would be
taking a clear opportunity to comply with the obligation in Common Article 1 through their
positive inclusion in progress towards a legally binding instrument clearly prohibiting the use
of nuclear weapons.  
The NPT, some proposals for a specific legally binding instrument to prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons, the ICJ Advisory Opinion and IHL principles will now be discussed.
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4.1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT was concluded in 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970.88 In essence the
basis of the treaty was the restriction of nuclear weapon states to those in possession of them
at the time of the treaty negotiations – United States, USSR, United Kingdom, China and
France. In exchange these states were to provide assistance with the development of peaceful
nuclear technology by the non-nuclear weapons states. The treaty came about against the
backdrop of a climate of fear of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also in
circumstances where a proposal by the USSR to destroy all atomic weapons had not got any
traction.89 Under the NPT nuclear weapon states undertook not to help non-nuclear weapons
states to acquire nuclear weapons90 and non-nuclear weapon states agreed not to manufacture
or pursue nuclear weapons.91 The NPT was originally intended to be an interim measure92
(for 25 years) with disarmament as the ultimate goal.93  On 11 May 1995, the Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons determined that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely.  Commentators
have noted that making the treaty indefinite was not in-keeping with the original intention of
the treaty for which disarmament and a nuclear-free world was the ultimate goal and
‘squandered a unique opportunity to advance the course of nuclear disarmament’.94
Importantly, for this discussion Article VI of the NPT provides:
[e]ach of the parties to this treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
It is also noted that the preamble recalled:  
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the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all
time and to continue negotiations to this end.
Almost all nations are party to the NPT. Those who are not include four nuclear weapons
states – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea95 and the world’s newest state South Sudan.
Australia became a party on 23 January 1973.96
In 1996 the Article VI provision was interpreted by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion (see further below) as meaning that there ‘exists an obligation to pursue in good faith
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control.’97 Many have commented that this obligation, as
expressed by the ICJ, ‘goes beyond a mere obligation of conduct… [to] actually involve and
obligation of result, i.e., to conclude those negotiations’.98
In 1995, the year that the NPT was due to expire, the United States and other nuclear weapon
states pressed for Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
The Principles and Objectives set forth measures for implementation of the Article VI
disarmament obligation. They included negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of ‘systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.’99
On 1 May 2000, the five nuclear powers expressed strong support for the NPT and for the
full realization and implementation of Article VI. In their statement, they reaffirmed the
necessity of an effective international, ‘convention banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’.100 It is therefore difficult to argue
that the nuclear powers do not understand that Article VI binds them, and the whole
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international community, to create a convention that bans nuclear proliferation and mandates
nuclear disarmament.
This understanding was restated at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. ‘The unequivocal
undertaking of the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all state parties are committed under article
VI’.101 Further, the 2010 NPT Review Conference ‘expresse[d] its deep concern at the
catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the
need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including
international humanitarian law’.102
After so many years of unsuccessfully asking the nuclear weapons states to fulfill the
commitment under Article VI, a significant number of the non-nuclear weapons states have
decided to pursue their agenda through a different mechanism. The 2015 NPT Review
Conference took place from 27 April – 22 May 2015 in New York. The meeting ended
without a consensus on the substantive part of the Final document.103 At this conference, the
Austrian government, on the back of the December 2014 Vienna Intergovernmental Meeting
on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons (and earlier Oslo and Nayarit meetings),
put forward the Humanitarian Pledge, supported by (at that time) 107 states, expressing a
commitment ‘to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition
and elimination of nuclear weapons’.104 As such, while the NPT has proven unlikely to ever
achieve compliance with Article VI, a ban-treaty (see below) is likely to be the focus of
discussions in the near future.
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4.2 Frameworks to ban nuclear weapons
Whilst the NPT does not regulate the use of nuclear weapons, it sets up a framework for the
adoption of regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties. A number of these treaties have been
concluded, in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Africa.105
These regional treaties expressly prohibit use, as well as possession, testing, manufacture and
acquisition, of nuclear weapons in the territories in which they apply. A number of subject
matter specific treaties also prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in certain places. For
example, the Antarctic, Outer Space and Seabed treaties106 all include prohibitions on the use
of nuclear weapons among their articles.  
There have also been a number of ban treaty initiatives put forward.107 For example, the
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention put to the UN General Assembly in December 2007 by
the governments of Costa Rica and Malaysia. This was the result of a process beginning in
April 1997 when the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, International Association of
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
and International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation jointly released a
drafted Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. The UN General Assembly resolution calling
for a Nuclear Weapons Convention is entitled Follow-up on the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. It
was first adopted in December 2007 and is revisited annually. One hundred and twenty seven
countries voted yes, 27 abstained and 27 voted against.108
The most notable of these initiatives is the Humanitarian Pledge. As noted above, this
initiative began with the historic meeting in Oslo, in March 2013, when representatives of
127 governments met to discuss the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons109, and
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the February 2013 meeting in Nayarit, of 146 governments continuing these discussions.110  
Whilst initially very focused on presenting the factual landscape around the humanitarian
consequences of nuclear weapons, in Mexico, the discussion became more focused on a
‘commitment of States and civil society to reach new international standards and norms,
through a legally binding instrument’.111  In particular at the Mexico meeting in early 2014,
the Meeting’s Chair, Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Mexico, concluded that:
the Nayarit Conference has shown that time has come to initiate a diplomatic process
conducive to [achieve a world without nuclear weapons]. … this process should
comprise a specific timeframe, … and a clear and substantive framework, making the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons the essence of disarmament efforts.112
The approach articulated by the Chair of the Mexico meetings was in line with the view that
‘in the past, weapons have been eliminated after they have been outlawed’.113 This process
then included a further follow up intergovernmental meeting in Vienna, Austria in December
2014. The Vienna meeting gave rise to the Humanitarian Pledge for the prohibition and
elimination of nuclear weapons. The Pledge calls for states to ‘identify and pursue effective
measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons’114 and
in 2015 has seen significant attention directed to it by states.
That the time really had come for action on this issue was made clear in New York when the
2015 NPT Review Conference failed. Non-nuclear weapons states had, in the months leading
up to the 2015 NPT, been considering the Humanitarian Pledge. These developments
continued to be strongly pushed by a number of states and by civil society. The failure of the
2015 NPT Review Conference has now given a clear platform to pursue this agenda. Hanson
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notes ‘the failed conference now liberates the world to seek safety from nuclear annihilation
by other, more promising means. This was the real achievement in New York last month’.115
As at late 2015 the Humanitarian Pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear
weapons, has been endorsed by 121 nations116 (not including Australia). The Humanitarian
Pledge was also the subject of a UN General Assembly resolution in October 2015, and is on
the agenda for the 71st session of the UN General Assembly First Committee in 2016.117
A ban treaty is now almost inevitable and the open-ended working group will commence
their work towards this in February 2016. However, the likelihood of it including any nuclear
weapons states, at least in its early years, is almost zero. As such there will be many
questions over its relevance and effectiveness. Hanson notes that this argument
misunderstands the objective of the ban-treaty. The role of the ban-treaty would be to ‘fill the
legal gap that currently exists’ and increase the ‘sense that no “civilized” states would use
them’.118 ‘In time, and with growing adherence, this ban is likely to be taken seriously by
nuclear weapons states and their allies’.119
Australia’s approach to the NPT and the ban-treaty will be discussed further below.  
4.3 Nuclear weapons advisory opinion120
Unanimously, the ICJ has found that:
[a] threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements
of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the
principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific
obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear
weapons.121
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However, by seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote, the ICJ found that:
[i]t follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact
at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.122
These findings have been very unhelpful to the many who have sought to interpret them in
the years that have followed this decision. The ICJ was asked to consider ‘is the threat or use
of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?’123 In doing so
they primarily had reference to the law on the use of force and IHL.124 In answering this
question, the Court concluded that there was no treaty law which specifically and universally
prohibited the use of nuclear weapons.125 The Court further noted that the emergence of a
customary rule specifically prohibiting such use was hampered by the continuing tension
between, on the one hand, the non-use of the weapons by states since 1945 and on the other,
states strongly adhering to the practice of deterrence.126 Ultimately, the Court felt unable to
rule out the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a state is at stake, because the principle of
proportionality in the law of self-defence may allow such use. The Court further held that any
such use must be in conformity with IHL.127 However, following a very brief analysis of
distinction and unnecessary suffering principles (the Court having earlier dismissed
arguments based on protection of the environment from widespread, long-term and severe
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damage128) the Court held use of nuclear weapons would ‘generally be contrary to the rules
of international law applicable to armed conflict’129.
One problem with this reasoning is, as has been pointed out by many, that it conflated the law
on the use of force in international law and the law on the use of force during times of armed
conflict.130 That is, in finding that, because it may be possible under self-defence law to use a
nuclear weapon, nuclear weapons cannot always be contrary to IHL, the Court failed to
separate their consideration of IHL principles and view the legal finding regarding self-
defence as entirely irrelevant to the IHL analysis.  
In light of other Statements by the Court, including that ‘the destructive power of nuclear
weapons cannot be contained in either space or time…[and] would be a serious danger to
future generations’131, and ‘their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human
suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come’132 it seems difficult to
imagine how the use of such a weapon could ever meet this requirement of compliance with
IHL. As such, whilst nuclear weapons could comply with the principle of proportionality
under the law of self-defence, it is very arguable that it may still not be able to comply with
IHL and the Court really did not undertake this latter analysis. Indeed, reading the relevant
paragraph, paragraph 78, demonstrates that while the principles were noted, they were not
applied in any manner.133 Judge Higgins in her dissenting opinion specifically makes this
point.
[a]t no point in its Opinion does the Court engage in the task that is surely at the heart
of the question asked: the systematic application of the relevant law to the use of
threat of nuclear weapons…An essential step in the judicial process - that of legal
reasoning - has been omitted.134
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Before turning to undertake this analysis, it is worth noting that, despite the findings of the
Court, many of the judges who did engage in the legal reasoning in their separate opinions
clearly suggest that nuclear weapons are not in any way compatible with IHL. Judge Ferrari
Bravo for example held:
all the rules produced over the last 50 years, particularly with regard to the
humanitarian law of armed conflict, are irreconcilable with the technological
development of the construction of nuclear weapons. Can one, for example, imagine
that just as humanitarian law, an essential and increasingly significant part of the
international law of warfare and (of late) of peace as well, is bringing into being a
whole series of principles for the protection of the civilian population or the
environment, that same international law should continue to accommodate the
lawfulness of, for example, the use of the neutron bomb, which leaves the
environment intact, albeit with the "'slight" drawback that the people living in it are
wiped out! If that is the case, it matters little whether a rule specific to the neutron
bomb can be found, since it becomes automatically unlawful as being quite out of
keeping with the majority of the rules of international law.135
The Declaration of the President, who made the casting vote, is particularly supportive of this
approach:  
10. There are some who will inevitably interpret operative paragraph 2 E as
contemplating the possibility of States using nuclear weapons in exceptional
circumstances. For my part, and in the light of the foregoing, I feel obliged in all
honesty to construe that paragraph differently, a fact which has enabled me to support
the text. My reasons are set out below.
…
20. Nuclear weapons can be expected - in the present state of scientific development
at least - to cause indiscriminate victims among combatants and non-combatants
alike, as well as unnecessary suffering among both categories. By its very nature the
nuclear weapon, a blind weapon, therefore has a destabilizing effect on humanitarian
law, the law of discrimination which regulates discernment in the use of weapons.
Nuclear weapons, the ultimate evil, destabilize humanitarian law which is the law of
the lesser evil. The existence of nuclear weapons is therefore a major challenge to the
very existence of humanitarian law, not to mention their long-term harmful effects on
the human environment, in respecting which the right to life may be exercised. Until
scientists are able to develop a "clean" nuclear weapon which would distinguish
between combatants and non-combatants, nuclear weapons will clearly have
indiscriminate effects and constitute an absolute challenge to humanitarian law.
Atomic warfare and humanitarian law therefore appear to be mutually exclusive, the
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existence of the one automatically implying the non-existence of the other.136
(emphasis added)
Judge Herczegh noted:  
[t]he fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, rightly emphasized in
the reasons of the Advisory Opinion, categorically and unequivocally prohibit the use
of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. International
humanitarian law does not recognize any exceptions to these principles.137
4.4 The Geneva Conventions and nuclear weapons
As discussed in chapter four, the rules of IHL prohibit the use of weapons that have the
following characteristics:
• have indiscriminate effects;138
• cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;139 or
• are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage
to the natural environment140.
Indiscriminate effects
As noted in chapter four, the principle of distinction, between military and civilian objects,
fundamental to IHL, is articulated by Article 48 of AP I.141 A weapon which has inherently
indiscriminate effects, as opposed to one that can be used in an indiscriminate way, is
unlawful.  This principle forms a part of customary IHL as a norm applicable in both
international and non-international armed conflicts.142 Nuclear weapons are inherently
indiscriminate. Their design feature, and indeed reason for existence, is, as was noted earlier,
  
136 Declaration of President Bedjaoui, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (Advisory Opinion)
[1996] ICJ Rep. 270, 272-273.
137 Declaration of Judge Herczegh, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996]
ICJ Rep. 275.
138 AP I art 51.  
139 AP I art 35 (2).
140 AP I art 35 (3).
141 AP I art 48.  In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.
142 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1:
Rules (ICRC and Cambridge University Press, Geneva, 2005) (hereafter ‘ICRC Customary Law Study’) 3.
142
to have a magnitude to their explosion thousands of times greater than that caused by
conventional weapons.143 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of the Effects of the
Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,144 which provides an assessment of the impact of
a ‘small’ nuclear weapon by today’s standards, provides conclusive evidence of this, in so far
as, their effects cannot be contained in space and time. Although, this was a case of the
weapons being directed against civilians, even if the weapons were directed only at a very
remote military location, because of the inability to contain the radioactive fallout material
which is highly likely to extend across international boundaries and impact on precipitation
and contaminate soil, they will have impacts which continue for generations and which
cannot distinguish between military and civilians.145  
It has been suggested that strategic or tactical nuclear weapons could be used in a
discriminate manner. A non-strategic nuclear weapon – or battlefield or tactical – nuclear
weapon is one that is intended to be used for an isolated purpose. These weapons would be
about a third of the size of the Hiroshima bomb.146 It is really not clear at what stage in
development these so called tactical nuclear weapons are. However, the Federation of
American scientists note that the reality is that other conventional weapons could inflict
comparable military consequences without radiation and as such would make them
redundant.147 A 2004 United States Department of Defence and Department of Energy study
is noted by Nasu as raising ‘serious doubts as to whether [a lower-yield nuclear weapons
capable of penetrating deeply buried facilities without causing excessive collateral damage]
could penetrate deep enough to contain the nuclear explosion and the radiation it would
consequently produce’.148
On this point the ICRC has noted:
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[s]ome have argued that low-yield nuclear weapons could be compatible with IHL.
While the use of low-yield nuclear weapons in a remote area, such as against troops in
a desert or against a fleet at sea, may not have immediate effects on civilians, there
would remain significant concerns, not just about the eventual spread of radiation to
civilian areas, but also the radiological contamination of the environment and the
impact of radiation on combatants. In other words, even the use of a nuclear weapon
far from civilian settlements would raise questions of compatibility with IHL rules.149
Unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury
Article 35 (2) of AP I provides that it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering. This provision is held to be applicable in both international and non-international
armed conflict.150  
There can be no serious argument about whether nuclear weapons cause superfluous injury
and unnecessary suffering. The ICJ noted that horrendous suffering is not necessarily
unnecessary suffering.151 However, as Boothby notes, these are comparative concepts152 and
it is therefore necessary to ascertain the nature of the comparator. Effects of the weapon
clearly included massive numbers of immediate deaths (from the explosion and from collapse
of buildings and flying debris) and also some 20-30% of the population experiencing burn
injuries.153 The radiation diseases, including blood cancers, which continue to cause
unnecessary suffering to the Japanese population and those victims of nuclear testing put this
weapon in a class of its own. The US concluded in 1946 that the radiation negatively affected
reproduction and ‘[o]f women in various stages of pregnancy who were within 3,000 feet of
ground zero, all known cases have had miscarriages’.154 Causing intergenerational health
effects constitutes suffering which is unnecessary – and this applies equally to civilians and
to military personnel (whom the prohibition on unnecessary suffering is intended to protect).
This is because conventional weapons could also achieve the military objective, without
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causing intergenerational suffering. Comprehensive health information about the effects of
radiation, including its disproportionate effects on women and children are now known such
that the unnecessary suffering is clearly identifiable.155  
Widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment
Weapons which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the natural environment are prohibited by Article 35(3) AP 1.156 This
Article, coupled with Article 55 of AP 1157, makes it clear that this concept is about ensuring
that the civilian population is able to continue to use its environment to provide for the
necessities of life.  Recent studies have shown alarming consequences for the environment,
global climate, rainfall, temperatures and food production from modelling of a ‘small scale’
nuclear war.158 The ability for the civilian population to use the environment to provide for
the necessities of life is compromised by nuclear fallout for generations and as such these
weapons fall foul of this principle.
Conclusion on the international humanitarian law analysis
In 2011 the Red Cross Movement concluded that ‘it finds it difficult to envisage how any use
of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the rules of IHL, in particular the rules of
distinction, precaution and proportionality’.159 This statement can be put more unequivocally
today. In 2015, in the light of the extensive evidence presented in Oslo, Nayarit and Mexico
on all aspects of health, environmental, climate, and emergency response capacity, and in
light of more up to date information on tactical nuclear weapons that was not before the ICJ,
it is no longer possible to maintain the argument that these weapons could be lawful in any
circumstances under IHL.  
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5. Australia’s approach to the steps to regulate nuclear weapons
As we have seen Australia was very quick to support Britain’s efforts to develop nuclear
weapons with Prime Minister Menzies allowing British nuclear testing to take place on
Australian soil and in some respects, given the current reliance on the Unites States’ nuclear
weapons for security (see further below), what little has changed is that the support is no
longer to Britain but rather the United States.  
However, even before this acceptance of British testing had occurred, Australians had been
concerned about the ‘immediate and widespread destruction’ the bomb could cause. Then
Chief Justice Latham of the High Court of Australia wrote to the Secretary General of the
Australian Red Cross in 1945, which was then considering its approach to the forthcoming
conference to negotiate the Geneva Conventions, and noted:  
[i]t may be that a defence against the bomb will be discovered by scientists, but if one
aeroplane gets through with one bomb a whole city may be destroyed. Something
must be done to control the use of this new form of destruction, or to prevent its use,
unless mankind is in the future to be upon continual alert - living always under the
imminent fear of immediate and widespread destruction. This matter can be handled
only upon the political plane, and it is important that the Red Cross should preserve
its non-political character. It appears to me, however, that the issue before humanity is
so great and so vital that it would be proper for the Red Cross to prepare an address to
the Governments of the world, impressing upon them the necessity, in the interest of
humanity, of arriving at an agreement which will either prevent or control the use of
the atomic bomb for purposes of destruction.160
Clarke asserts that Australia’s signature of the NPT in February 1970 was done ‘somewhat
reluctantly’ as then Prime Minister John Gorton believed that Australia required nuclear
weapons for its regional security.161 Hubbard labels the approach as one of ambivalence.162
Australia’s part in the story of UN and Western efforts since 1968 to halt the spread
of nuclear weapons can be understood from three distinct perspectives: its defence
and security alliance with the US, its regional and wider status within the international
community, and its own reluctance to renounce the option of acquiring an
independent nuclear deterrent force.163
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Ratification in 1973 took place under the then Prime Minister Gough Whitlam who supported
the NPT, but also supported the economic benefits from uranium mining as well as the cause
of advancing Aboriginal Land Rights.164  Upon signature of the NPT in 1970 Australia
lodged a fairly lengthy declaration which, among other things, indicated a desire to be
‘assured that there [was] a sufficient degree of support for the Treaty’. The declaration
‘attache[d] weight to the statements by the Governments of the [US], [UK] and the Soviet
Union declaring their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide help to
any non-nuclear weapons state party to the Treaty that is subject to aggression or the threat of
aggression with nuclear weapons’.165 This declaration was noted on 29 August 1985 to no
longer accurately reflect Australia's position and was not intended to have any further
application after Australia's ratification of the NPT on 23 January 1973.166 Australia signed
an atomic energy safeguard in July 1974 with the International Atomic Energy Agency.167
With respect to the Rarotonga Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (1985), Australia chaired the treaty
negotiations and ‘explicitly opposed controls over land-based dumping, presumably because
of the wish to retain its own options for dumping associated with Australian uranium mining
and nuclear industry’.168 Australia has come under criticism for putting its nuclear power and
uranium mining interests ahead of comprehensive efforts to assist the region in the wake of
nuclear tests. The regional Waigani Convention on Hazardous Wastes, signed at the
Australian-chaired 1995 South Pacific Forum, as France was conducting its highly
controversial final nuclear tests in the Pacific, does not include radioactive wastes. Hamel-
Green asserts Australian negotiators ‘bear much of the responsibility for this omission’.169
By 1996, Australia was advocating strongly against the compatibility of nuclear weapons and
IHL. In oral submissions170 before the ICJ, Gavan Griffith QC and The Hon. Gareth Evans
QC put that ‘Australia's position on these questions is that customary international law has
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now developed to the stage where the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary per
se to international law’.171 Evans made very clear arguments as to why nuclear weapons were
illegal under international law, specifically focusing on IHL. He noted:  
nuclear weapons are by their nature illegal under customary international law, by
virtue of fundamental general principles of humanity. It is illegal not only to use or
threaten use of nuclear weapons, but to acquire, develop, test, or possess them. The
right of States to self-defence cannot be invoked to justify such actions.172
The current ADF policy is contained in the 2013 Defence White Paper and with regards to
nuclear weapons notes (although it is noted that this document was released under the former
Australian government173):
… as long as nuclear weapons exist, we rely on the nuclear forces of the United States
to deter nuclear attack on Australia. Australia is confident in the continuing viability
of extended nuclear deterrence under the Alliance, while strongly supporting on-going
efforts towards global nuclear disarmament.174  
The Policy also notes that Australia’s key strategic interests in South Asia include nuclear
non-proliferation and the maintenance of peace between the nuclear armed India and
Pakistan.175
Under successive governments, Australian defence policy has ‘acknowledged the value to
Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance’.176
However, the 2009 Defence White Paper noted deterrence as a policy that would continue
within the timeframe of that white paper177 and that stable nuclear deterrence would be a
feature of the international system for the foreseeable future such that extended deterrence
would continue to be viable,178 indicating that this position was not a permanent one. Indeed
the Rudd/Gillard Government gave a number of indications of a commitment to a nuclear
free world. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons cite responses from
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former Prime Minister Rudd to the Canberra Press Club on 15 November 2007 as stating
that, if elected, Australia would drive the international agenda for a nuclear weapons
convention. 179 In 2008, jointly with the Japanese Government, Australia established the
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Further, in a
parliamentary motion which received cross-party support, on 21 March 2012 Prime Minister
Gillard affirmed support for the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. 180 These public
statements of commitment, however, were not supported by action.
At the UNGA First Committee, Australia has, in October 2013181, October 2014182 and
October 2015183, led a group of states in putting forward statements which couch Australia’s
commitment to a nuclear free world as a balance between security interests and humanitarian
arguments for their abolition. Australia maintains that the NPT is the ‘cornerstone for
progress towards total nuclear disarmament’184 and that ‘general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control will have to be negotiated to underpin a world
without nuclear weapons’.185
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons reported that Australia refused the
request of New Zealand to join with 125 other nations in support of their statements in 2013
and 2014 which were more unequivocal on the humanitarian arguments for abolition. It was
noted that ‘Australia’s specific objection was to a sentence declaring that it is in the interest
of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, “under any circumstances” – which
Australia believed “cut across” its reliance on the use of US nuclear weapons on its behalf.’
186 This view of Australia as ‘spoiler’ State is held by a number of non-governmental and
activist organisations. Australia has been labelled a ‘Nuclear Weasel State’ by activist group
  
179 ICAN, Government positions on a nuclear-weapons convention (August 2010) 6.
180 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, (21 March 2012) 3685, (Julia Gillard)
(Tony Abbott).  
181 Australian Mission to the United Nations, Joint Statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear
weapons,UNGA68 1st Comm, (21 October 2013) (Peter Woolcott).
182 Australian Mission to the United Nations, Joint Statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear
weapons,UNGA69 1st Comm, (20 October 2014) (John Quinn).
183 Australian Mission to the United Nations, Joint Statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear
weapons,UNGA70 1st Comm, (21 October 2014) (John Quinn).
184 Ibid.
185 Australian Mission to the United Nations, Joint Statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear
weapons,UNGA69 1st Comm, (20 October 2014) (John Quinn).
186 ICAN Australia, ‘Briefing Paper Undermining disarmament: the Australian way’ (March 2014)
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Wildfire. ‘Weasels’ are non-nuclear weapon states which rely on alliances with nuclear
powers and the doctrine of deterrence. Wildfire view them as undermining disarmament
processes while claiming to support humanitarian arguments for their abolition.187
Australia attended the Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna Meetings. Freedom of Information materials
released following requests from the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
reveal differences of opinion between civil society and the Australian government on this
issue and in particular, Australia’s approach being, that effective disarmament is needed to
achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons rather than a legally binding instrument
prohibiting their use.188  
Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, on the eve of the Mexico conference on the
humanitarian consequence of nuclear weapons, put the Australian position. She said that the
push for a ban on nuclear weapons was ‘emotionally appealing, but the reality is that
disarmament cannot be imposed this way. Just pushing for a ban would divert attention from
the sustained, practical steps needed for effective disarmament’.189
That disarmament must come first is a position which Australia has maintained, including at
the 2015 NPT Review Conference where, in delivering a joint-statement on the humanitarian
consequences of nuclear weapons, Australia again reiterated its view that the NPT ‘is the
cornerstone for progress towards total disarmament’.190 The most recent round of information
obtained through a Freedom on Information request on this issue, notes Australia as being
concerned about emergence of the Austrian pledge and does not want to see it ‘become
synonymous with a nuclear weapons ban treaty’.191 The documents reveal that ‘it is in the
very interest of the survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under
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190 HE Gillian Bird, Joint Statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, 9th Review
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any circumstances’ is ‘a phrase that Australia cannot accept’.192 Australia abstained from the
vote on the establishment of the open-ended working group on effective legal measures
towards a world without nuclear weapons ‘in the face of unresolved and substantive
differences with the mandate and rules of procedure’.193
6. Australia, nuclear weapons and the obligation to respect and ensure respect for
IHL
Australia has consistently adopted an approach to nuclear weapons that is strongly influenced
by other states. This is today characterised by the Australian doctrine of reliance on the
United States nuclear umbrella. This doctrine has been ridiculed by many commentators on
account of there being no agreement between the United States and Australia to that effect.194  
Before the ICJ in 1995 Australia argued strongly that nuclear weapons were not compatible
with IHL. While Australia supported ‘the principle of stable nuclear deterrence pending
complete nuclear disarmament’, Australia stated multiple times that such ‘stable deterrence
can only be accepted as an interim or transitional condition’.195 Given the failure of nuclear
weapons states to bring about that disarmament in the 20 years that has followed, it seems
timely for Australia to reconsider its approach and a Common Article 1 analysis is a positive
vehicle through which Australia could change its positioning.
While it remains the case that there is no clearly articulated unequivocal prohibition on the
use of nuclear weapons in international law, it is clear the move towards one is gaining
momentum. States seeking to demonstrate respect and ensuring respect for the Geneva
Conventions are at the forefront of this momentum. Further, the Advisory Opinion decision is
approaching 20 years old. Before the ICJ Australia noted:
[b]ut the question whether the use or threat of nuclear weapons was illegal in the
1940s, or even in the 1980s, is not of particular significance for present purposes.
Even if the use or threat of nuclear weapons was not per se inconsistent with
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elementary considerations of humanity and the dictates of public conscience in the
past, this does not determine whether it is per se inconsistent with those principles
today.196
The ICJ’s finding is adopted with the caveat ‘in view of the current state of international law,
and of the elements of fact at its disposal’. In light of the facts now available, as presented in
Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna, which have made so clear the effects on human health (both
immediate and intergenerational) and climate which would result from a nuclear detonation,
and the inability of the emergency responders to assist, it is no longer possible to foresee any
use of nuclear weapons being compatible with IHL. As such, regardless of the existence of a
ban treaty in the future, or any other similar developments, or indeed any view on the
viability or otherwise of nuclear deterrence, the continued existence of nuclear weapons is an
affront to Common Article 1.
Australia must look to Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions as a source of a strong
argument for supporting the humanitarian initiative towards a clear and specific legally
binding prohibition on nuclear weapons. It has been said that Australia has a reputation in
this space for talking the talk but not walking the walk when it comes to a real commitment
to a nuclear free world.197 By considering the nuclear weapons issue through the Common
Article 1 lens, Australia will be persuaded from its current approach. For example, while
Australia’s direct influence on US nuclear policy is not necessarily significant, Australia has
significant capacity in respect of this topic. Australia can easily amend its policy of nuclear
deterrence. Taken as one of a number of states currently reliant on US nuclear deterrence
such a move could be influential in relation to persuading other states to take the same
approach. That would constitute taking a measure in support of Common Article 1
obligations and would be for the benefit of Australia’s international relations, and for
humanity.  
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197 Woodroofe, above note 57. Although more recently it is being strongly critiqued for not even talking the
talk. See, eg, Tim Wright, Documents reveal Australia is ‘worried’ about ‘growing momentum’ towards nuclear
weapon ban, (15 September 2015) International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
<http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/foi-documents-reveal-australia-is-worried-about-growing-momentum-
towards-nuclear-ban/>.  
152
7. Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the failings of international law to deal with humanity’s greatest
threat - nuclear detonation198 and Australia’s role in undermining efforts to move the
international legal landscape forward from its 75 year stalemate. The potential opportunity
for Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to be a strong ally in the quest for a clear
and specific prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons is clear. In light of the new evidence
about the incompatibility of nuclear weapons with IHL all states, including Australia, have an
obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions by recognizing the
existing illegality of their use under IHL, supporting the proposal for a clear and specific
prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.
Australia, as a state that has undertaken a number of measures to undermine this route now
has a role to play in reversing its stance. Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu, ahead of the Nayarit
Intergovernmental Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons, noted:
[w]hy should these weapons, whose effects are the most grievous of all, remain the
only weapons of mass destruction not expressly prohibited under international law?
By stigmatizing the bomb -- as well as those who possess it -- we can build
tremendous pressure for disarmament.199
Australia is undermining efforts to stigmatise nuclear weapons and therefore Australia is in
breach of its obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Australia must reconsider its
position on nuclear weapons. In order to facilitate this Australia should employ a Common
Article 1 analysis in relation to its approach to nuclear weapons. Further, if Australia does so,
it is well placed to use its capacity to influence others towards a position of respecting IHL
with respect to nuclear weapons.
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CHAPTER SIX: AUSTRALIA, THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE OBLIGATION TO
RESPECT AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Chapter six provides an overview of the newest international instrument regulating weapons,
namely the ATT, and its development. It considers the approach taken by Australia to the
negotiation of the ATT and its implementation by Australia. It answers the questions what
approach has Australia taken to the regulation of small arms and light weapons by
international law and what conclusions can be reached from this evaluation regarding the
approach of Australia to compliance with the obligation to respect and ensure respect
pursuant to Common Article 1? It notes that Common Article 1 has not featured in
Australia’s approach to the treaty to date, but that the treaty itself includes provisions (in
Articles 6(3) and 7) which have strong links to Common Article 1. The real work with the
ATT begins now, in the early years of implementing the treaty. Australia has taken a leading
role in the negotiation and promotion of the treaty to date. Australia also has significant
capacity to assist other states to ensure respect for IHL. The ATT should be a vehicle for
Australia doing so.
1. Introduction
The ATT came into force on 24 December 2014.1  It was hailed by Ban Ki-moon as ‘a
victory for the world’s people’ and ‘a powerful tool in our efforts to prevent grave human
rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law’.2  The ATT was adopted by the
UN General Assembly on 2 April 20133, having been agreed, without consensus, on 27
March 2013 in New York.4 One hundred and fifty four states, including Australia, supported
the text. Twenty-three nations abstained from voting. Iran, Syria and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea voted against it.5 Australia was among the States Party at commencement,
  
1 Arms Trade Treaty, opened for signature 3 June 2013, (entered into force 24 December 2014).
2 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, The Arms Trade
<https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ArmsTrade/>.
3 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 67/234. The Arms Trade Treaty B, UNGA, 67th sess, 71st plenary
mtg, Agenda item 94, A/RES/67/234B (11 June 2013).
4 Peter Woolcott, Presidents Non Paper, 27 March 2013, United Nations Final Conference on the Arms Trade
Treaty New York, 18-28 March (28 March 2013)
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/Presidents_Non_Paper_of_27_March_2013_(ATT_Final_Confere
nce).pdf> .
5 United Nations, ‘Overwhelming Majority of States in General Assembly Say ‘Yes’ to Arms Trade Treaty to
Stave off Irresponsible Transfer that Perpetuate Conflict, Human Suffering’ (United Nations Meetings Coverage
and Press Releases, 2 April 2013)  < http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/ga11354.doc.htm>.
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having lodged an instrument of ratification on 3 June 2014.6  The ATT regulates the ‘export,
import, transfer, trans-shipment and brokering’ of the weapon categories set out therein,
which include small arms and light weapons and key military hardware such as battle tanks,
combat aircraft and warships.7 The first meeting of States Party was held in Mexico in
August 2015.8 The initial reports from countries, on their implementation of the ATT, are due
for submission in December 2015.9  
Australia has played a number of significant roles internationally in the development of the
ATT, including as President of the March 2013 ATT Conference in New York, which lead to
the final text of the treaty and its adoption by the UN, and as co-author of early resolutions
before the General Assembly which led the international community on the path towards the
ATT. Australia has expressed strong support for the ATT process.
Australia’s commitment to the treaty process is driven by humanitarian, security and
trade considerations, in addition to a desire to develop an international instrument that
will deter the destabilizing impact on security and development of illicit transfer of
arms.10
2. Weapons that are regulated by the ATT and the operation of the ATT
The object of the ATT is articulated as being to ‘establish the highest possible common
international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in
conventional arms’ and to ‘prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms’.11  
Reducing human suffering, increasing peace and security and confidence building among
states are listed as the reasons for the treaty’s existence.12
Article 2(1) of the ATT provides that the ATT applies to:  
  
6 Australian Government, Arms Trade Treaty Ratification Event: “Approaching entry into force” (3 June 2014)
Australian United Nations Security Council 2013-2014 < http://australia-unsc.gov.au/2014/06/arms-trade-treaty-
ratification-event-approaching-entry-into-force/>.
7 ATT art 2.
8 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, First Meeting of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty,
http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/csp1/. Australia’s opening statement to the meeting dated 24 August 2015
is available at < http://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/images/Australia.pdf>.
9 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, The Arms Trade Treaty,
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>.
10 Compilation of views on the elements of an arms trade treaty, UN GA, A/CONF.217/2 (10 May 2012) <
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.217/2&Lang=E>, 7.
11 ATT art 1.
12 ATT art 1.
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all conventional arms within the following categories:
(a) Battle tanks;
(b) Armoured combat vehicles;
(c) Large-calibre artillery systems;
(d) Combat aircraft;
(e) Attack helicopters;
(f) Warships;
(g) Missiles and missile launchers; and
(h) Small arms and light weapons.
The ATT regulates the ‘export, import, transfer, trans-shipment and brokering’ of the
weapons within these categories where that ‘international movement’ takes the weapons out
of the ownership of the first State Party.13 It also covers ammunition/munitions and parts and
components for the aforementioned weapons.14
Transfers of the weapons regulated by the ATT shall not be authorised by a State Party if
doing so would violate obligations under UN measures (eg. arms embargoes) or other
international obligations (eg. illicit trafficking) or if the State Party has knowledge that the  
arms ‘would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions [], attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected
as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a
Party’.15Additionally, States, prior to authorising a transfer must consider whether there is an
overriding risk of the arms being used to undermine peace and security or to commit or
facilitate serious violations of IHL, international human rights law, international terrorism or
transnational organised crime.16 Specific mention is made in Article 7(4) that States Party
‘shall take into account the risk’ of the arms being ‘used to commit or facilitate serious acts
of gender based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children’. If such an
overriding risk exists, then the transfer must not take place.17
There are a number of obligations set out under the treaty on States Party to assist other
States Party with the implementation of the ATT, including the sharing of information with
one another to prevent breaches of the treaty (including the diversion of arms)18 and in
  
13 ATT arts 2(2), 2(3).
14 ATT arts 3, 4.
15 ATT art 6.
16 ATT art 7.
17 ATT art 7(3).
18 See ATT art 11(4).
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particular, the provisions of Article 15 ‘International Cooperation’ and Article 16
‘International Assistance’. Record keeping and reporting obligations are also important to the
treaty. Article 12 provides that each State Party maintain records of exports or authorisation
of exports of arms covered by the treaty. The treaty is not prescriptive as to how this is done19
and indeed specifically notes that the records shall be maintained ‘pursuant to its national
laws and regulations’.  There is no obligation to maintain records of imports, although Article
12(2) ‘encourages’ State Party to do so.
3. The ATT and international humanitarian law
The nature of the ATT means that it is not an IHL treaty20, with an arms control21 element
like the Ottawa Landmines Convention22 or the Cluster Munitions Convention which was
discussed in chapter three.23 The ATT is a much broader arms control instrument which is
designed to assist in the implementation of not only IHL but also other legal frameworks
including domestic laws, international human rights law and international law on the use of
force. Further, the Preamble to the text specifically mentions the ‘need to prevent and
eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion’ in the context of
terrorism.24
  
19 See also ATT art 12(3) as to suggested content of the records and art 12(4) as to the requirement to keep such
records for 10 years.
20 International humanitarian law is concerned with regulating the use of particular means and methods of
warfare in times of armed conflict, in order to protect those not or no longer taking part in the fighting and to
minimize suffering.
21 Note the distinction between international humanitarian law treaties and arms control regimes as articulated
by Robert Mathews and Tim McCormack ‘ The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and
Arms Control’ in Tim McCormack and Helen Durham (eds), The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of
International Humanitarian Law (Kluwer Law International,1999) 66. See also Robert Mathews and Tim
McCormack, ‘The influence of humanitarian principles in the negotiation of arms control treaties’, (1999) 834
International Review of the Red Cross 331-352.  
22 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on their Destruction, opened for signature 3 December 1997, 2056 UNTS 241 (entered into force 1 March
1999).
23 Until 1977 weapons law issues traditionally fell under the Hague Law source of IHL law which (as distinct
from the Law of Geneva which deals with the protection of victims of war) however, AP I clearly covers
weapons law in some detail.  During the period leading up to the negotiations of the 1977 Additional Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions there were different views among states as to which framework would be the most
appropriate for considering specific weapons prohibitions. That these discussions took place indicate that it was
by no means a fait accompli that IHL and arms control law must be considered completely separate regimes.
See Francois Bugnion, ‘Droit de Geneve et droit de La Haye’ (English abstract) (2001) 844 International
Review of the Red Cross; Ashley Roach, ‘Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or
Humanitarian Law?’ (1984) 105 Military Law Review 3, 9-10.
24 ATT preamble.
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While many weapons law treaties have both the purpose of prohibiting the use of a weapon,
and prohibiting its manufacture, acquisition, transfer and sale, the ATT is designed only to
place restrictions on the circumstances in which transfers of conventional weapons are
allowed. This is because the weapons regulated by the ATT are not weapons which
inherently breach the principles of the Geneva Conventions regarding the legality of the use
of weapons.25  These weapons are not weapons which are inherently indiscriminate. These
weapons have the ability to comply with the provisions of IHL. Specifically, these are
weapons that can be employed in such a way as to avoid indiscriminate effects, unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury and widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural
environment. As such, the analysis provided in other chapters of this thesis regarding the
weapons’ compatibility with IHL, is not relevant here.
However, it is important to note that while not all of the prohibitions on the transfer of these
weapons stem from the potential for IHL violations, many do. It is therefore importanct to
include attitudes towards the ATT in this thesis, as a way of approaching an analysis of the
obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in Common Article 1. In
particular, the prohibitions on arms transfers in Article 6 of the treaty note that knowledge of
these armaments being used in the ‘commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or
civilians protected as such, or other war crimes’, have significance from an IHL perspective.  
Whilst it could be argued that there may be situations of crimes against humanity that do not
constitute violations of IHL26, many crimes against humanity will also constitute war crimes
and/or serious violations of IHL27. As such, there is a very significant focus in the
prohibitions reflected in IHL principles and the approach that Australia has taken to the ATT
is highly relevant to an analysis of the approach Australia takes to the obligation to respect
and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in Common Article 1.
  
25 Cf for example landmines and chemical and biological weapons.
26 The attacks on America on September 11, 2001, for example, were discussed in this light.
27 The ICRC has expressed the view that the terms serious violations of IHL and war crimes are
‘interchangeable’ and are encompassed by grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and AP I , article 8 of the
Rome Statue of the ICC and other war crimes pursuant to customary international law. ICRC, ‘What are
“serious violation of international humanitarian law”? Explanatory Note’
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2012/att-what-are-serious-violations-of-ihl-icrc.pdf>.  
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4. History of attempts to regulate the global arms trade
Stone notes that the notion of limiting arms exports for the purposes of the peace and security
of other states is a ‘modern’ concept and that traditionally arm exports were limited not by
formal prohibitions, but for national interest reasons, namely to ‘keep valuable munitions
available’.28 The Treaty of Washington, signed in 1871, between the United States and the
United Kingdom, and dealing with, among other items, compensation for damage done to the
Union during the American Civil War by the privately British built and crewed Alabama
vessel, is an apt starting point for a discussion of attempts to regulate interstate arms trade.
The positions put by the British made it very clear that they did not believe there to be any
international law obligations on states with regard private arms exports.29 (This was a
position dating back to 1660.30) The British agreed to be bound in future dealings with the
United States by the Treaty of Washington’s requirement that 'a neutral government is bound
[to exercise] due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming or equipping' of vessels intended
to make war against states with which it is at peace’31 (without prejudice to its view that this
was not a principle of international law).  Subsequent international legal frameworks,
including the Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, confirmed the principle
that private trade in arms was not for states to concern themselves with.32  
The idea that states may have obligations with regards to the activities of private enterprise is
a feature of the post World War I world, on account of both the ‘public revulsion against
arms manufacturers and traders’ and the licensing on all exports brought about during
wartime rationing.33 On 10 September 1919 the Convention for the Control of the Trade in
Arms and Ammunition was signed at St-Germain-en-Laye in Paris.34 The Convention
introduced restrictions on exporting any arms that were not licensed exports. It was set up in
such a way as to effectively be not about arms reduction, but about restricting arms being
transferred to Africa and the Middle East.35  The Convention, despite being signed by all
  
28 David Stone, ‘Imperialism and Sovereignty: The League of Nations’ Drive to Control the Global Arms
Trade’ (2000) 35(2) Journal of Contemporary History 213, 214.
29 Ibid 214-215.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid 216-7.
33 Ibid 217.
34 ‘Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol’ (1921) 15(4) The American
Journal of International Law, 297-313.
35 Stone, above note 28, 217.
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major arms-producers came to be ratified by very few nations and the failure of the United
States, in particular, to ratify the Convention became its undoing.36 An Arms Traffic
Conference held in 1925 was slated to give rise to an alternative to the St Germain-en-Laye
Convention.37 Concerns regarding sovereignty and state security were among those voiced in
the deliberations38 and again the reluctance of States to ratify the Arms Traffic Convention
led to its failure.
The importance of arms regulation was also a subject of the Covenant of the League of
Nations. Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations noted the ‘reduction of national
armaments’ as one of its objectives and sought to avoid the ‘evil effects’ of private sector
manufacture of ‘munitions and implements of war’.39 Article 23 entrusted ‘the League with
the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the
control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest’. Whilst the League of Nations did
not ultimately achieve its objectives, Stone notes that ‘it would be a mistake to see the
League’s record on arms trade a complete failure’ as, ‘in setting standards by which
international behaviour might be judged, it achieved an unjustifiably forgotten success’.40
Stone points to the League assembling significant data on the global arms trade, paving the
way for future work and bringing about the acceptance of peacetime licensing on arms
exports, to illustrate this point.41  
The UN Charter also included scope to deal with the proliferation of arms. Article 47 notes
that the ‘regulation of armaments’ is a topic that the Military Staff Committee (comprised of
a military representative from each of the permanent five members of the Security Council)
of the UN will advise the Security Council on.42 However, although the aftermath of its
creation saw a focus on international human rights regulations, the easy availability of
weapons so often responsible for violations of these rights was not addressed.
  
36 Ibid 217- 221.
37 ‘Convention for the Supervision of Trade in Arms and War Munitions’ (1926) ) 20(1) The American Journal
of International Law, 151-154.
38 Stone, above note 28, 222-227.
39 Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919.
40 Stone, above note 28, 230.
41 Ibid.
42 Charter of the United Nations art 47(2).
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In 1986 the ICJ observed ‘in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may
be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments
of a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without
exception’.43 Global efforts to seek to more comprehensively address the proliferation of
conventional arms really began in 1991, although they experienced a number of stumbling
blocks through to 2006, when the process that resulted in the ATT commenced.
The UN Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1991. Today it notes the building
of confidence between states, with a view to the prevention of conflict, through transparency
in the accumulation of armaments, as its mandate.44  Through the process of a series of
Groups of Governmental Experts the scope of the Register has been expanded over the years.
The categories of armaments to be comprehensively reported on annually, reflect those now
listed in the ATT.45 The only exception is that reporting on the transfer of small arms and
light weapons is optional under the Register. Small arms and light weapons were added to the
Register in 2003.46 The Register reports that it has received reports from more than 170
countries during its existence and that the ‘vast majority of official transfers are captured in
the register’.47 Through analysing the reports of both the importer and exporter countries the
systems includes a built in ‘verification mechanism’. 48  However, not all countries report
every year and reports are subject to national interpretation. 49  
In 1991, cognisant of the contribution of the global arms trade to human rights violations, the
United States called on the permanent five Security Council members to discuss arms trade
guidelines.50 These discussions ended in 1992 due to a lack of agreement between member
  
43 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep, 14. Although note the exceptions discussed by Drummond and Cassimatis,
including the findings of the Nicaragua case itself. Catherine E Drummond and Anthony E Cassimatis,
‘Weapons smuggling’ in Neil Boister and Robert J Curries (eds) Routledge Handbook on Transnational
Criminal Law (Routledge, Oxon, 2013) 252-253.
44 United Nations, The Global Reported Arms Trade The UN Register of Conventional Arms (2013)
<http://www.un-register.org/Background/Index.aspx> .
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Peter Woolcott, ‘The Arms Trade Treaty’, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/att/att_e.pdf.
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states.51  Amnesty International attributes the realisation that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait had
been aided by arms supplied by all five UN Security Council Permanent Members as a
catalyst for global action in regulation of the global arms trade.52  This was followed by the
genocide in Rwanda, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and a surge of global interest in
protecting populations from mass atrocities.  
The European Union was the first to take any concerted action in relation to arms transfer
controls. In November 1993, through the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, a voluntary set of principles on arms exports was introduced.53 In the years that
followed, Amnesty International, joined by others including Nobel Peace Laureates and
members of the NGO community made concerted efforts towards mobilising political interest
in the topic of global arms trade restrictions.54 On 5 June 1998, at Brussels, a voluntary
European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted.55 Compliance with the
code required details of licence refusals to be circulated to other states through diplomatic
channels.56 (This document was built on in December 2008 by the European Union Common
Position.57)
Another arrangement developing around this time was the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Wassenaar
Arrangement became operational in 1996 following an agreement in The Hague regarding
multilateral cooperation on harmonizing export controls.58 Today the Wassenaar
  
51 Ibid.
52 Amnesty International, The long journey towards an Arms Trade Treaty (5 June 2013)
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/long-journey-towards-arms-trade-treaty-2013-03-27>.
53 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Principles government Conventional Arms Transfers
(25 November 1993) <http://www.osce.org/fsc/42313> .
54 Amnesty, above note 52.
55 European Union The Council, European Union code of Conduct on arms Exports (5 June 1998)
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf>.
56 Ibid operative provision 3.
57 European External Action Service, Arms Export Control <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm>.
58 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,
Frequently Asked Questions <http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html>.
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Arrangement has 41 participating states.59 Australia is a member of the Wassenaar
Arrangement.60
In 1999 the ICRC brought the issue of arms availability to the attention of the international
community in a publication entitled ‘Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed
conflict: a study presented by the ICRC’. The publication noted ‘weapons are increasingly
falling into the hands of all types of fighters, including children, unconstrained by IHL’.61
Amnesty International led further civil society pushes including putting together a draft
International Code of Conduct for arms transfers, which was initially promoted to European
Union member states. In November 2000, having gained the support of Nobel Peace Prize
winner and former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, Amnesty and their supporters, through
Costa Rica’s UN Mission, circulated a draft Code of Conduct on international arms transfers.
This was subsequently revised into a document known as the 2001 Framework Convention
on International Arms Transfers. Over the years that followed, Amnesty and a number of
non-governmental organisations, high profile personalities and supporters, gained an
increasing amount of government support for their agenda.62
In the early 2000s, the UN General Assembly had also turned its mind to the issue of small
arms and light weapons in a number of resolutions and in 2001 agreed to the Programme of
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All Its Aspects.63 The most recent review conference on this Programme of Action was
held in September 2012.64 The Programme of Action looked at a number of different methods
of achieving goals including stronger national laws and systems for controlling the spread of
these weapons within jurisdictions, criminalisation of acts related to the manufacture,
possession and stockpiling of these weapons, as well as national and international
infrastructure and frameworks for preventing the export, import and transfer of these
  
59 Ibid.
60 Australian Government DOD, International Export Control Regimes and treaties, Defenec Export Control
Office <http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/Regimes.asp>.  
61 ICRC, Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict (Study, No. 0734, ICRC, 1999) 1.
62 Amnesty, above note 52.
63 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects, A/CONF.192/15  (July 2001) <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/N0150720.pdf>,
64 Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons Review Conference 2012 < http://www.poa-
iss.org/RevCon2/>.
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weapons.65  The Programme of Action led, among other initiatives, to the International
Tracing Instrument.66  This instrument, while not binding, introduced detail regarding
measures such as methods for marking small arms and light weapons, and for implementing
tracing systems. Record-keeping and international cooperation67 measures were also included
as ways states could take to help prevent misuse of small arms and light weapons.
The issues relating to arms transfers stayed quite prominently in the international discourse
during the early 2000s. At the 2003 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent (a conference attend by the ICRC, the International Federation of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, all National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and government
representatives from States Party to the Geneva Conventions) Final Goal 2.3 (adopted by
consensus) notes that:
States should make respect for international humanitarian law one of the fundamental
criteria on which arms transfer decisions are assessed. They are encouraged to
incorporate such criteria into national laws or policies and into regional and global
norms on arms transfers.68
Further, during this period a number of regional frameworks, in addition to the European
Union Code, were developed including the 2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control
and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of
Africa, the 2005 Central American Integration System Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material and the 2006 Economic
Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
Further, in 2005 the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (Firearms Protocol)69 came into force. The UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime was an initiative concluded in Italy in December
  
65 Ibid.  
66 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit
Small Arms and Light Weapons, GA Res 60/81 (8 December 2005) 2005;  Report of the Open- ended Working
Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in
a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, UN Doc A/60/88 (27 June 2005).
67 Ibid parts III – V.
68 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Agenda for Humanitarian Action Final
Goal 2.3.
69 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and
Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 31 May
2001, 2326 UNTS 208 (entered into force 3 June 2005.)
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2000 to help provide a globalised response to organised crime70 and included protocols
pertaining to the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants.71  At that time, the
committee working on the firearms aspect of the Convention, was not ready to proceed to the
adoption of a protocol.72  The Firearms Protocol was subsequently adopted by General
Assembly resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001 ‘to promote, facilitate and strengthen
cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition’. 73
The focus of this treaty, however, was illicit transfers of weapons. The humanitarian
consequences of the lawful trade in conventional arms remained to be addressed.
The process towards the ATT began in 2006 with the General Assembly establishing a group
of government experts to report on ‘the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a
comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for
the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’.74 This group’s report led to the General
Assembly establishing an Open-ended Working Group towards an ATT. This working group
began meeting in 2009 and was established to look at ‘common international standards for
the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’.75
On 2 December 2009, pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 64/48, a UN Conference on
the ATT was planned for 2012. The Resolution providing for the conference noted the
conference was to ‘meet for four consecutive weeks in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding
  
70 See forward of Kofi Annan. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto (2004)
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> iii-iv.
71 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000,
2237 UNTS 319 (entered into force 25 December 2003); Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15
November 2000, 2241 UNTS 507 (entered into force 28 January 2004).
72 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, GA Res 55/25, 55th sess, Agenda Item
105, UN Doc A/RES/55/25 (15 November 2000) art 4.
73 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and
Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 31 May
2001, 2326 UNTS 208 (entered into force 3 June 2005) art 2.
74 Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and
transfer of conventional arms, GA Res 61/89, 61st sess, Agenda Item 90, UN Doc A/RES/61/89 (6 December
2006).
75 Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and
transfer of conventional arms, GA Res 63/240, 63rd sess, Agenda Item 89, UN Doc A/RES/63/240 (8 January
2009).  
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instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of
conventional arms’.76
Substantive and procedural Preparatory Committee sessions were planned for, and conducted
in 2010, 2011 and 2012. From 2-27 July 2012 a Diplomatic Conference was held in New
York. This Conference did not result in agreement on a treaty text. Its legacy became the
President’s comprehensive draft treaty text77 which formed the basis for ongoing
negotiations. The ATT was subsequently agreed to in March 2013, following a further
Diplomatic Conference from 18-28 March 2013 in New York.78  It entered into force on 24
December 2014 and Mexico hosted the First Conference of States Party in August 2015.79
5. Australia’s approach to the preparatory steps to an arms trade treaty
Little detail of Australia’s contribution to early negotiations towards an arms trade treaty is
available. However, Australia was in attendance at early discussions on this issue. For
example, the Honourable George Foster Pearce, Minister of Defence, is listed as attending
the 1921 negotiations for the Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and
Ammunition, and Protocol.80  
More recently, as noted in chapter three, Australia has taken a proactive stance on a number
of arms control issues including the establishment of the Australian Group in 1985
concerning the spread of chemical and biological weapons. Relevant to the conventional arms
discussion, Australia was a founding member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.81 Australia has held
a number of leadership roles in the Wassenaar Arrangement.82 Australia acted as one of the
  
76 The arms trade treaty, GA Res 64/48, 64th sess, Agenda Item 96 (z), UN Doc A/RES/64/48 (12 January 2009)
art 4.
77 Draft of the Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/CRP.1 (1 August 2012).
78 As established by GA Res 67/234A (24 December 2012).
79 Pursuant to Article 17 of the ATT within 12 months of the treaty entering into force a Conference of States
Parties was to be convened. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The preparatory process for the first conference of
state parties to the arms trade treaty begins in Mexico’ (Press Release 385, 8 September 2014)  
http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/index.php/archived-press-releases/2710-the-preparatory-process-for-the-first-
conference-of-states-parties-to-the-arms-trade-treaty-begins-in-mexico/.  
80 ‘Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol’ (1921) 15(4) The American
Journal of International Law, 297-313.
81 The Wassenaar Arrangement Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
Final Declaration (The Hague, 19 December 1995) http://www.wassenaar.org/public
documents/declaration.html.  
82‘Public Statement 2005 Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies’ in Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
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Vice-Presidents of the Bureau of the July 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects Conference.83
Australia signed the Firearms Protocol on 21 December 2001.84
Australia has expressed that it is ‘genuinely delighted’ that it co-authored the 2006 General
Assembly resolution 61/89 ‘Towards an Arms Trade Treaty’ (which eventually led to the
ATT).85 As noted earlier, this resolution established a Group of Government Experts charged
with examining the feasibility, scope and parameters of an arms trade treaty. Australia was
represented in the group by Washington based, DFAT Special Advisor Mr. Bryce
Hutchesson.86  Australia, along with many other countries, submitted to UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs a document entitled Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Australia’s
response to the UN Secretary General (UNGA A/Res/61/89).87 In that 2007 document,
Australia supported a ‘legally binding, multilateral treaty’ which retained ‘the right of all
States to manufacture, transfer, import and export, and retain conventional arms for
legitimate security and self-defence’.88 Australia also considered ‘international assistance,
whether bilateral or multilateral, to countries which request such assistance, to be a crucial
element for such a treaty to have a practical effect’89.
    
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies Basic Documents (Complied January 2015) available at:
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2015/WA-DOC%20(15)%20SEC%20001%20-
%20Basic%20Documents%202015%20-%20January.pdf>, 112; Public Statement 2006 Plenary Meeting of the
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies in
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
Basic Documents (Complied January 2015) available at: http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2015/WA-
DOC%20(15)%20SEC%20001%20-%20Basic%20Documents%202015%20-%20January.pdf>, 113 and 125.
83 Ibid 4.
84 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Status as at 26/09/2008
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-firearmsprotocol.html>.
85 G Quinlan, Adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, Australia United Nations Security Council 2013-2014
<https://australia-unsc.gov.au/2013/04/adoption-of-the-arms-trade-treaty/>. Garcia notes that Australia was part
of a core group led by the United Kingdom in championing the ATT and bringing it to the General Assembly in
2006: Denise Garcia, ‘Global Norms on Arms: The significance of the Arms Trade Treaty for Global Security in
World Politics, (2014) 5 (4) Global Policy 425, 428.
86 Note by the Secretary General, Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards
for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, 63rd session, Provisional Agenda Item 91, UN Doc
A/63/334 (26 August 2008) [5].
87 Secretary General, Towards an arms trade  treaty: establishing common international standards for  the
import, export and transfer of conventional arms, 62nd sess, Provisional Agenda Item 100 (aa), UN Doc
A/62/278 (Part II) (17 August 2007).
88 Ibid 12.
89 Ibid 13.
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In a 2007 Analysis of State’s Views on an arms trade treaty prepared by UN Institute for
Disarmament Research90, Australia was noted as supporting the inclusion of manufacturing
technology for the weapons in the parameters of an arms trade treaty, as well as allowing for
flexible definitions in the weapons descriptions to account for future technological
developments.91 Australia is also noted as supporting an annexed list of weapons or
categories of weapons to an arms trade treaty.92 Australia supported the inclusion of re-export
in any proposed treaty.93 Australia was of the view that the treaty should not cover transfers
within a state, but that private end-use should be covered.94 Australia supported the
prevention of a destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons being among the criteria
required to be considered for authorising transfers.95
In 2009, the concept enshrined in the 2006 General Assembly resolution 61/89 ‘Towards an
Arms Trade Treaty’ was further progressed through an Open-Ended Working Group process.  
Australia was a co-author of UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48. This resolution
established the timelines for the ATT negotiations, which included preparatory meetings in
2010 and 2011 and the final ATT conference to take place in July 2012.96 Australia was an
active participant in the preparatory process for the conference, including as a Friend of the
Chair. The DFAT has noted that Australia has ‘funded workshops on the proposed treaty in
the Pacific (Feb 2012), Africa (May 2012) and Caribbean (July 2010, Feb 2011 and May
2012), focused at encouraging the widest engagement in the ATT negotiations’.97
Ambassador Peter Woolcott, Australia’s Ambassador to the UN in Geneva was appointed
President of the March 2013 Conference which would ultimately negotiate the final text,
which was then adopted on 27 March 2013. Australia sent a large delegation to the
  
90 Sarah Parker, ‘Analysis of State’s Views on am Arms Trade Treaty’, UN Institute for Disarmament Research,
(2007) <http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/analysis-of-states-views-on-an-arms-trade-treaty-332.pdf>.
91 Ibid 6.
92 Ibid. Note that Australia is not a party to the Firearms Protocol. The difficulty of ratifying this Protocol for
Australia includes the highly prescriptive nature of the Protocol. The practical challenges this Protocol posed for
Australia were highly influential factors in Australia’s approach to the negotiation of the ATT (discussed
below).
93 Ibid 8.
94 Ibid 9.
95 Ibid.  
96  Compilation of views on the elements of an arms trade treaty, A/CONF.217/2 (10 May 2012) available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.217/2&Lang=E ; See also DFAT, Small arms and
light weapons, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/security/small_arms.html> .
97 DFAT, Small arms and light weapons, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/security/small_arms.html> .
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conference, consisting of 19 representatives (including representatives from civil society).98
The approach taken by Ambassador Woolcott to his Presidency was described by a DFAT
staffer as being catergorised by ‘[w]ide consultation, openness, transparency, focused debate,
high tempo, clear timetable, opportunity to consult with capitals’.99
Australia approached the ATT negotiations from an arms control perspective from the outset
with the Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation Branch of DFAT leading the delegation.
This made sense because, from even before the preparatory committee was formed, the
decision had been taken by the working group to approach the issue from an arms control
perspective.100 Significantly, the Australian delegation also involved personnel from
Australia’s Defence Export Control Office and from Customs.  
During the lead up to and during the negotiations leading to the ATT, the Australian
Government, through DFAT, engaged in broad consultation across government
departments101 and with civil society organizations.102
During these negotiations Australia maintained a strong interest in ensuring that the treaty
approached the categorisation and classification of prohibited weapons, materials and
components from the perspective of not being prescriptive.  The need for Australia to be able
to practically implement the treaty in domestic law, as well as the desire to create a treaty
with as few loopholes as possible, saw Australia seek an approach which was inclusive, and
  
98 List of participants, A/CONF.217/2013/INF2 (11 April 2013): available at
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.217/2013/INF/2>.
99 Lachlan Scully, ‘Arms Trade Treaty An Insiders Perspective’ (Paper presented at Australian National
University, 2013)  (on file with author).
100 Tackling the issues of the proliferation of small arms globally could have taken a number of different paths.
For example, as discussed above, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects outlined a number of approaches, including criminalisation of
transfers and other acts. The view clearly taken by GA resolution 61/89 “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty and
followed through in the Open Ended Working Group and ultimately the ATT was that arms control was the
most appropriate framework to pursue.
101 Including the DOD, Attorney-General’s Department, AusAID and the Australian Customs and Border
Protection Service. See further National Interest Analysis Arms Trade Treaty [2013] ATNIA 19
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/dfat/ATNIA/2013/19.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=arms%20trade%20treaty at para
46.
102 Including humanitarian, security, sporting and industry interests, including: Oxfam; Amnesty International;
Small Arms Survey; International Action Network on Small Arms; Act for Peace; ICRC; WiSH; Paradox FX;
Caritas; Sporting Shooters’ Association of Australia; Pistol Australia; National Rifle Association of Australia;
National Firearm Dealers; and the Medical Association for Prevention of War. See further National Interest
Analysis Arms Trade Treaty [2013] ATNIA 19 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/dfat/ATNIA/2013/19.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=arms%20trade%20treaty at para
46.
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would cover new weapons technologies and variations on existing ones. Australia, as a
consequence of its dualist approach to international law, has experienced practical difficulties
with the implementation domestically of some highly prescriptive treaties such as the Arms
Trafficking Protocol and was keen to ensure that this was not also to be a feature of the ATT.
The regulation of small arms and light weapons was also one of the topics that Australia
chose to use its 2013-2014 term as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council to
draw attention to. Resolution 2117 of 2013103 was adopted on 26 September 2013 following a
process led and initiated by Australia.104 This Resolution is much broader than just
considering the impacts of small arms and light weapons in an armed conflict context -
referring also to concerns such as organised crime, trafficking and human rights violations,
however, clearly sets out the impact of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in
fuelling conflict and destabilising post conflict peace-building.105 As Drummond and
Cassimatis point out, this Resolution, in linking the ATT and earlier initiatives including the
Firearms Protocol, Programme of Action and International Tracing Instrument, recognized
the links between ‘enhanced regulation of lawful arms transfers and the eradication of illicit
transfers’.106  
6. Australia’s approach to the domestic legislation implementing the ATT
The ATT was tabled in the Commonwealth Parliament on 12 December 2013.107 The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Standing Committee on Treaties invited
public submissions on the treaty and held public hearings on the treaty on 3 March 2014.108
This process was comparatively quick as public submissions on treaties are often open for a
period of many months. It would appear that no public submissions on the treaty were
made.109 The only people who appeared at the Public Hearings were representatives of
  
103 SC Res 2117, UN SCOR, 7036th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2117 (26 September 2013).
104 UN, Arms Trade Treaty Ratification Event: “Approaching Entry Into Force”
(Statement by HE Mr Gary Quinlan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia
3 June 2014) <https://australia-unsc.gov.au/2014/06/arms-trade-treaty-ratification-event-approaching-entry-into-
force/>; see also Julie Bishop, ‘Australia concludes UN Security Council term’ (Media release, 31 December
2014) <http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2014/jb_mr_141231.aspx>.
105 SC Res 2117, UN SCOR, 7036th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2117 (26 September 2013).
106 Catherine E Drummond and Anthony E Cassimatis, ‘Weapons smuggling’ in Neil Boister and Robert J
Curries (eds) Routledge Handbook on Transnational Criminal Law (Routledge, Oxon, 2013) 248-249.
107 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Review into Treaties tabled on 11 and 12
December 2013, 20 January 2014 and referred on 15 January 2014 (Report 138) (26 March 2014).
108 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 3 March 2014.  
109 Parliament of Australia, Submissions – Treaties tabled on 11 December 2013,
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties/Treaties_tabled_11_December_201
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DFAT, the Attorney-General’s Department, and DECO.110 Again, this is very surprising
given the strong interest in the treaty, particularly from humanitarian organisations, and is
perhaps reflective of the speed at which this process was advanced. One explanation for the
speed of this process was to ensure that Australia was one of the founding 50 nations that
would bring the treaty into force.111
The Report of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Standing Committee
on Treaties report of March 2014 notes:
• Australia’s support since 2006 for the process leading to the ATT112 and engagement
in the UN processes;113
• The treaty’s role as ‘the beginning of the process’ towards ‘common global standards’
with regard the trade in conventional arms;114
• The potential for better controls on illicit arms transfers to ‘serve national and
international security interests’;115
• The key obligations in the treaty116; and
• The practicalities around implementation in Australia, including that no new
legislation is required to meet the obligations in the treaty.117
The Committee noted its support for the ATT and recommended that binding treaty action be
taken.118 The Committee also noted that it was keen to see Australia continue its leadership
role in the implementation of the treaty.119
    
3/Submissions>. The public submissions listed on this page relate to other treaties also tabled on 11 December
2013.
110  Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 3 March 2014.  
111 ATT Art 22 provides that the ‘Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of deposit of the
fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Depository’.
112 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Review into Treaties tabled on 11 and 12
December 2013, 20 January 2014 and referred on 15 January 2014 (Report 138) (26 March 2014) [3.4].
113 Ibid [3.5-3.8].
114 Ibid [3.10] and [3.12].
115 Ibid 3.13.
116 Ibid 3.19-3.43.
117 Ibid 3.44.
118 Ibid 28 - Recommendation 2.
119 Ibid 3.55.
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Significantly, the National Interest Analysis, which was conducted on the treaty prior to it
being tabled in parliament, and Report 138 concluded that:
36. No new legislation is required to give effect to the Treaty in Australia. The
legislative framework established by the Customs Act 1901, the Defence and
Strategic Goods List and the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations (1958)
already meets Australia’s obligations under the Treaty.
37. Some new administrative procedures may be required to comply with Australia’s
obligations under Article 12 of the Treaty for record keeping and Article 13 for
reporting.120
That the implementation of the ATT into Australian legislation required no legislative
amendment is perhaps surprising and requires some discussion. Two points explain this. The
first is that, in setting an international common standard for arms control of conventional
arms, the ATT takes a position that almost all countries can agree on, and can practically
implement, rather than adopting a gold standard. Australia has long had a high standard of
import and export control with regards arms, as evidenced by its proactive membership of
arrangements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and existing domestic legislation and
institutions such as the DECO. The introduction of the ATT standards were largely standards
already being met by Australia. This was the subject of a question to Ms Gabrielle Burrell,
Assistant Secretary, DECO before the Committee on 3 March 2014. Ms Burrell noted that
the:
existing export control regime will require little adjustment to comply with the Treaty
requirements. Current reporting requirements for the UN Register of Conventional
Arms will fulfil the reporting requirements under the Treaty and an updated IT system
is expected to streamline the process.121
Further, in 2011 and 2012 some amendments were made to Australia’s import and export
controls and arms brokering laws in anticipation of an international arms trade treaty
framework. As noted in chapter three, the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 (Cth), was
passed to, among other things, make some amendments to Australia’s customs regulations
(which dated from the mid 1990s) in order to ensure best practice and that compliance with
  
120 National Interest Analysis Arms Trade Treaty [2013] ATNIA 19; Joint Standing Committee on Treaties,
Parliament of Australia, Review into Treaties tabled on 11 and 12 December 2013, 20 January 2014 and
referred on 15 January 2014 (Report 138) (26 March 2014).
121 National Interest Analysis Arms Trade Treaty [2013] ATNIA 19 citing Ms Gabrielle Burrell, Assistant
Secretary, Defence Export Control Office, Strategic Policy Division, DOD, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 3
March 2014, 15–16.  
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best international standards was maintained.122  The explanatory memorandum to the
Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011 specifically notes that:
[e]liminating these gaps will align Australia with the accepted best practice of current
export control regimes to which Australia is a member. It will also prepare Australia
to give effect to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which it is anticipated will be
negotiated in 2012.123
Given this set of circumstances, it is less surprising that the NIA found that there was no need
for further legislative change.124
Questions from the Committee were also put in relation to the costs of the ATT. It was noted
that Australia had committed significant funding to regional implementation of the ATT,
including $1million through the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms
Regulations.125
7. Implementing the ATT in Australia in light of Common Article 1
Articles 6(3) and 7 of the ATT has strong links to Common Article 1 in the sense that States
Party, such as Australia, have obligations as exporting states. As such, through effectively
implementing Article 6(3) and 7 states are helping to ensure respect by other states by
denying those other states access to weapons that would be used to violate IHL. Indeed, IHL
was considered as an obvious inclusion in the ATT by many states by virtue of Common
Article 1 obligation.126
However, as has been made clear, Common Article 1 is not a clear point of reference for the
Australian government when approaching legal negotiations on specific weapons law treaties.
This was perhaps particularly so with regard the ATT due to the fact that the negotiations
were not approached by Australia, and indeed by the international community, as pertaining
  
122 Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Trade Controls Bill 2011, 4.  
123 Ibid.
124 Rachel Stohl who was a consultant for the United Nations on the Arms Trade Treaty process notes that it is
also the case for the United States that the existing comprehensive export system would not need amending.
Rachel Stohl, ‘Tell the Truth About the Arms Treaty’, New York Times (online), 11 April 2013)
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/opinion/tell-the-truth-about-the-arms-trade-
treaty.html?ref=opinion&_r=1>.
125 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Review into Treaties tabled on 11 and 12
December 2013, 20 January 2014 and referred on 15 January 2014 (Report 138) (26 March 2014) [3.46].
126 Knut Dormann and Jose Serralvo, ‘Common Article  1 to the Geneva Conventions and the obligation to
prevent international humanitarian law violations’ International Review of the Red Cross First View Articles
(CUP, 30 January 2015), 27.
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to an IHL instrument but rather to an arms control regime.  That said, the proliferation of
small arms in a society contributes to the likelihood of IHL violations. This is a conclusion
reached by many, including the ICRC, which makes this finding ‘on the basis of its
experience from conflict and post-conflict situations around the world’.127 As such, in
seeking to respect and ensure respect for IHL, one method of doing so must be in taking steps
to restrict this proliferation.
More specifically, Australia does not appear to have turned its mind to the obligation in
Common Article 1 with regards to the ATT. In a number of statements putting forward
Australia’s views regarding the development of the ATT, Australia has specifically noted UN
Charter obligations as well as humanitarian reasons for the treaty 128, however, other than
references made to non-interference with existing international obligations, there is no
evidence that the ATT is seen by Australia in light of this obligation.
That said, the ATT is a legal framework well supported by Australia, and Australia
championed a number of measures aimed at making the treaty as robust as possible. Australia
has displayed and continues to display evidence of assisting other states in the lead up to the
treaty negotiation and in the implementation of the treaty including through the commitment
of funding to assist in the regional implementation of the ATT.129
The ATT, while not posing any significant legislative challenges for states like Australia,
introduces some burdens on the legal systems of less well developed states, in order to ensure
compliance. As has been pointed out ‘[t]he implications of ratifying the ATT will be
enormous for under-staffed and technically decrepit states’.130 In this context Australia can
play a strong role in supporting other states to ensure respect and ensure respect for IHL.
  
127 ICRC, Unregulated arms availability, small arms & light weapons, and the UN process (26 May 2009)
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/small-arms-paper-250506.htm#a3>.
128 See for example Compilation of views on the elements of an arms trade treaty, A/CONF.217/2 (10 May
2012) < http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.217/2&Lang=E>.
129 Australia has committed financial resources to regional implementation of the ATT. ‘In 2012, Australia and
Germany initiated a multi-donor assistance fund to help less developed countries ratify and implement the
Treaty, and the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation in Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) was
launched in 2013. Australia has committed a total of AUD 2 million to the Facility.’ UN Security Council 2013-
2014, Arms Trade Treaty < http://australia-unsc.gov.au/australia-and-the-un/current-issues/arms-trade-treaty/ >.
130 Ben Coetzee, ‘Making the Arms Trade Treaty work in practice is the real challenge for Africa’, Institute for
Security Studies (3 April 2013) <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/making-the-arms-trade-treaty-work-in-
practice-is-the-real-challenge-for-africa>.
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Australia cites the tensions on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands between 1999 and 2003,
and its response aimed at ‘getting guns out the community’,131 as one, close to our shores,
example of the threat small arms and light weapons pose. The Australian led Regional
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands saw more than 400 firearms come into the hands of
the Mission during a three week amnesty period. 132 Again, while not couched in Common
Article 1 terms, this is an action, in relation to small arms and light weapons, which helped
ensure respect for humanitarian principles, if not IHL.
8. Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated that Australia has taken a proactive approach to helping bring
about the ATT but that Australia appears to have done so without reference to the already
existing Common Article 1 obligation.  However, because the Common Article 1 obligation
lies beneath the IHL obligations the subject of the ATT and Australia has supported the ATT
process, Australia has effectively been a champion for Common Article 1 in respect of this
important development.
John Tilemann, formerly of DFAT, led the Australian delegation for the ATT negotiations
and notes that Australia is ‘ATT compliant. Australia’s interest is in how the ATT can now
enhance our regional security and humanitarian objectives’.133 In this light, helping to
implement the ATT is an excellent example of an action by Australia in support of the
obligation to not only respect but also to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions.
The ATT will face many challenges on the way to implementation. By framing the ATT as a
necessity for respecting and ensuring respect for IHL, states can provide gravitas to the
efforts to bring about effective implementation of this treaty.  The real work with the ATT
begins now, in the early years of implementing the treaty. Australia has taken a leading role
in the treaty to date. Australia has significant capacity to assist other States to ensure respect
for IHL. The ATT should be a vehicle for Australia doing so.
  
131 The Hon Julie Bishop MP, Small Arms: The impact of the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and
misuse of small arms and light weapons on international peace and security, (26 September 2013) Australian
United Nations Security Council 2013-2014< https://australia-unsc.gov.au/2013/09/high-level-meeting-small-
arms-the-impact-of-the-illicit-transfer-destabilising-accumulation-and-misuse-of-small-arms-and-light-
weapons-on-international-peace-and-security/>.
132 Ibid.
133 John Tilemann, Australia must push for regional adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (21 January 2015) The
Interpreter <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/author/John%20Tilemann.aspx>.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AUSTRALIA, NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW  
Chapter seven provides an overview of the new weapons technologies which are currently
attracting attention from an IHL perspective. It considers the approach taken by IHL scholars
to each of these weapons concluding that the principles of IHL clearly apply to them, and it is
imperative that the principles of IHL are not compromised in the adoption of any new rules
pertaining to their use. It answers the questions what approach has Australia taken to the
regulation of these weapons and what conclusions can be reached from this evaluation
regarding the approach of Australia to compliance with the obligation to respect and ensure
respect pursuant to Common Article 1? It notes Australia has released relatively little by way
of guidance as to its thinking on new weapons technologies, although Australian researchers
have shown great interest in this area. The chapter urges Australia to consider Common
Article 1 obligations to respect and ensure respect for IHL in relation to these weapons and
the development of legal frameworks around them going forward. By promoting the ability
of existing IHL principles to apply to new weapons technology, and promoting compliance
with Article 36 of AP I weapons review obligations, Australia can achieve this.
1. Introduction
There is significant interest in Australian military and academic circles in new weapons
technology and the challenges they pose for the principles of IHL. Australian researchers
have recently released a book on New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict.1 When
Australia hosted the launch of the ICRC’s New Technologies and Warfare issue of the
International Review of the Red Cross journal comment was made about the high proportion
of Australian contributing authors to the publication.2 The topic is also the subject of much
media interest.3
  
1 Hitoshi Nasu and Rob McLaughlin (eds), New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict (TMC Asser
Press, 2014).
2 Alan Backstrom, Ian Henderson, Hitoshi Nasu and Eve Massingham in ‘New Technologies and warfare’
(2012) 94 (886) International Review of the Red Cross. Launch held in Canberra on 19 November 2013
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/event/2013/australia-04-11-new-technologies-panel-
discussion.htm>.
3 See, eg, Dylan Welch, ‘Australia inches closer to getting killer drones’ The Sydney Morning Herald (online)
31 May 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/australia-inches-closer-to-getting-killer-drones-
20120530-1zjej.html>; David Sanger, ‘Hoping to instill fear, US announces new strategy for cyber warfare’
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New weapons technologies have always been emerging and to date the principles of IHL,
both modern and pre-dating the First Geneva Convention in 1864, have been able to be
applied to them.  Fidler has noted that there is a ‘remarkable consistency between age old
moral principles and the modern rules of international law’.4 Further, in some cases specific
new legal frameworks have been developed to make clear the prohibitions or restrictions on
their use. Blinding laser weapons are widely regarded as having been quite unique in IHL
with their humanitarian consequences being of such concern to the international community
that they were banned prior to their use.5
However, emerging new weapons technologies may raise some new challenges for IHL that
earlier technological developments have not.  Autonomous weapons systems, unmanned
aerial vehicles, cyber warfare, nanotechnology and non-lethal weapons comprise the key new
weapons technologies being discussed in the defence and international law communities to
date. Some new weapons technologies may of course always be science fiction and some
may gather little support from states for the existence of new rules to regulate their use.
Copeland puts forward the view that the greater the strategic effect of a weapon the less
likely the weapon is to be regulated by a specific legal framework.6 However, it is clear that
States need to be thinking about the IHL implications of their development.
This chapter will assess the legality of various autonomous weapons systems, unmanned
aerial vehicles, cyber warfare, nanotechnology and non-lethal weapons. It will then consider
the approach that Australia has taken to date in the developing discourse around the legality
of these weapons. The chapter urges Australia to consider Common Article 1 obligations to
respect and ensure respect for IHL in relation to these weapons and the development of legal
frameworks around them. Australia can achieve this by promoting both the ability of existing
IHL principles to apply to new weapons technology and compliance with Article 36 of AP I
weapons review obligations.
    
Brisbane Times (online) 24 April 2015, <www.brisbanetimes.com.au/world/hoping-to-instill-fear-us-
announces-new-strategy-for-cyber-warfare-20150424-1mse2r>.
4 David Fidler, ‘Non-lethal weapons and international law: three perspectives on the future’ (2001) 17(3)
Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 194, 195.  
5 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol IV,
entitled Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons), opened for signature 13 October 1995, 35 ILM 1218 (entered
into force 30 July 1998).  
6 Damian Copeland, ‘Legal Review of New Technology Weapons’ in Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLauglin
(eds), above note 1, 52.
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2. New weapons technologies and international humanitarian law
An analysis of the legality of new weapons technology from an IHL perspective involves a
number of challenges. That a number of developments leading to new weapons technology
also have very significant non-military application, that is the technology is dual-use, is also
relevant to the discussion. While the principles of IHL, and in particular Article 36 of AP I,
can be applied, the uncertainty surrounding aspects of these weapons does pose some
challenges.7
As has been noted in earlier chapters, any analysis of the compatibility of any weapons
system with IHL requires consideration of the following four weapons law criteria8:
a. whether the weapon is specifically regulated by treaty law
b. whether the weapon inherently has indiscriminate effects9
c. whether the weapon inherently causes unnecessary suffering or superfluous
injury10
d. whether the weapon inherently causes widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment.11
These questions will now be considered for various autonomous weapons systems including
unmanned platforms such as drones, cyber warfare, nanotechnology and non-lethal weapons.
First, whether the weapon is specifically regulated by treaty law will be considered. Second,
issues b-d will be considered under the heading Article 36 criteria by way of application of
existing IHL to each of these weapons.  
  
7 Ibid 53.
8 Kathleen Lawand, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare (ICRC,
2006), William Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2009), 345-6: See
also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law –
Volume 1: Rules (ICRC, 2005) (hereinafter ICRC Customary Law Study), rules 70 and 71 as well as rules 72-
86.
9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (hereinafter
AP I), Art 48 and 51(5).
10 AP I Art 35(2), see also ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 8, rule 70.
11 AP I Art 35(3), see also ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 8, rule 45 establishing this principle as a
rule in ‘international armed conflict, and arguably also in non-international armed conflict’.
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2.1 Specific regulations in treaty law
There are currently no international norms specifically concerning the use, in times of armed
conflict, of autonomy as a method of warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, cyber warfare,
nanotechnology or ‘non-lethal’ weapons. However, a number of projects are in existence to
add clarity to the regulation of new technologies in warfare and the UN has given
consideration to a number of these topics.
2.1.1 Autonomy as a method of warfare – autonomous weapons
Automated weapons have long existed. These types of weapons include anti-vehicle mines
which are activated by the weight of a military vehicle, rather than by a trigger pulled by a
soldier. However, weapons systems are now being designed which have increased levels of
autonomy – although fully autonomous fighting robots do not yet exist.12  For example, the
ICRC note that ‘[w]eapons systems with significant autonomy in the ‘critical functions’ of
selecting and attacking targets are already in use’.13 However, ‘[a]utonomous weapon
systems that are highly sophisticated and programmed to independently determine their own
actions, make complex decisions and adapt to their environment…do not yet exist’.14
These weapon systems are often referred to as autonomous weapons, lethal autonomous
weapons or ‘killer robots’ by some. The ICRC defines autonomous weapons as ‘weapons that
can independently select and attack targets, ie. with autonomy in the ‘critical functions’ of
acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets’.15 The United States military uses the
definition of weapons that ‘once activated, can select and engage targets without further
[human] intervention by a human operator’.16 There is currently no international legal
framework specifically dealing with these weapons – neither those currently possible nor
  
12 ICRC, Expert Meeting: Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects
(November 2014), 7 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-
28-march-2014#.VOFBQxscS70>. Note also Chris Jenks description of ‘autonomy as a spectrum of integrated
human and machine capabilities’ rather than something being either autonomous or not. ICRC, Interview with
Professor Chris Jenks on autonomous weapons (Canberra, 10 July 2015)
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/australia-qa-professor-chris-jenks>.  
13 ICRC, Expert Meeting: Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects
(November 2014), 7 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-
28-march-2014#.VOFBQxscS70>.
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.
16 Cited by Jeffrey Thurnher, ‘Examining Autonomous Weapons Systems from a Law of Armed Conflict
Perspective’ in Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLauglin (eds), above note 1, 213, 214.
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future technologies. The ICRC is calling for States to consider the legal implications of the
use of this technology, as well as the ethical ones.17
The ICRC organised an expert meeting on these issues in March 201418. It noted that views
regarding the way forward in terms of legal regulation are varied with some advocating a
complete ban on autonomous weapons and others insisting the current IHL framework is
sufficient.19 In April 2013, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions Christof Heyns called for States to:
implement national moratoria on at least the testing, production, assembly, transfer,
acquisition, deployment and use of [lethal autonomous robots] until such time as an
internationally agreed upon framework on the future of [lethal autonomous robots]
has been established.20
Since this time a consideration of lethal autonomous weapons has been occurring under the
auspices of the States Party to the UN Convention of Conventional Weapons (CCW)
following the Human Rights Report Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots
published in 201221. CCW informal meetings of experts on lethal autonomous weapons took
place in Geneva in April 2015 and in May 2014.22 These meetings have included
presentations from technical and legal experts but have not yet formed any clear conclusions
as to the way forward.
There is still a great deal of uncertainty as to what is scientifically possible when it comes to
automation. Schmitt, in discussing autonomous weapons, notes that states are not likely to act
  
17 ICRC, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Autonomous weapons: States must address major humanitarian, ethical
challenges (2 Feb 2013) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/q-a-a-autonmous-weapons.htm>.
18 ICRC, Expert Meeting: Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects
(November 2014), 7 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-
28-march-2014#.VOFBQxscS70>..
19 ICRC, ‘Autonomous weapons: ICRC addresses meeting of experts’ (Statement, 13 May 2014)
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2014/05-13-autonomous-weapons-statement.htm>.
20 Report of the special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN Human Rights
Council, 23rd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/23/47 (9 April 2013) 21.
21 Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots (2012)
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity>; See United Nations Office at Geneva, Background
– Lethal Autonomous Weapons
<http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocu
ment>.  
22 United Nations Office at Geneva, LAWS 2014 Meeting of Experts,
<http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6CE049BE22EC75A2C1257C8D00513E26?OpenDocu
ment>.
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on any regulation of them ‘until both their potential for unintended human consequence and
their combat potential are better understood’.23
2.1.2 Unmanned aerial vehicles
One type of weapon that has attracted specific attention is that of remotely piloted aircraft,
also known as unmanned aerial vehicles or drones, both in the context of their use in armed
conflict as well as their use in domestic law enforcement. Again, while not the subject of
their own specific legal framework it is clear that the principles of IHL apply to drones and
that their application must be on a  case by case basis. On 28 March 2014, the UN Human
Rights Council adopted resolution 25/22 ‘Ensuring use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed
drones in counterterrorism and military operations in accordance with international law,
including international human rights and humanitarian law’.24 This resolution specifically
mentions the need for the use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones to comply with
IHL obligations of precaution, distinction and proportionality.25
Earlier, on 13 September 2013, UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns delivered a report to
the General Assembly focused on the use of lethal force through armed drones.26 On 18
September 2013, UN Special Rapporteur  on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, released an interim
report on his study of drone strikes and targeted killings27 to be debated by the General
Assembly along with the Heyns report. Emmerson released the final version of his report by
way of devoting a part of his third annual report to the Human Rights Council to the issue of
  
23 Michael Schmitt, Essays on law and war in the fault lines (TM Asser Press, 2012).
24 Adopted by a vote (27 in favour, 6 against, 14 abstentions). Ensuring use of remotely piloted aircraft or
armed drones in counterterrorism and military operations in accordance with international law, including
international human rights and humanitarian law, UN Human Rights Council, 55th mtg, (28 March 2014).
Australia does not hold a seat on the UN Human Rights Council and has never done so, although is currently
bidding for election in 2017. See Matthew Knott and Sarah Whyte, ‘Australia press for Human Rights Council
seat despite UN criticism’ The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 12 October 2014
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australia-presses-for-human-rights-council-seat-
despite-un-criticism-20141011-114rmo.html>.
25 Ensuring use of remotely piloted aircraft or armed drones in counterterrorism and military operations in
accordance with international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law, UN Human
Rights Council, 25th sess, Agenda Item 3, A/HRC/25/L.32 (24 March 2014), 2.
26 Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, UNGA, 68th ses, Agenda Item 69 (b), UN Doc A/68/382 (13 September 2013).
27 Ben Emmerson, Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UNGA, 68th sess, Agenda
Item 69(b), UN Doc A/68/389 (18 September 2013).
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‘Civilian impact of remotely piloted aircraft’.28 Emerson’s report identified a large number of
unanswered legal questions29 that States would need to consider if a treaty framework was to
be considered.
2.1.3 Cyber warfare
Russia was an early advocate of greater regulation of cyberspace, raising the issue with the
UN General Assembly First Committee in 1998.30 However, legal issues concerning
cyberspace issues are much broader than legal issues concerning cyber warfare and indeed
most of the discussion around cyber effects to date concerns cyber security not in the context
of an armed conflict. While some states accept the applicability of IHL to cyber warfare, this
is not a view articulated by all states.31 Cyber warfare is not currently addressed by any treaty
provisions. Further, there is little by way of state cyber practice or opinio juris from which to
establish provisions of customary international law given how new this method of warfare
is.32  
The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn
Manual)33 was put together by an International Group of Experts at the invitation of the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. It is the primary source of
discussion currently before the international community regarding the application of IHL to
cyber warfare. Australian Army member Colonel Penny Cumming, was one of nine legal
experts in the International Group of Experts34 and Royal Australian Air Force member
Group Captain Ian Henderson, was a peer reviewer in the process.35
  
28 Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN Human Rights Council, 25th sess, Agenda item 3
A/HRC/25/59 (11 March 2014).  
29 Ibid 18-19.
30 Cordula Droege, ‘Get off my cloud: cyber warfare, international humanitarian law, and the protection of
civilians’ (2012) 94 (886) International Review of the Red Cross 53, 535.  UNODA, Developments in the field
of information and telecommunications in the context of international security,
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/>.  
31 Droege, above note 30, 536-7.
32 M Schmitt (ed) ‘Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare’ (Cambridge
University Press, 2013) 5 (hereinafter Tallinn Manual).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid xi.
35 Ibid xii.
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The Tallinn Manual deals with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues and seeks to identify
‘the law currently governing cyber conflicts’.36  It asserts that the general principles of
international law are applicable to cyberspace37 and specifically that the ‘cyber operations
executed in the context of an armed conflict are subject to the law of armed conflict’.38 While
it provides helpful guidance it remains the opinion of a group of experts rather than
constituting a binding legal framework.
2.1.4 Nanotechnology
In technical terms nanotechnology is ‘the manipulation of matter on the atomic and molecular
level in the size range of 1-100nm (1nm = 10 -9 m) in one or more external dimensions’.39 It
is essentially about using science to make weapons and other types of military equipment
more fit for purpose be that stronger, lighter, more accurate or more heat resistant.40
Nanotechnology for military application is not specifically regulated by its own treaty at this
stage (and it being so is seen as unlikely41) however, many of the weapons that
nanotechnology may improve are already regulated by the various weapons law treaties.42 In
particular the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC)43 and the
CWC have potential application to many types of nanotechnology.44  
  
36 Ibid 5.
37 Ibid 13.
38 Rule 20, Ibid 75.
39 Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Nanotechnology and the Law of armed Conflict’ in Hitoshi Nasu and Robert McLauglin (eds),
above note 1, 143, 144.
40 See further Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Nanotechonology and challenges to international humanitarian law: a preliminary
legal assessment’ (2012) 94 (886) International Review of the Red Cross 653, 656-657.  
41 Ibid 656-659 citing Jim Whitman, ‘The arms control challenges of nanotechnology’ (2011) 32(1)
Contemporary Security Policy 99-115.  See also, Hitoshi Nasu and Thomas Faunce, ‘Nanotechnology and the
International Law of Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano-Weaponry: Towards International
Regulation of Nano-Weapons’ (2010) 20(1) Journal of Law, Information and Science, 23.
42 See further, Evan J. Wallach, ‘A Tiny Problem with Huge Implications - Nanotech Agents as Enablers or
Substitutes for Banned Chemical Weapons: Is a New Treaty Needed?’, (2009) 33 Fordham International Law
Journal, 858.
43 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, better known as the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC), opened for signature on 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975).
44 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on their Destruction, opened for signature on 13 January 1993, 32 ILM 800 (entered into force 29 April
1997).
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Nanotechnology has not yet been the subject of any particular international discussions by
States45 in the same way as drones, cyber warfare and autonomous weapons have. Nasu and
Faunce note this is a concern because it is leading to the developments being used in an
experimental manner and without appropriate scrutiny and creating ‘an urgent need for
regulating nanotechnolgy’.46  They further note that the scientific uncertainty and military
sensitivity make it very unlikely that States would consider a treaty dealing specifically with
nano-weapons.47
2.1.5 Non-lethal weapons
Non-lethal weapons are those weapons which are designed to incapacitate rather than to kill.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defines non-lethal weapons as those
‘weapons which are explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel,
with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimum
undesired damage or impact on the environment’.48 Some non-lethal weapons technologies
are dealt with by existing IHL treaties and other legal frameworks. Some representative
prohibitions include the BWC and CWC. The latter provides for the prohibition on any
chemical which, through its chemical action on life processes, can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The protocols to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects49 also deal with a
number of potential non-lethal weapons technologies such as non-detectable fragments,
mines and booby-traps, and blinding laser weapons.
However, ‘[n]on-lethal is a relative term. All weapons… create some primary or secondary
risk of death or permanent injury.’50 Concerns about the use of non-lethal weapons in military
operations as opposed to civilian policing operations have been expressed.51
  
45 Wallach, above note 42, 952-5 notes some of the academic discussion on this point.
46 Nasu and Faunce, above note 41, [6].
47 Ibid.
48 NATO Policy on Non-lethal Weapons, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p991013e.htm>.
49 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III), opened for
signature on 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 7 (entered into force 2 December 1983).
50 Neil Davison, Non-lethal weapons (Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 1.
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2.2 Article 36 criteria
As we have already seen, the principle of distinction between military and civilian objects is
fundamental to IHL.52 A weapon which has inherently indiscriminate effects, as opposed to
one that can be used in an indiscriminate way, is unlawful per se. The distinction principle
forms a part of customary IHL as a norm applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.53 All new weapons technologies must have their compatibility
with this principle assessed.
Further, Article 35 (2) of Additional Protocol 1 provides that it is prohibited to employ
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering. This provision is applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflict.54 Weapons which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment are prohibited by
Article 35(3) AP 1.55  
2.2.1 Autonomous weapons
There are a number of challenges presented by autonomous weapons to the principles of IHL
but particularly to the principle of distinction. There may be many circumstances where they
can distinguish between targets56 and indeed it has been argued that they may make this
determination in a superior fashion to humans.57  However, by their very nature, they
effectively involve the programming of computers to make the determination as to whether
an intended target is military or civilian. Whether it will be possible to program computers
    
51 Stephen Coleman, ‘Discrimination and non-lethal weapons: issues for the future military’, in David Lovell
(ed.), Protecting Civilians during Violent Conflict (Ashgate, 2012). See also, Eve Massingham, ‘Conflict
without casualties…a note of caution: non-lethal weapons and international humanitarian law (2012) 94 (886)
International Review of the Red Cross, 673.
52 AP I art 48.
53 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 8, rule 1.
54 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 8, rule 70.
55 AP I art 35.
56 For a good account of what is currently possible with this technology see Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson,
‘New capabilities in warfare: an overview of contemporary technological developments and the associated legal
and engineering issues in Article 36 weapons reviews’ (2012) 94 (886) International Review of the Red Cross
483, 488-499.  See also Hin-Yan Liu, ‘Catergorization and legality of autonomous and remote weapons
systems’ 2012) 94 (886) International Review of the Red Cross, 627. Note also the caution against the
dehumanization of warfare argued in Noel E Sharkey, ‘The evitability of autonomous robot warfare’ (2012) 94
(886) International Review of the Red Cross, 787.
57 ICRC, Interview with Chris Jenks, above note 12. Contra Sharkey, above note 56, 795.
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appropriately to make these determinations in accordance with IHL is still somewhat unclear.
Further, there are conflicting views about whether this could and should58 ever be lawful in
the case of fully autonomous weapons or ‘killer robots’.59  A further question is that of who is
responsible for the war crime committed if the computer gets it wrong? These questions
remain the subject of intense debate.60
There is nothing about autonomous weapons that would inherently make these weapons have
any greater impacts on suffering or on the environment than that expected of the munition
which they are deploying. As such the issue with autonomous weapons primarily relates to
the rules against indiscriminate attacks and their ability to comply with those rules and on
subsequent analysis their ability to comply with the rules of targeting, including the
proportionality rule.61  
2.2.2 Unmanned aerial vehicles
Unmanned aerial vehicles have been noted by both the UN Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and by the ICRC as not being inherently
unlawful.62 Because these unmanned aerial vehicles are remotely operated, while they
contain a level of autonomy, they are distinct from autonomous weapons because the
decision making regarding targeting is retained by the human operator. As such, it is the
human who is applying the principle of distinction (and the principle of proportionality) in
the targeting decisions. The fact that the operators of unmanned aerial vehicles are so far
removed from the battlefield means that questions have arisen in the IHL community over the
attribution of responsibility. The fact that the operator of the unmanned aerial vehicle is so far
  
58 This being an ethical question rather than a legal one. See further Sharkey, above note 56. ICRC, Interview
with Chris Jenks, above note 12 notes the legal questions are ‘relatively straight forward. The ethical and moral
issues…are far broader.’
59 Sharkey above note 56; Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UNGA, 68th ses, Agenda Item 69 (b), UN Doc A/68/382 (13
September 2013), [13].
60 See, eg. Thurnher, above note 16, 213; Sharkey, above note 56. Liu, above note 56, 641-3; ICRC, Interview
with Chris Jenks, above note 12.  
61 See, eg, Thurnher, above note 16, 225-6, 221-222; Stuart Casey-Maslen, ‘Pandora’s box? Drone strikes under
jus ad bellum, jus in bellow, and international human rights law’ (2012) 94 (886) International Review of the
Red Cross 597, 612-3.
62 Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, UNGA, 68th ses, Agenda Item 69 (b), UN Doc A/68/382 (13 September 2013); ICRC, Ensuring the
use of drones in accordance with international law : Statement to the Human Rights Council, 27th sess, (22
September 2014).
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removed from the battlefield has been understood, by many states and organisations, as not
effecting the determination of criminal liability for any breaches of IHL.63
Concerns have been raised about the potential psychological impacts of unmanned aerial
vehicles being constantly in the vicinity of civilian populations.64
2.2.3 Cyber attacks
The application of IHL principles to cyber space is particularly challenging because cyber
technology is premised on two concepts directly contradictory to the premise of IHL itself.
First, in cyber space one is often intended to have anonymity, while in armed conflict one is
required to show one’s hand. The identification of the attacker may be challenging. Second,
in cyber space there will not necessarily be easily identifiable physical effects. In armed
conflict traditional attacks cause highly visible physical destruction.65  
Significant questions also include the definition of a cyber attack, and whether IHL applies to
the situation in so far as it concerns the question of the existence of an armed conflict or
not.66
The Tallinn Manual rules note the clear application of the intransgressible principle of
distinction67 . The Tallinn Manual rule 42 concludes that it would only be in ‘rare cases’ that
cyber means and methods of warfare would be in violation of the rule against unnecessary
suffering and superfluous injury.68 The Tallinn Manual also notes the application of the rule
regarding the protection of the natural environment.69
The dual use nature of cyberspace and the potential for both military and civilian impacts
from a cyber attack is perhaps the area of most concern in the discussions.  Cyber warfare has
significant potential to have far reaching consequences should an attack hit vital
  
63 ICRC, Interview with Peter Maurer: The use of armed drones must comply with laws (10 May 2013) <
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm>.
64 Ibid.
65 Droege, above note 30, 541.
66 The Tallinn Manual rule 30 defines a cyber attack as ‘a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that
is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction of objects’ during either an
international or non-international armed conflict. Tallinn Manual, above note 32, 106.
67 Rule 31, Ibid 110-112. An example of a breach is given as emailing an enemy population urging capitulation
(at 112).
68 Ibid 144.
69 Rule 83, Ibid 231.
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infrastructure, including that containing dangerous forces.70 Droege notes a proposal to
expand the definition list, found in Article 56 of AP I, of works and installations containing
dangerous forces to include cyber infrastructure, such as servers upon which civilians rely.71
2.2.4 Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology is in its early days in terms of development and application for military use.
Many of these efforts are directed at force protection. However, weapons enhancement is also
a part of this research and while the enhancement of weapons may be valuable in increasing
their ability to discriminate between combatants and civilians and to render enemy
combatants inactive, enhanced weapons may also have the result of causing superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering. Nanotechnology also has potential to impact on the
environment through the manipulation of nano particles.72 Nasu notes that the health and
environmental effects of nanotechnology remain the subject of much scientific uncertainty.73
Nasu also argues that nanotechnology raises a few questions about the underlying principles
of IHL including the prohibition which dates back to the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration on
not using particles less than 400 grammes and on the prohibition against using gases because
nano-explosives may reduce suffering and collateral damage when compared with larger
more conventional weapons.74
2.2.5 Non-lethal weapons
Non-lethal weapons is a broad category of weapons and as such it is difficult to apply Article
36 criteria to them as a whole. However, a significant concern with non-lethal weapons is
their ability to comply with the principle of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.75
The issues with non-lethal weapons is that when they do not work as intended, or when the
‘victim’ has a particular tendency that means they are particularly susceptible to the effects of
the weapon they may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
  
70 Article 56 of AP I provides special protection for ‘works and installations containing dangerous’, namely
‘dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations’.
71 Droege, above note 30, 577.
72 Nasu and Faunce, above note 41, [6].
73 Nasu, International Review of the Red Cross, above note 40, 663.
74 Ibid 662-3. Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Nanotechnology and the Law of Armed Conflict’ in Hitoshi Nasu and Robert
McLauglin (eds), above note 1, 150-151.
75 See Massingham, above note 51, 676-677.
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Non-lethal weapons pose a raft of legal, ethical and practical queries. ‘Non-lethal is a relative
term. All weapons … create some primary or secondary risk of death or permanent injury.’76
As with any weapon system there is the potential for it to be abused.77
2.2.6 Conclusion on the application of international humanitarian law principles to new
weapons technologies
A significant issue with these technologies is the unpredictability of their effects at this stage.
Questions arise over how much control humans will retain over the decision making
conducted by weapons with increasing levels of autonomy.  Questions arise over the nature
of an attack - be it in relation to cyber warfare or nano-technology. Questions arise over
perceptions of unnecessary suffering from nanotechnology and non-lethal weaponry.
The development of new weapons technologies may pose some challenges in terms of the
application of the principles of IHL. What is imperative is that these principles continue to be
applied to new weapons technologies and not compromised just because the technology may
not fit neatly into the conceptions States, militaries and international humanitarian lawyers
have about rules. The rules were designed to be adaptable to a range of technological
development in weaponry and have application to all of those technologies discussed in this
chapter. In order to respect and ensure respect for IHL it is imperative that Article 36
weapons review processes are applied to these weapons and that States ensure that IHL
underpins their thinking about these weapons.
3. Australian perspectives on new weapons technologies
The ‘Implications of Technology Development for the ADF’ is one aspect of the strategic
discussion in the current Australian Defence White Paper.78 The White Paper identifies ‘the
fields of biological sciences, materials, nanotechnology, computing and sensing, and
simulation’ as being likely to have ‘[s]ignificant technological advances with defence
  
76 Davison, above note 50, 1.
77 See further Massingham, above note 51, 673.
78 Australian Government DOD, Defence White Paper 2013 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), 19. (‘Defence
White Paper 2013’).
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applications’.79 In particular it identifies for further discussion and development ‘unmanned
air, maritime and land platforms’ and cyber applications.80  
Australia has noted the ability of existing legal frameworks to address new weapons
technologies in international fora. For example, in the Australian statement to the 2013
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meeting of States Party, Australia notes ‘the
CCW needs to continue to demonstrate its relevance as a key instrument of IHL that can
remain responsive to advancements in weapons technology’.81 Further, in negotiation the
Arms Trade Treaty (dealt with in chapter six) Australia took the view that ‘[c]are must be
taken to ensure that emerging technologies can be covered as far as possible without
requiring constant amendment of the treaty text’.82
The Australian Article 36 review process (as discussed in chapter three) would apply to new-
weapons technologies in the same way it applies to lethal weapons. Given the sensitive nature
of disclosures of information relating to new-weapons technologies it is highly unlikely that
the DOD would release Article 36 reviews for new weapons technologies, and there is no
requirement to do so.83 To date, Australia has addressed the specific new weapons
technologies in the following ways.
3.1 Autonomous weapons
Australia has not as yet released any specific policy on its approach to autonomous
weapons.84 The 2013 Defence White Paper noted:
  
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid 19-21.
81 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Meeting of High Contracting Parties General Exchange of
Views (Statement by Mr Ian McConville, Chargé, Australian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in
Geneva, 14 November 2013) .
82 Australian Government Pledge, Follow-up to the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent
<https://www.icrc.org/applic/P128e.nsf/va_IBA/10C6CE85F57FA22BC125739A0035EE46?openDocument&s
ection=>.
83 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva, 1987), 424.  
84 Some thought has also been given to autonomous weapons development in specific jurisdictions. The US and
UK both have national policies on autonomous weapons systems that are publically available. ICRC, Expert
Meeting: Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects (November 2014), 7
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-
2014#.VOFBQxscS70>; Sean Welsh, ‘Machines with guns: debating the future of autonomous weapons
systems’ The Conversation (online) (13 April 2015) <https://theconversation.com/machines-with-guns-
debating-the-future-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-39795>.
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[s]emi-autonomous unmanned systems able to engage in both self-protection and
offensive action are under development internationally. Although there are significant
challenges in making these systems viable and operationally useful, it is possible that
they will be deployed by defence forces in the mid-2020s. Domestic and international
legal and policy considerations will be important factors associated with their
employment. We will need to understand the increasing opportunities and risks
arising from the use of greater autonomy in intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance and electronic attack, including in the early stages of strike
operations.85
Australia attended the 2014 CCW Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems (LAWS) meeting and made a statement for the general debate on 13 May
2014.86  Australia noted its full support for Article 36 reviews for any new weapons, means
or method of warfare and its particular interest in a definition of lethal autonomous weapons
identifying its ‘key distinguishing aspects’.
Australia stated its position as:
[c]onsistent with Australia’s approach to other emerging technologies, like in the
cyber context, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, if they are to be used, should
only be used in accordance with existing international law. How international law,
including the use of force, international humanitarian law and international human
rights law, applies to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems will need to be addressed
as the technology continues to develop.87
Australia noted its support for ‘further informal exploratory discussion’ on autonomous
weapons within the framework of the CCW.88 Australia did not make any official statements
or present any papers at the 2015 Meeting of Experts on LAWS.89
3.2 Unmanned aerial vehicles
Australia has been particularly focused on unmanned platforms in recent times. With regard
to unmanned air, maritime and land platforms, the 2013 Defence White Paper notes:
  
85 Defence White Paper 2013, [2.81].
86 United Nations Office at Geneva, CCW Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
(LAWS) Australian Statement for the General Debate (13 May 2014)
<http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/026EC9EABF74393BC1257CE4004326A4/$file/Aust
ralia_MX_LAWS_GeneralDebate_2014.pdf>.
87 Ibid.
88 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Meeting of High Contracting Parties General Exchange of
Views (Statement by Australia, 13 November 2014).  
89 United Nations Office at Geneva, 2015 Meeting of Experts on LAWS,
<http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/6ce049be22ec75a2c1257c8d00513e26?OpenDocu
ment&ExpandSection=2%2C1#_Section2>.  
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[t]he importance of unmanned air, maritime and land platforms to future ADF
operations and the future force needs further investigation. These platforms,
particularly unmanned aircraft, are proliferating not only among national defence
forces around the world, but also civil organisations and non-state actors. With stealth
and the ability to loiter for extended periods, these systems have advantages for
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, including in support of Australia’s
border security needs. Armed unmanned systems will be available in greater variety
and sophistication in years to come.90
In 2014 the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade referred to the
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee for inquiry and report the topic of
the potential use by the ADF of unmanned air, maritime and island platforms.91 Submissions
were received from 25 individuals and organisations and public hearings were held in  April
and May 2015 in Canberra.92  The Committee’s report was released in June 2015 and defined
unmanned platforms as ‘all complex remotely operated devices and their associated
communication and control systems’.93 The Committee’s report recommends the use by
Australia of unmanned platforms as ‘well suited to Australia’s defence and strategic
circumstances’94 and notes:
[t]he introduction of armed unmanned platforms will need to address the law of
armed conflict and international humanitarian law in the context of managing
fundamental inputs to capability (such as training and doctrine).95
The Australia Defence Force has put on record that military personnel, not civilians, would
be responsible for operating the unmanned platforms.96  
3.3 Cyber warfare
The 2000 Defence White Paper97 saw Australia first note the ‘new security challenge of
cyber-attacks’.98 Then Prime Minister John Howard established the E-Security Initiative in
  
90 Defence White Paper 2013, [2.80].
91 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, (28 October 2014)
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Def
ence_Unmanned_Platform>.
92Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Parliament of Australia, The potential use of
unmanned air, maritime and land platforms by the Australian Defence Force (25 June 2015), 1.  
93 Ibid 5.  
94 Ibid 63.
95 Ibid 66.
96 Evidence to Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 14
April 2015, 49 (Air Vice Marshal Davies).
97 Australian Government DOD, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Commonwealth of Australia,
2000).
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2001 which brought together the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO),
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD, now known as the Australian Signals Directorate—ASD),
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) to work
together to combat cyber threats.99 Howard’s successor, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
introduced a review of Australia’s e-security100 and the 2009 Defence White Paper, issued by
the Rudd Government, Minister’s Preface noted that ‘[c]yber warfare has emerged as a
serious threat to critical infrastructure’.101 The 2009 Defence White Paper specifically noted a
need for the ADF of 2030 ‘to be a more potent force in certain areas …[including] cyber
warfare’.102 The Paper introduced ‘a major enhancement of Defence’s cyber warfare
capability’103 and the establishment of a Cyber Security Operations Centre.104 In 2009 a
Cyber Security Strategy was also released.105
Concerns about cyber attacks have only continued to grow.106 Australia notes that ‘a range of
existing international legal principles may be applicable to the use of cyberspace, including
the principles of sovereign equality of states and the prohibition on the use of force and acts
of aggression, as well as IHL.107  The 2013 Defence White Paper 2013 notes ‘[c]yber security
continues to be a serious and pressing national security challenge.’108  Further, the 2013
Defence White Paper notes:
Australia works within the framework of its traditional defence and intelligence and
broader national security relationships to counter cyber threats. More broadly,
    
98 Nicole Brangwin, Cyber Security, (Commonwealth of Australia)  
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100 See further Attorney General (Cth), ‘Government bolsters e-security by engaging private sector’ (Joint Media
Release, 19 December 2008).
101 Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Commonwealth of
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102 Ibid 13.
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Security…it’s your move,  < http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/csoc.htm> and Defence White Paper 2013, 21.
105 Australian Government, Cyber Security Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009).
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May 2013.
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Australia believes that the existing framework of international law, including the UN
Charter and international humanitarian law, applies to cyberspace. Australia is
participating in international efforts to achieve a common understanding of these
laws.109
Commentators have more recently noted that although to date official public information
about Australia’s approach to cyber warfare has been framed in the sense of defending
Australia’s interests against cyber attack, Australia is also investing in the development of
offensive capabilities in the cyber space.110 Dorling notes that the Australian Defence
Doctrine Publication 3.13 – Information Activities111 refers to ‘new offensive capabilities,
which were not discussed in the Australian government’s 2013 Defence white paper, [which]
have been developed by the top secret Australian Signals Directorate with support from the
Defence Science and Technology Organisation’.112
3.4 Nanotechnology
Apart from the 2013 White Paper identifying nanotechnology as being likely to have
‘[s]ignificant technological advances with defence applications’113, Australia has not put
anything on the record with regard to its approach to nanotechnology.
3.5 Non-lethal weapons
Adaptive Campaigning 09 – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept,114 a document released
by then Chief of Army David Morrison, makes clear that Army’s role is one of an executor of
lethal force115, and one which is being challenged by the ‘trends of the diffusion of
lethality…’.116 However, non-lethal capacity is also discussed. The document defines ‘Non-
Lethal Capabilities’ according to the NATO definition. Specifically, a ‘weapon that is
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explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate or repel persons or to disable
equipment, while minimising fatalities, permanent injury and damage to property and the
environment (NATO)’.117 The document identifies the possibility of a:  
[l]and Force needing to conduct sustained close combat against a lethal enemy
‘among the people’. Consequently, Land Forces deployed on any operation will need
to have access to an appropriate array of lethal and non-lethal capabilities, be
protected, equipped and structured to operate and survive in potentially lethal
environments, while concurrently maintaining the potential to perform diverse
humanitarian, counterinsurgency and peace support tasks.118
4. Why Australia should consider Common Article 1 as it continues to play a role in
these discussions around new weapons technologies
In chapter two of this thesis, it was argued that all states have an obligation pursuant to
Common Article 1 to respect and ensure respect for IHL. It was argued in chapter three that
Australia, as a middle power with a great deal of credibility in the weapons law space
historically, must take on this obligation to the best of its ability.  Throughout this thesis it
has been noted that Australia has either ignored (ATT) or sought to undermine (cluster
munitions and nuclear weapons) its obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL in its
approach to weapons law.
Australia has played a significant role in a number of historical weapons law processes and
more recently as President of the ATT conference. Australia has been a strong supporter of
Article 36 (as discussed in chapter three) and has been involved in projects addressing new
weapons technologies like the Tallinn Manual.  As the discussions around new weapons
technologies develop, this thesis urges Australia to take up the challenge of being mindful of
the Common Article 1 obligation.  This is particularly so because of the challenges that some
of these new weapons technologies pose to traditional understandings of warfare. By being a
strong advocate for the rule against indiscriminate effects, the rule against superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering and the rule against causing widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment, Australia can continue to play this leadership rule in this
space.
  
117 Ibid xiii.
118 Ibid 6.
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5. Conclusion
New weapons technologies pose some questions which have yet to be decided by the
international community as to how their use can ensure compliance with the rules of IHL. It
may be that the development of some of these technologies results in specific treaties or
agreements that clearly articulate the application of IHL principles to their use. In the
meantime, the study of each category of weapons considered here, demonstrates the value
and significance of Article 36 of AP I. This analysis highlights how important compliance
with this provision is to ensuring that states comply with their obligations under IHL.
Australia has publicly noted the applicability of existing IHL principles to new weapons
technology in the form of cyber warfare and lethal autonomous weapons systems. Australia
has also shown itself to have a relatively robust approach to Article 36. As such, it is through
promoting the ability of existing IHL principles to apply to new weapons technology and
promoting Article 36 that Australia can demonstrate compliance with its Common Article 1
obligations to respect and ensure respect for IHL in the weapons law field going forward.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
In this chapter the analysis in chapters two to seven is drawn on to demonstrate the nature of
the obligation to respect and ensure respect pursuant to Common Article 1 and how the
approach Australia has taken to the regulation of weapons by international law either ignores
or undermines the scope of this obligation. The conclusion details the answers which have
been determined to the research questions. Recommendations for further work as well as
limitations of the research are also outlined.  The thesis proposes that Australia give greater
consideration to Common Article 1 when approaching weapons law, so as not to breach its
obligation under Common Article 1 and to remain a nation with credibility and influence in
relation to IHL.
1. The research questions of the thesis
The first research question involved a review of the case law and literature on the meaning of
the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL pursuant to Common Article 1. While
limited in number, academic contributions, such as those by Kalshoven and Focarrelli, as
well as the ICRC, through the Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and various articles
by ICRC staff, have given consideration to Common Article 1. The literature reflects a solid
contribution by the ICRC to reading Common Article 1 as a clear legal obligation. The
practice of States and the jurisprudence also show that a legal obligation arises from
Common Article 1.
The second research question involved the drawing of a conclusion regarding the meaning of
the nature and value of the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL pursuant to
Common Article 1. The answer to this question was found in the evolutionary process that
Common Article 1 has undergone. The findings demonstrate that despite some uncertainty
surrounding the meaning of Common Article 1 over the years, today it is understood as
constituting a legal obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. As was noted in chapter
two, the obligation is not an obligation for states to take any set measures or specific steps in
relation to violations of the Geneva Conventions by other states or non-state actors, but rather
to act in good faith and to take those measures required by due diligence and which are
within their capacity and influence.
197
The third and fourth research questions involved a consideration of the approach taken by
Australian in recent history to weapons law negotiations. This also included determining the
level of deference given by Australia to the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL
in the weapons law context. The answer is that Australia does not appear to have given
consideration to Common Article 1 in its approach to any of the weapons law negotiations
discussed herein.
By way of brief summary it was seen that:
• Australia has not considered Common Article 1 obligations in its approach to the
Cluster Munitions Convention and, although Australia itself does not see the
military utility in cluster munitions (having made a decision not to stock them even
prior to global action to prohibit them), it puts great stock in ensuring that its allies,
particularly the United States, can still deploy them.  Throughout the process of
negotiating the CCM, Australia went to considerable efforts to assist another
nation, specifically the United States, to not be hampered by the introduction of
this legal framework. In taking this approach, Australia cannot be said to have
lived up to its obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Whilst cluster munitions may
not be inherently unlawful weapons, there are very narrow circumstances in which
targeting law under the Geneva Conventions would allow their use and in any
event the international community has agreed that their humanitarian
consequences outweigh their military utility and prohibited them accordingly.
Australia has agreed to this prohibition on their use and is bound by the customary
obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL and as such, now should be doing
more to encourage States not party to the Convention to join up to it, and should
not be enabling the use of these weapons by other states as it is currently doing.
• Nuclear weapons are not in any way compatible with the Geneva Conventions and
thus an obligation based on Common Article 1 applies to Australia to take steps to
ensure respect for IHL by supporting banning nuclear weapons. In 2015, in the
light of the extensive evidence presented in Oslo, Nayarit and Mexico on all
aspects of health, environmental, climate, and emergency response capacity, and
in light of more up to date information on tactical nuclear weapons that was not
before the ICJ, it is no longer possible to maintain the argument that these
weapons could be lawful in any circumstances under IHL.  Australia is
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undermining efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and as such in breach
of its obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. Australia must reconsider
its position on nuclear weapons in light of this obligation and, if it does so, it is
well placed to use its capacity to influence others towards a position of respecting
IHL with respect to nuclear weapons.
• Australia has taken a leading role in the ATT treaty to date. Australia has
displayed and continues to display evidence of assisting other states in the lead up
to the treaty negotiation and in the implementation of the treaty including through
the commitment of funding to assist in the regional implementation of the ATT.
However, Australia does not appear to have turned its mind to the obligation in
Common Article 1 with regards to the ATT. Helping to implement the ATT is an
excellent example of an action by Australia in support of the obligation to not only
respect but also to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions, even if not done in
these terms. Australia also has significant capacity to assist other states to ensure
respect for IHL. The Arms Trade Treaty should be a vehicle for Australia doing
so.
• Australia has publicly noted the applicability of existing IHL principles to new
weapons technology in the form of cyber warfare and lethal autonomous weapons
systems. Australia has also shown itself to have a relatively robust approach to
Article 36 of AP I weapons reviews. As such, it is through promoting the ability of
existing IHL principles to apply to new weapons technology and promoting
Article 36 that Australia can demonstrate compliance with its Common Article 1
obligations to respect and ensure respect for IHL in the weapons law space going
forward. New weapons technologies pose some questions which have yet to be
decided by the international community as to how their use can ensure compliance
with the rules of IHL. The study of each category of weapons considered here
demonstrates the value and significance of Article 36. By being a strong advocate
for the rule against indiscriminate effects, the rule against superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering and the rule against causing widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment, Australia can continue to play this
leadership role in this space.
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The final research question was what conclusions can be reached from this evaluation
regarding the approach of Australia to compliance with the obligation to respect and ensure
respect pursuant to Common Article 1? Throughout this thesis it has been noted that
Australia has either ignored or sought to undermine its obligation to respect and ensure
respect for IHL in its approach to weapons law. Although the approach taken by Australia
has sometimes been one that is reflective of good practice (for example under the ATT),  the
lack of consistency in Australia’s approach is problematic.
2. Significant findings from the work
The first implication of this body of work is the finding as to the growing use of Common
Article 1 as a reference point for states, courts, international organisations and the UN to seek
to improve humanitarian security outcomes. Nation States that engage in activities that are
consistent with the notion of respecting and ensuring respect for the Geneva Conventions
have an opportunity to prevent breaches of IHL.  There are a number of actions that States,
such as Australia, can, and indeed do, take to respect and ensure respect, by those within its
control and influence, for IHL.  
The second implication of this body of work is the finding that Australia does not use
Common Article 1 as a reference point for its approach to IHL.  The four case studies
presented in this thesis have provided evidence that suggests that Australia does not consider
its obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in its approach to
regulating the use of weapons in armed conflict. Australia, like many states, has a mixed
record when it comes to an analysis on implementing this obligation, and as has been noted,
it is difficult to reconcile some of the approaches taken by Australia which appear to
undermine IHL, with the rhetoric about concern for humanitarian consequences. This is
particularly notable in respect of the approach taken by Australia, outlined above, in respect
of cluster munitions and nuclear weapons, where deference to United States interests is
difficult to dispute.
The third implication of this body of work is the finding that approaching weapons law
through a prism of Common Article 1 can demonstrate a variety of actions that States can,
and indeed do, take to respect and ensure respect for IHL. By being party to all major
international weapons law treaties, conducting Article 36 weapons review processes and
placing emphasis on training for its military personnel in relation to weapons and targeting
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law, a State can cover the basic requirements of respect for IHL in relation to weapons law.
However, it is clear that much more can be done and, in the case of states with the capacity to
influence, much more must be done.  
The final implication of this body of work is the finding that Australia should promote
Common Article 1. While Australia does not appear to evaluate its approach to weapons law
in light of its Common Article 1 obligations, Australia has demonstrated that it takes certain
weapons law related obligations very seriously – both from the perspective of national-
interest and of being a good international citizen.  Australia, as a middle power with a great
deal of credibility in the weapons law space historically, must take on this obligation to the
best of its ability.  Adopting a Common Article 1 analysis system for all weapons law issues
will ensure Australia takes a consistent and principled approach going forward. It will also
ensure that Australia is contributing to the creation of an international norm of effective IHL
compliance.
This work builds on the developing recognition of Common Article 1 as a clear legal
obligation and proposes its application by Australia in the weapons law context. There is a
range of ways that a State may endeavor to bring States which are not respecting, or ensuring
that their armed forces respect the Geneva Conventions, back to an attitude of respect for
them. Similarly, there is no clear one way to implement international obligations in a
domestic context. There are a range of factors, including the nature of the national legal
system, that effect the process of national implementation. There are actions that can be
taken, or omitted to be taken, which mean that a state falls short of its implementation
obligations. However, as the processes for national implementation are rarely
comprehensively detailed or specified in international legal frameworks,1 an analysis of this
nature must be conducted on a case by case basis.
Actions which would constitute simple and effective support for Common Article 1 would
include continuing strong support for the ICRC strengthening compliance project.  Australia
could also potentially request to convene a meeting of States Party on Article 7 of AP I on the
topic of Common Article 1. With regards to weapons, Australia has done this in a number of
ways, albeit without reference to Common Article 1, including the provision of financial
  
1 T. Dunworth, R. Mathews and T. McCormack, 'National Implementation of the Biological Weapons
Convention' (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 93, 95, 115.
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resources to various countries to assist them in implementing weapons law treaties and in the
provision of personnel, such as in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
operation.  
The argument put in this thesis is that the Australian government should give greater
consideration to its obligations under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions.
Australia should specifically consider Common Article 1 when entering into any weapons
law treaty discussion or discharging any weapons law related obligation. Doing so would
have a highly positive effect on Australia’s approach to implementing international law
obligations, as Australia would be seen as a leader in this field. Australia would be able to
adopt a consistent and principled approach and would be making a valuable contribution to
creating an international norm around effective IHL compliance.
This thesis, in taking a case by case approach to the implementation into the Australian legal
system, can, from a practical perspective, be of some value to DFAT, the ADF and the
Commonwealth Attorney- General’s Department in demonstrating the significance and
potential value of considering Common Article 1 obligations.
3. Limitations of the research
This study is of course just one small contribution to the broad field of weapons law and the
even broader field of IHL. While it fills gaps in the literature regarding Common Article 1
and Australia’s approach to weapons law and to Common Article 1, it by no means answers
all of the potential questions regarding these topics.  The thesis has only had scope to deal
with four weapons law case studies. The reasons those particular case studies were chosen
were set out in the introduction. However, other weapons case studies may be of interest.  For
example, a more historical analysis of Australia’s approach to earlier weapons law treaties
could also be of some value and may be the subject of future work.
A significant practical limitation to the research is that much information regarding the
approach of the Australian government is simply not publicly available nor was it able to be
provided to the candidate, for national security reasons, when requests were made to the
DOD or the Attorney-General’s Department.  
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A further limitation is that, without scientific and technical expertise in relation to the
weapons technologies (in particular the new weapons technologies) the candidate is relying
on descriptions by others of the capabilities and functionality of these weapons.  
4. Recommendations for future work
This study has looked at the way in which one country has approached one aspect of a
seminal provision of IHL.  It would be worthwhile to take a broader approach and look at
questions such as how Australia has approached IHL dissemination in light of its Common
Article 1 obligations or to look in more detail at the question raised in chapter three regarding
how Australia has approached the investigation and prosecution of war crimes in light of
Common Article 1 obligations. Other topics with significant bearing on Common Article 1
include the provisions of IHL which deal with detainees – including both civilian detainees
and prisoners of war – and could involve a consideration of Australia’s handing over of
detainees to other forces within the International Security Assistance Force command
structure or to the Afghan National Army, Australian diplomatic efforts in relation to David
Hicks and Mamdouh Habib, and interoperability and Australian involvement with facilities
such as Abu Ghraib. It would also be interesting and significant to have an opportunity and
the scope to consider how other nations have approached Common Article 1, both in relation
to weapons law and more broadly.
5. Final observations
Unfortunately, given humanity’s proclivity for fighting, armed conflict remains a common
state of existence and short of its elimination, restrictions on its conduct for humanitarian
reasons remain the best solution. IHL is a legal framework that seeks to draw a delicate
balance between two vastly different concepts, military necessity and humanity. The idea of
this balance is not to prevent suffering in times of war. It is to limit that suffering to what is
necessary to achieve the military objective. The destruction of military assets and personnel
has been accepted as a legitimate end and the availability of weapons to achieve this end
must therefore also be accepted.
The weapons discussed here, those which have humanitarian security implications, are
prohibited and regulated for humanitarian reasons in a way that is compatible with military
necessity. Those weapons which are prohibited, or around which discussions about their
prohibition are ongoing, are weapons whose military utility has been shown to be limited and
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humanitarian arguments against their use clear.  Complying with the obligation to respect and
ensure respect for IHL does not prevent the achievement of those actions which are militarily
necessary.
As Dormann and Seralvo note:
Further State practice and academic research is still needed to elucidate the scope of
this international legal obligation. Yet, it is clear that greater acknowledgement of
Common Article 1 obligations, and the equivalent under customary international law,
can help improve respect for IHL. In a world ravaged by armed conflict, and with
non-compliance amongst the most critical contemporary challenges to IHL, the
importance of this duty should not be underestimated. Third States, thanks to their
(often) more neutral stance, are in a privileged position to ensure that IHL rules are
universally respected.2
Australia is not doing all it can to comply with the obligation to respect and ensure respect for
IHL. Indeed, it would appear that it is not even giving this seminal provision any
consideration. In taking that approach Australia has both undermined Common Article 1 in
its approach (cluster munitions and nuclear weapons prohibitions) and ignored Common
Article 1 in its approach (the ATT and new weapons technologies).  Australia needs to lift its
standards in its approach to and implementation of weapons law issues pertaining to armed
conflict. There is much more to be done before Australia can be said to have a consistent and
principled approach and, in doing so, be making a valuable contribution to the creation of an
international norm around effective IHL compliance.
  
2 Dormann and Serralvo, ‘The obligation to prevent violations of international humantiarin law’ on Intercross
blog (24 September 2015)
<http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/3ok4ejdgxggz8nwmj7yencivh46ij0#sthash.WeeAunmE.dpbs=>.
